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UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE ACT, 1983

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EDUCATION, ARTS AND HUMANITIES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 564

TO ESTABLISH THE UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

MARCH 16, 1983

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 1983

Page

Low, Ambassador Stephen, Director, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State 40

Laue, James H., vice chairman, National Academy of Peace Commission, and director, Center for Metropolitan Studies, and professor of sociology, University of Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.; William F. Lincoln, commissioner, National Academy of Peace Commission, and president, National Center Associates, Montpelier, Vt.; and Edward F. Welch, Jr., past president, Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 50

Picker, Harvey, dean, school of international and public affairs, Columbia University; Duncan L. Clarke, professor, school of international service, the American University; John Funari, dean, graduate school of public and international affairs, University of Pittsburgh; William Zartman, school of advanced international studies, Johns Hopkins University; and John R. Dellenback, commissioner, National Peace Academy Commission, and president, Christian College Coalition 106

STATEMENTS

Bell, Hon. Terrell H., Secretary, Department of Education, prepared statement 173

Byron, Rev. William J., S.J., president, Catholic University of America, prepared statement 176

Clarke, Duncan L., professor, school of international service, the American University, prepared statement 111

Cornuelle, Herbert C., chairman, trustees of the estate of James Campbell, prepared statement 28

Dellenback, John R., president, Christian College Coalition, prepared statement 152

Funari, John, dean, graduate school of public and international affairs, University of Pittsburgh, prepared statement 135

Glickman, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Kansas, prepared statement 170

Goodpaster, Andrew J., general, U.S. Army (retired), prepared statement 182

Hatfield, Hon. Mark O., a U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon, prepared statement 163

Jacob, Philip E., professor emeritus, University of Hawaii, prepared statement 32

Jepsen, Hon. Roger W., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa, prepared statement 168

Laue, James H., vice chairman, National Academy of Peace Commission, and director, Center for Metropolitan Studies, and professor of sociology, University of Missouri, St. Louis, Mo.; William F. Lincoln, commissioner, National Academy of Peace Commission, and president, National Center Associates, Montpelier, Vt.; and Edward F. Welch, Jr., past president, Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 50

Prepared statement 53

Lincoln, William F., commissioner, National Academy of Peace Commission, prepared statement 78

Page

Low, Ambassador Stephen, director, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State 40
Prepared statement 43
Matsunaga, Hon. Spark M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Hawaii, prepared statement 24
Moorer, Thomas H., admiral, U.S. Navy (retired), prepared statement 174
Myrdal, Gunnar, Dr., Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, prepared statement 27
Newsom, David D., Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, prepared statement .. 187
Picker, Harvey, dean, school of international and public affairs, Columbia University; Duncan L. Clarke, professor, school of international service, the American University; John Funari, dean, graduate school of public and international affairs, University of Pittsburgh; William Zartman, school of advanced international studies, Johns Hopkins University; and John R. Dellenback, commissioner, National Peace Academy Commission, and president, Christian College Coalition 106
United Nations Association, Pasadena, Calif. chapter, Mrs. Evelyn Pickarts, president, prepared statement 39
Zartman, I. William, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, prepared statement 145

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Articles, publications, etc.:
Washington Herald-Times, the, Tuesday, August 26, 1941, by U.S. Representative Jennings Randolph of West Virginia 103
Communications to:
Denton, Jeremiah, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama, from M. G. Bayne, Irvington, Va., March 8, 1983 17
Zablocki, Hon. Clement J., a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, from Eugene V. Rostow, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, June 21, 1982 14
Questions and answers:
Responses of I. William Zartman to questions asked by Senators Stafford, Randolph, and Denton 218
Responses of Dr. Harvey Picker, dean, school of international and public affairs, Columbia University, to questions asked by:
Senator Denton 228
Senator Stafford 224
Senator Randolph 204
Responses of Duncan L. Clarke, professor, school of international service, American University, to questions asked by:
Senator Stafford 234
Senator Randolph 212
Responses of Admiral Edward F. Welch, Jr., U.S. Navy (retired), to questions asked by:
Senator Stafford 237
Senator Denton 240
Responses of Dr. James Laue, vice chairman, National Academy of Peace Commission, to questions asked by:
Senator Stafford 243
Senator Denton 248
Responses of Ambassador Stephen Low, Director, Foreign Services Institute, Department of State, to questions asked by:
Senator Stafford 254
Senator Denton 256
Senator Randolph 264
Responses of John Funari, dean, graduate school of public and international affairs, University of Pittsburgh, to questions asked by:
Senator Denton 266
Senator Stafford 269
Senator Randolph 216
Responses of Hon. John R. Dellenback, commissioner, United States Academy of Peace Commission, to questions asked by Senator Denton 272
Responses of William F. Lincoln, commissioner, National Academy of Peace Commission, to questions asked by Senators Stafford and Denton. 274

UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE ACT, 1983

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, ARTS AND HUMANITIES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room SD-430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Robert T. Stafford (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Stafford, Denton, Randolph, and Matsunaga.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STAFFORD

Senator STAFFORD. The Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities will come to order. A vote will occur at 11, at which time the subcommittee will need to adjourn. In view of the time constraints, the chairman is going to start with an opening statement, and then we will have opening statements from other members of the committee who wish to make them.

As has been noted before, the notion of establishing a Federal institution devoted to promoting the maintenance of peace has been discussed since the early days of our Nation. While both George Washington and Benjamin Rush have often been cited for expressing the need for such an institution, most national legislative activity has occurred during the 20th century.

In 1945, my distinguished colleague, Senator Randolph, who, I might add, just recently celebrated his 50th anniversary of most distinguished legislative service to the United States, pioneered efforts to create a peace institution by introducing in the House of Representatives a bill to establish a Department of Peace.

Senator Randolph has been a tireless advocate of the idea of a national peace institution ever since. It is clear that much has changed since the days of Senator Randolph's early efforts, not the least of which is the extent and complexity of armed conflict throughout the world.

In 1945 the atomic bomb was a new and limited phenomenon. Today the umbrella of nuclear destruction hangs ominously over the heads of all of us. Our Nation faces the enormous task of containing dozens of conflicts in areas throughout the world. In nearly every conflict there is the risk of escalation, of superpower involvement, and ultimately of nuclear war.

If there was ever a time when we must commit ourselves to resolving conflicts peacefully, it is now. If there was ever a time when we must study how best to resolve conflicts peacefully, it is

now. A commission to study the establishment of a U.S. Peace Academy and the majority of witnesses testifying at last year's Peace Academy hearing came forward with a very clear message: the United States needs an institution to coordinate peace research activities, conflict resolution training, and information services to insure that we are adequately prepared and trained to pursue to the fullest extent possible peaceful solutions to conflicts.

Yet, as important as it is for us to commit ourselves to enhancing this Nation's conflict resolution capabilities, we must make very sure that the form of such a commitment works effectively to achieve our goal. We must constantly evaluate the nature and structure of an institution which would be devoted to the paramount goal of furthering world peace.

Today's hearings are a very important part of that continuing process of evaluation.

The subcommittee welcomes the recommendations of our witnesses regarding both the nature of our need for a National Peace Academy, as well as the form that such an academy should most appropriately take.

Now, the Chair would welcome the opening statements of members of this committee, and Senator Randolph, with pleasure, we invite you to make your statement.

Opening Statement of Senator Randolph

Senator Randolph. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and our colleague, Senator Denton.

Mr. Chairman, last year we reported legislation by a vote of 10 to 6 from this committee. What was that legislation? It is the subject of the hearing today. Last year's measure, S. 1889, let the record indicate, is identical to S. 564 which we are again considering today.

Last year, when Members of the Senate introduced S. 1889, we had, ladies and gentlemen, 52 cosponsors, a majority of the Senate of the United States. We gained 4 more signers for a total of 56 by the time that the bill was reported from this committee to the Senate.

Now, I say very factually, that some people sincerely believe and they have so stated that our obtaining of a majority of support for S. 1889 was somewhat of an election year fluke. They said it could not be duplicated again. I do not like to say "I told you so," but I am gratified to state for the record that we have done it again. We have introduced the identical bill with 53 Members of the Senate, a majority, as cosponsors.

Because the Senate did not have the time or opportunity to take up S. 1889 for passage during the 97th Congress, we are beginning again today in the 98th and adding today's testimony to the comprehensive hearing record completed last year.

We have not lost cosponsors; we have gained one additional cosponsor, Mr. Chairman. And so we have witnesses today to testify, and I only wish that I could stay to hear every word that they would speak. If they are not in total opposition to the idea of the Academy, then I am confident they will testify, in a constructive manner; they may make suggestions for changes, or modifications

to the bill, and perhaps they would then join us in support of S. 564.

Now, if they can do that, perhaps we can receive from them their recommendations for changes that certainly I would consider them very carefully, as would other members of the subcommittee and the committee.

I will oppose vigorously any attempts to chip away the basic structure of the Peace Academy bill in an effort to weaken it, turn it into a mere shell with no depth and serving no useful or any tangible purpose.

I welcome the witnesses today. I always listen to witnesses for and against legislation. I welcome the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, Steven Low, and Rear Adm. Edward F. Welch, Jr., former President of the Naval War College. I think some of you may not know that Adm. Edward Welch was, several years ago, a witness before the U.S. Study Commission on proposals for the establishment of a Peace Academy. Today, through his testimony, we may be able to lay to rest the concern that a Peace Academy will somehow duplicate or compete with the Naval War College, or with our other military academies.

We view the Peace Academy as a complement to our service institutions that will supplement what they do, rather than to supplant their contributions in the efforts not just to make war, but to also preserve peace.

Woodrow Wilson—I do not need to tell you who he was—he was a scholar, a statesman; he was our President, but these are his words: "It is plain that it is the duty of an institution of learning, set in the midst of a free population and amid signs of social change, not merely to implant a sense of duty, but to illuminate that duty by every lesson that can be drawn out of the past."

If Woodrow Wilson were alive today, I remember I was in Baltimore when he was nominated as the Democratic candidate for President in 1912. I sat on the knee of my father who was pledged as a delegate from West Virginia to vote for Woodrow Wilson. Others from the State delegation in West Virginia, Senator Denton, were for the Speaker of the House, Champ Clark. It was a divided delegation. And on issues, people are divided. We understand that.

I shall never forget the bunting and the bands; I could not tell you more than that. But I do know that in that issue, Woodrow Wilson would not accept the Democratic nomination for President if it depended on the votes of Tammany Hall under Boss Murphy.

He said that over and over again while the convention was in session. And so for what it is worth, here was a man who would not accept the nomination because if it was given to him by votes from that sector, he would not be the candidate of the Democratic Party.

What I am talking about in mentioning Wilson, is that there are some of us along the way who also have strong feelings about matters. And I have had a strong feeling since the middle 1940's about the necessity to do something in regard to establishing a peace arm of government.

Mr. Chairman, so as not to occupy more time—I am appreciative of your time and Senator Denton's—there are other words that I

would have spoken. I ask unanimous consent they be used as a part of my statement at this time.

Senator STAFFORD. Without objection, Senator, we will put them in the record as if read.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RANDOLPH—CONTINUING

Senator RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman, as we are getting a late start this morning, I will endeavor to keep my remarks brief and to the point, asking that my full statement be included in the record as though read.

As most of those present here today are aware, I have been in public service for 50 years—having celebrated that 50th anniversary on March 9 of this year. Nearly 40 of those years have been spent as a Member of Congress—first in the House from 1933 to 1946, and then as a Member of the Senate beginning in 1958 to the present time.

Since 1945, I have been initiating legislation to create an official arm of the Federal Government committed to peacemaking. That is not to say that this country has not been committed always to keeping the peace if possible, for America has always represented that commitment in the eyes of the world as far as I am concerned. In 1948, we changed the name of our War Department to the Department of Defense. In other words, we would try to keep the peace, but we would be derelict in our duty to Americans if we were not fully prepared for war—prepared to defend ourselves. The outcome has been that we are seen, more and more in the eyes of the world, as war mongers, rather than peacemakers.

It is time that we established—it is long past the time when we should have done so—an entity of Government in the Nation's capital that is a visible as well as symbolic signal to the world that we are also a nation of men and women in pursuit of keeping the peace through nonviolent resolution of conflicts, and that we are not convinced that the inevitable solution or the acceptable first response to unrest or world tension is to send in the fleet and the tanks. That official entity—the National Peace Academy—is meant to be a scholarly community where we learn to apply the tools of critical analysis to a broader range of international situations.

We live in a city of monuments, towering stately and serene. And most of them are monuments erected to honor the wars that we have fought, the war of independence, as well as our own Civil War between the States, and we have many monuments erected to the brave generals who helped fight, and win, those wars. There is nothing shameful in that—except that there is not one monument erected to represent our commitment to peace.

My first taste—so to speak—of the political world came when, as a young boy, I traveled with my father to Baltimore, Md., for the Democratic Convention of 1912, and heard Woodrow Wilson's name placed in nomination for the Presidency.

It is appropriate to speak of Woodrow Wilson today, because as a great scholar and statesman, he knew then what I have learned since—that civilization is a movement, not a condition, and it is a voyage, not a harbor. As a scholar, Wilson realized that all civilizations had risen, flourished, and then fallen. As a statesman, he

sought solutions to keep our civilization from perishing. In seeking a peaceful world order, Woodrow Wilson pursued with a passion his idea of establishing a League of Nations. He saw it, I believe, as a means of nations together seeking new truths. He found that the customary fate of new truths is that they begin as heresies and end as superstitions. Wilson often spoke of the passionate pursuit of dispassionate truth—but it was not to bear fruit because the League of Nations was never achieved during his Presidency.

As a scholar, however, Woodrow Wilson was later to write—"It is plain that it is the duty of an institution of learning, set in the midst of a free population, and amidst signs of social change, not merely to implant a sense of duty, but to illuminate that duty by every lesson that can be drawn from the past."

I believe that today, if Woodrow Wilson were alive, he would hail the creation of a National Peace Academy as an institution of learning, surely set in the midst of a free population amidst signs of social change. And certainly I believe Wilson would see the academy as a place where it will be possible to implant a sense of duty and to illuminate duty so that every lesson embodied in our past—and particularly those lessons that can be drawn from our past wars—could be used to help us avoid future wars and might lead to ways in which we can achieve that peaceful world order that was the passion of his life.

Mr. Chairman, we are about to hear testimony from witnesses who, if not opposed outright to the creation of a Peace Academy, are disposed to offer in a constructive manner proposed changes and modifications to S. 564 that would make it more acceptable to them. If such suggestions are forthcoming in testimony given today, and if they strengthen the Academy concept, they will receive courteous and serious consideration by the subcommittee.

We would be remiss if we did not consider proposals to strengthen our bill. But Mr. Chairman, what we will not entertain are attempts to chip away at the basic structure of the Peace Academy concept in an effort to weaken it and turn it into a mere shell, with no depth and serving no useful purpose.

We—all of the cosponsors of S. 564—have the courage of our convictions about how the bill is so far structured. We are not, however, wedded to every dotted "i" and every crossed "t" in the bill.

I remind the witnesses that we have before us a bill that is identical to the one, S. 1889, favorably reported by a committee vote of 10 to 6 last year. Last year, S. 1889 was introduced with a majority of cosponsors—52 in all—and it had gained 56 cosponsors by the time it was reported.

Last year it was stated publicly that our majority of cosponsors was some sort of fluke—probably a result of Members running for reelection, and couldn't be maintained, and couldn't be duplicated ever again.

Needless to say it is gratifying that, when the 97th Congress did not have time to consider S. 1889 prior to adjournment last year, necessitating the reintroduction of the bill this year, that we were able to introduce S. 564 with another majority of cosponsors—53 in all. I never say "I told you so"—but we did it again.

So although we have the courage of our convictions on this legislative initiative to establish a peace arm of our Government, our

feet are not cast in concrete, and we will listen with a view toward conciliation and negotiation on modifications that might strengthen the concept. But we negotiate from a position of strength—we have a clear majority of support both on the committee, and in the Senate to pass this legislation as it now stands.

Almost any issue, almost any initiative, almost any organization, that contains the word "peace" today is, for some unfathomable reason, considered suspect. If the word peace appears on any surface, those involved are called, wittingly or unwittingly, Communist fronts.

People who have rallied in the name of peace, are called radicals when in fact most of them are well-educated, studious, and sincere people who no longer are able to remain a part of a silent majority. Americans having heard and read that supposedly sane and reasonable men in leadership positions believe that this country could wage a limited nuclear war, are appalled. Americans who have heard that nuclear war is survivable and winnable, are not convinced. And thus we have had a great public outpouring of opposing views—and those opposing views have taken the form of antinuclear campaigns, both unilateral and bilateral disarmament agreement demands, and referendums being placed on State ballots calling for nuclear disarmament and discontinuation of military buildups by the United States.

I have always, and the record will show it, supported funding for the adequate defense of the United States and its allies. I may question whether we need $1.6 trillion in order to provide for an adequate defense. I may vote for less defense spending than that—but I will insist on enough funding to structure our defense.

I am not a cosponsor of pending nuclear-freeze resolutions, nor the peace through strength resolution, as it is called. My peace initiative is the creation of a National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution.

Our civilization is more than 2,000 years old, and throughout our history we have wished and prayed for peace. We are no closer to achieving peace than we were 2,000 years ago. It could be that while we have wished for peace, we have prepared for war. It could be that you get what you prepare for—or what you pay for. The time has come to pray for peace, and also prepare for it.

The Peace Academy will not cause us to beat our swords into plowshares overnight. A peace academy will not be a trade school in peacemaking. Students of such an academy will not graduate with a false impression that they can immediately go out and get a job as an international mediator, settling international disputes overnight.

The Academy will be run by people who are educated, who are responsible, who are mature, sophisticated—much the same types who probably run the Naval War College or the Foreign Service Institute. There will be people from the right and from the left—all of them, in the words of Admiral Welch in describing the Naval War College administration and instruction, will have to walk a fine line between the crazies of the right and left.

There is much misunderstanding among the groups who support and oppose the creation of a peace academy. Sometimes it appears to be a totally unnecessary adversarial relationship. Who is to say

that those who wish to dedicate their lives and their energies to peace are somehow dangerous, whereas we accept fully those who wish to dedicate their lives and energies to the military service as their way of maintaining peace.

The Academy will be an institute of learning, of research, training and dissemination of studies and findings in the science of peacemaking and peacekeeping techniques. The Academy will, in all probability, eventually offer programs—broadly based programs—in history, economics, communications, political science, and international relations—not in competition with existing university-based graduate programs, but in concert with them.

Peace, simply defined, is the kind of friendship existing between men and women, sealed by fidelity to higher laws. Peacemakers can be those who, when they hear of corruption in high places, fascists, or communist conspirators, will know that the common good has been wounded and the concept of friendship and peace has been perverted.

Peacemaking, in our time, can be described surely as public opposition to national policy. But it also means patriotism and the obligation to serve one's country in a time of war in whatever capacity available to you. To today's peacemaker, it means confronting the implications of nuclear war, and toiling to find ways to avoid the possibility of such conflagration.

The Peace Academy concept deserves a test to see whether, as its supporters believe, it is a critically essential element in our national security framework. We don't have the advantage of the 100-year-old Naval War College, or the other illustrious histories of our military service academies, to justify our claims.

Our universities that have existing programs in international relations and foreign language studies, are doing invaluable work towards peace through research, general education offerings. No one, least of all this subcommittee or its members, seek to downgrade what many of us have spent a lifetime building up in the higher education community.

But why do such existing institutions feel so threatened by yet another, slightly different, institution for the study of peace and conflict resolution? Why do representatives of 100-year-old military academies go on the defensive when it comes to justifying why they should be allowed to exist, but a peace academy should not?

The supporters of the Peace Academy idea are certain that, given a few years—and hopefully 100 years—to exist and to grow and to evolve will be just as credible and just as prestigious as those we revere and rely on today.

Most of our witnesses today seem skeptical—but they are either unable or unwilling to pinpoint just precisely why they are skeptical about the efficacy of establishing a peace academy. Perhaps we ought to consider establishing the Academy, giving it time to become operational, giving it time to evolve, and then evaluating it with a view toward changes and modifications that would make it into a service academy preparing students to enter diverse career fields on the same level as those graduates of university-based international relations programs. Why is it unlikely that a peace academy, standing alone, will be able to provide as good training

for careers in a multitude of fields as are the current schools of international affairs? How will we ever know if we don't try?

S. 564 is not meant to become all things to all people. It is a modest beginning. In political jargon, it can be called a foot in the door. A foundation upon which to build. No one, not the least of the subcommittee members, pretends that S. 564 is perfectly structured. We learned, to our amazement, in 1976 during hearings on Senator Vance Hartke's proposal to establish a peace academy, that with all our combined knowledge and experience as lawmakers, as foreign service officers, as businessmen, as Americans—we knew very little about the ways and means of structuring an academy of peace in such way as to be useful to us in our goal of avoiding war and if forced into confrontations, how to successfully resolve them through nonviolent means wherever possible. It was at the suggestion of our distinguished ranking minority member, Senator Claiborne Pell, then Education Subcommittee Chairman, that we opted to create a U.S. Study Commission charged with the responsibility to hold hearings nationwide and obtain testimony on the need, and the feasibility of creating the Academy and if so, how to structure it.

Some people accuse the supporters of the Peace Academy bill, S. 564, of desiring peace at any price. In their minds, that means that we don't want peace with justice, or peace through strength.

We are not so stupid that we do not realize that so-called "peace" in Poland, or Afghanistan, or Korea—or any number of places where there are uneasy and often armed truces in place—is not peace in a real sense—because there is no justice or equity involved. Human rights are denied all across the board in those locations—and we abhor that kind of peace.

We are called upon the carpet by some witnesses who wonder why only international affairs are mentioned in our legislation, and not intranational concerns.

If one will go back into the short history of this legislation, they will find that the U.S. Study Commission was prohibited from considering any but international affairs for justifying, if it should justify, the creation of the Academy in its final report.

It was believed that if a Peace Academy were to involve itself in settling community disputes having to do with race, or textbooks, or busing, or whatever might disrupt a community—it would constitute an invasion of privacy, and might place communities under Federal law or governance during such unrest, instead of under the proper and appropriate systems of justice and laws within a State as administered by duly elected and appointed Governors and administrators, including the courts.

We did not anticipate that a U.S. Peace Academy would ever be placed, or try to place, itself in that position—but we bowed to the insistent recommendation of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee members, and we eliminated the language that would have had the U.S. Study Commission study peace proposals related to national as well as international affairs, as it was orginally proposed to do.

If this committee, or in its joint jurisdiction over this legislation, the Foreign Relations Committee, desires to add that language to S. 564, I assure concerned individuals that it will be done—for we

never sought to eliminate reference to intranational affairs in the first place.

We are told that as supporters of S. 564, we have focused our attention unwisely, and totally, on the threat of nuclear war. This is very far from the truth. If you will talk to the mothers of dead soldiers—or to the mothers of sons, if not daughters, who have returned from recent wars such as Vietnam, without arms, or legs, or eyes—suffering in addition to physical pain and loss also from the pain of trauma that has rendered them emotionally and mentally incapable of making new lives for themselves—you will find that we oppose conventional wars just as much as we oppose and would seek to prevent nuclear war. Dead is dead; maimed is maimed. It matters little how one is killed or maimed. So far, to our knowledge, there are no American soldiers suffering from the effects of nuclear war—except for those who were exposed to excessive radiation when assigned as military personnel to testsites here and abroad. But we have certainly seen the effects of nuclear weaponry on civilians—Japanese civilians who were decimated by the hundreds of thousands at Hiroshima.

The legislation reported last year, S. 1889, explicitly states that it is to be a noninterventionist agency and nonpolicymaking agency with regard to foreign policy and affairs of the U.S. Government, directly or indirectly, unless called upon by its Government to function in an advisory or investigatory capacity, or to conduct research on behalf of the Government.

The administration has expressed opposition to S. 564 because of "severe budgetary restraints * * * and cannot justify the expenditure of Federal funds for research, educational, and informational activities in an area where much work is already being done by private universities, institutes, and foundations."

Yet this is the same administration that insists that procompetition proposals be considered, enacted, and implemented in nearly every other activity undertaken in years past by the Federal Government. Competition is good for private enterprise as well as among Government agencies, on the one hand, but competition by a peace academy with established private university, institute, and foundation activities in the same areas is not good and would be a waste of money.

This is the same administration that recently created, through Executive order, an Institute of Democracy, calling for the expenditure of $65 million in Federal funds at a time of severe budgetary stringencies. Although little is known about how this Institute for Democracy will work, I daresay it will have to involve itself in the same kinds of research, educational, and informational activities now being done by those same institutions that a peace academy might compete with. Is that not a duplication of what is already being done?

This is the same administration—or President—who submitted his budget to the Congress for fiscal year 1983 and recommended that title VI of the Higher Education Act—International Education and Foreign Language Studies—be cut to $8 million from its then current $19 million per year; and this year, this same administration has recommended a fiscal year 1984 funding level for title VI of exactly "zero." Of course, the Congress is not about to defund

international education. It didn't last year and it won't this year. But we have a President, and a State Department, and many others, crying about budget stringencies on the one hand, while on the other pretending to support those private institutions who are already engaged in similar activities to those proposed in S. 564, when in fact they seek to zero them out of the budget entirely, and while they are zeroing international education that serves existing university-based international relations programs, the administration bypasses the legislative process—the Congress—and uses the powerful Executive order to create an Institute for Democracy and calls for $65 million in fiscal year 1984 to pay for it—whatever it is.

Our bill has been called vague and lacking in specificity. We do not pretend that it is so well written as to leave nothing to doubt. We are open to constructive criticisms and suggested modifications. So far, we have heard only from those who want nothing of the bill to survive, or to pay lipservice only to our concept of an established academy committed to the research, education, and training of individuals from all walks of life in the emerging science of peacemaking—or conflict resolution and management.

This subcommittee is open to constructive suggestions that will strengthen the bill. But I repeat, we are aware of efforts to weaken it, and we will not be a party to such efforts.

On the one hand, the U.S. Study Commission's report, the product of which is the bill S. 564 before us, is criticized because of the fact that hundreds of people were witnesses, but only 5–10 percent had a solid background in international security affairs or arms control. It is true that the Commission was expected to get grassroots testimony from John Q Public as to the American people's feelings about our need for a peace academy. On the other hand, the Commission is criticized because its members were known and prominent for having been involved in peace research, or mediation and conflict resolution. The Commission also included members who were known to oppose the Peace Academy concept—one of whom was former Member of the House, the late John Ashbrook, whose dissenting views can be found in the Commission's report.

This hearing today will result in statements and questions, all dealing with the complexities of the field of peace learning, or peacemaking, or peacekeeping—who is responsible, who is now doing the job, who could do it better than a peace academy could?

I have mentioned the President's new initiative, the Institute for Democracy—or project democracy—and its price tag. I am not opposed to the President's new initiative—I just wonder why this new institute should be created without a word of public debate and agreement by the legislative branch, when the Peace Academy is opposed for attempting to do basically the same thing.

We are asked to change the name of the Academy to "center" or "institute"—we are asked to include the word "justice" along with the word "peace" in the bill. I have no problem with changing its name. As a matter of fact, we could call it the Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Justice—but surely someone would come along and insist on adding the word "freedom." The name could become something like the National Institute for Peace, Justice, Democracy, and Freedom—or NIPJDF for short.

I believe the Peace Academy concept is opposed for the most part because no one clearly understands it, and its never been done before.

Indeed, Secretary of State George Shultz in his recent statement before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that when the project democracy proposal was first presented to him, he wondered: "Why hasn't this been done before?" Indeed why hasn't it—and why can't we do both with the full faith of the U.S. Government behind it?

Secretary Shultz said that, in moving forward with project democracy, we might find that "in some instances, the United States may not have that much to offer. Instead," he said, "assistance and guidance might better be provided by other democracies. And change may be slow. Patience, respect for different cultures and political traditions, and recognition of our own limitations must be hallmarks of our effort; but our ultimate objectives must remain uppermost in our minds."

We could say the same for the Peace Academy concept—what we hope to achieve, and how we hope to achieve it—and how we are not absolutely sure if it will work as presently structured, but that it represents a beginning, however modest, and a foundation on which to build—whether we seek democracy, or peace, or justice, or all of those.

Project democracy is not all that different from project peace academy. In the Secretary of State's words, "we must develop a better capability to help. This is a matter critical to our national security. I ask that you give it your sympathetic consideration.

Establishing an official arm of our Government committed to peace has been a 37-year effort on my part. I have recently announced, after 50 years of public service which began in 1933, that I will not be a candidate for reelection in 1984. It is my hope, and my expectation, that S. 564 will be enacted into law within the next session of the 98th Congress, allowed to begin, allowed to progress, and allowed to survive in a world of tension and unrest. That it will be allowed to provide leadership training in peacemaking, that it be allowed to educate, that it be allowed to publish and disseminate studies, findings, journals, reports, and books on the development of new peacemaking techniques, as well as those already in effect and working for us at home and abroad. Let us begin to work to develop lasting ties and working relationships between American individuals, institutions, organizations, parties, and their foreign counterparts.

Senator STAFFORD. Senator Denton, do you have an opening statement?

Senator DENTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. I welcome the opportunity to discuss the merits and demerits of S. 564, the bill to establish a U.S. Academy of Peace. I cannot overstate my respect for the chairman nor for Senator Randolph who knows that my estimate of him and my feelings toward him. I consider absolutely necessary, Senator Randolph, the dignity that you lend this body, the tradition that you tend to retain in it, and I have as much respect for the motives for your support of this bill as any of your supporters do.

I respect the fervent way in which you express yourself about the efficacy of this bill, and I hope that you will respect the fervent way in which I express my reservations.

Senator RANDOLPH. I do, and I have said that in the past and will repeat it now very happily.

Senator DENTON. Without reiterating all of the sincere desire I have to preserve, to achieve peace, I will say that I talked for 45 minutes with Pope Paul VI on this matter. He is a "Peacenik," if you will. He agreed with everything I was saying to him, which represented my view on peace. Having been in Vietnam and been told by my captors that the Pope was opposed to my point of view, we had it out. He gave me a page from his encyclical on peace, which I read on ABC television only to have it cut by the people who editted the program in New York. It showed the kinds of reservations he had about unrealistic approaches to peace and the definition of peace.

I do not think that you and Senator Stafford, whom I respect also as a Naval Reserve officer and a man who is familiar with this subject, are unaware of the issues which I debated at some 2 hours length with Senator Matsunaga before the three House subcommittees. I do not think that there is any discord that can be related to a clash in spirit. I do believe that there is a difference in the approach, the means by which peace can be achieved and the tack which this Academy is likely to take.

I had a long conversation with General Goodpaster the night before last. He is one of the supporters of this concept, and he says the only difference between him and me on this subject is his optimism that the Peace Academy will become precisely that which he and I agree upon. He said that his own written testimony coincided precisely with mine before the House in my debate with Senator Matsunaga.

I do fear that there are many who support the Peace Academy who have already acknowledged—as in St. Louis, Mo., when the peace, the nuclear freeze movement people met in their formal convention—that what they are after is unilateral, exemplary disarmament, and the freeze movement has propounded the establishment of the Peace Academy. There is great danger that the Peace Academy will become something which neither you nor the chairman want it to be.

I can point to names on the letterhead, but will not because I do not want to become personal, who have views very different from yours about what the Peace Academy is to be.

So the only difference between General Goodpaster and myself is the optimism he has that it will not get off the track, that there will be sufficient monitoring by realistic, knowledgeable people. That is the only difference I have with either of you. Our differences are not about the desirability of peace nor of the desirability actually of effecting the kind of tutoring, if you will, and discussion of conflict resolution that you have in mind.

I must reiterate my major reasons for opposition to this bill, which I expressed in more detail in the last Congress, and I will try to be brief. We have a vote at 11 on cloture, as you know.

For the record, the administration opposed the bill last year and it opposes it this year. I cannot believe that we can assume that

the men who are opposing this, who include the Secretary of Education, those who speak for the White House, including the President, the Office of Management and Budget, that all of them are Hawks or prowar people.

I despise the Hawk-Dove distinction. I despise the liberal-conservative split on the issue of peace or the Democratic-Republican one.

But I must say that all of those offices do oppose it, and I must inform the chairman that Secretary Bell informed me a few moments before I came to the meeting preceding this one that he was chagrined that he has only received yesterday a request for his testimony and that he was unable to clear it and get it to us at this time.

However, he authorized me to say that he opposes this bill, and I will develop that in a couple of sentences later as to why he opposes it. But the administration is strongly opposed to the establishment, and Ambassador Low will testify for the administration later in words that are better than mine and affirm that position.

During our consideration of the matter in the last Congress, we had statements from the Department of State, the Department of Education, the Director of Office of Management and Budget, and the President. In addition, I would like to submit for the record a letter sent by the Honorable Eugene V. Rostow, then the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to Congressman Zablocki. And, Mr. Chairman, I repeat, I want to submit that for the record.

Senator STAFFORD. Without objection, it will be made part of the record.

[The letter referred to follows:]

21-097 O—83——2

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

June 21, 1982

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am happy to respond to your letter of May 12, 1982, regarding the establishment of a peace academy as proposed in H.R. 5088 and H.R. 6182. There is surely no responsible person who does not desire peace. As Director of the agency which was established by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act to be "a new agency of peace to deal with the problem of reduction and control of armaments looking toward ultimate world disarmament," if I were convinced that establishment of a new academy would be effective in promoting peace, I would give it my wholehearted support. I am, however, not so convinced.

In my view, the description of what the peace academy would study, how it would educate and train students in the ways of peace, and how these students would then apply their knowledge in furthering a peaceful world is not sufficiently concrete to allow a judgment about its effectiveness. Consequently, I am not convinced that the goal of a peaceful world would be better served by the establishment of a new institution rather than by the support of existing institutions and programs.

The Office of Management and Budget advised that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

Eugene V. Rostow

The Honorable Clement J. Zablocki
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives

Senator DENTON. Second, the proposed Academy would require the expenditure of funds not currently included in the budget, a total of $21 million in the first year and $10 million in the second year.

Moreover, the Commission's report projects that operating costs would escalate rapidly in succeeding years. When we face massive budget deficits and must make an effort to control Government spending, it is difficult to defend any expenditure such as this, particularly when the President has requested no funds for established programs such as title VI of the Higher Education Act in his 1984 budget.

Parenthetically, I will say that you have, as the Secretary of Education's point will establish, the room within title VI to accomplish that which you wish. And if Congress so mandates, it can be accomplished within that title of the Higher Education Act.

Third, and by far the most important, the proposal does not adequately consider the capabilities and views of our existing educational institutions that deal with international affairs, with research and teaching on the great questions of war and peace.

We will hear, I believe persuasively, from several experienced and competent educators today, and there are others who could speak to this question.

Fourth, I believe that we would further the prospects for peace and better develop the capacity of our educational system to address the issues of war and peace for the largest number of our young people if we devoted our scarce Federal dollars to the strengthening of programs of peace studies already well developed and thriving in our educational system.

Fifth, I believe that we must be careful about having the Federal Government create its own schools open to all comers. I do not believe that our educational community or we in Congress want to see the Federal Government establishing schools for a private clientele in whatever disciplines it may desire, particularly in this one. I think liberals would object to that.

Sixth, I find naive and dangerous the contention held by many that a U.S. Academy of Peace would become the center and base for an internationally recognized group of conciliators and mediators who could have, for example, stopped the Falkland Island crisis short of hostilities. I do not see the Academy of Peace capable of that sort of action nor properly disposed in authority to do so.

Seventh, I fear that people in other countries would justifiably view a U.S. Academy of Peace, constituted as the bill provides and lavishly supported with Federal dollars, as nothing more than an instrumentality of the American Government, whatever in fact it might be, or whatever in fact you hope it would become.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, some argue that the United States spends billions on its defense establishment but nothing on a peace establishment. The implication that our Government, including Congress, does not devote efforts to peace that are comparable in seriousness and proportion of the national energy to those that we devote to the possibility we might have to fight a war is simply not credible and simply not true.

Peace is the mission of the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Agency for Internation-

al Development and a host of other civilian agencies. It is, moreover, as most of us are surely aware, the true mission of our Department of Defense and our military services.

As you two well believe and know, their mission is to preserve the peace. The functions that the bill would place with an entirely new institution are already assigned by law. The Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State is charged to provide training for Federal employees involved in foreign affairs. The Arms Control and Disarmament Act assigns to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency the responsibility for research and educational activity in that field.

As Secretary Bell emphasized to me this morning, title VI of the Higher Education Act authorizes the Government to support broadgage training, which frequently includes negotiation, conflict resolution, peacemaking, and peacekeeping in our public and private colleges and universities.

If you are not satisfied with the degree to which they do that after you look at it carefully, and perhaps you already have, I would be disposed to support you in emphasizing that kind of study with some funding.

I hope that this subcommittee will consider the matter seriously. I will oppose the bill, and I hope my colleagues will join me.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that a letter I have recently received from Vice Adm. Marmaduke Bayne, U.S. Navy, retired, be included in the record of this hearing. I also may receive some additional written materials in the next few days, and I ask that they be included in the record as well.

Senator STAFFORD. Without objection, they will be.

Senator DENTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The letter referred to follows:]

VICE ADMIRAL MARMADUKE BAYNE (RET.)
SEASCAPE, BOX 163
IRVINGTON, VIRGINIA 22480

March 8, 1983

Senator Jeremiah Denton
United States Senate
Washington, D.C., 20510

Dear Senator Denton,

Recently I was informed that Resolutions concerning the establishment of a United States Academy for Peace will again be brought before the Congress. Historical discussions of this issue, on and off the Congressional agenda since 1945, have conveyed the notion that the search for peace by way of an organized institution under the control of the Federal Government was unnecessary in our society. Our system, founded on the bedrock of freedom eschews war; thrives in an environment of world peace. Those of us, forced by mismanagement of World affairs, to engage in war, are the least likely members of our society to wish its return. We also, perhaps, are those who recognize most readily mankind's propensity for conflict.

As Counselor to Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, I was made aware by Dean Peter F. Krogh, Dean of the School, that Resolutions to establish a Peace Academy were before the Congress last year. I concurred in Dean Krogh's decision to speak against those Resolutions. His letter, submitted to the Joint Hearing before the Subcommittes on International Security and Postsecondary Education spoke of the new Intercultural environment at Georgetown, made possible by the Congress. He described it as fully engaged in the inquiry into Conflict Resolution and peaceful solutions for international differences. Since then the Intercultural Center at the School has sponsored international meetings of young world leaders; international fellows programs, and academic programs for international scholars. Young leaders from Western European nations, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and this country have met in discussion; presenting their views, listening to the views of others; all without the imperatives of political portfolio, or the risk of being quoted by news sources. A member of the Knesset opined that Israel should talk with reputable spokesmen for the Palestinians; a Minister from a Gulf Arab State voiced the belief that Arab States should recognize Israel; similarly leaders from other nations expressed candid opinion concerning traditional conflicting views among their nations. Surely the experience of such free discussions results in better understanding among world leaders, and gradually results in different attitudes, as this understanding becomes reflected in official national policy.

continuation- Senator Denton from Bayne-page two

In reviewing the Record of the Hearings before the Sub-committees of the Ninety-Seventy Congress, I admit to considerable surprise in noting that General Andrew J. Goodpasture had offered correspondance in support of the Resolutions. Yet, when I read General Goodpasture's statement, I was reminded of the extraordinary intellect of this soldier-scholar. General Goodpasture did not support just "A Peace Academy". He described quite carefully a concept for the inquiry into Conflict Resolution and peaceful solutions which would include all elements necessary for such an examination. He wrote of:

" a carefully designed institution-----both theoretical and practical-----to understand how peace relates to other fundamental values, needs and aspirations of our people, and how peace together with these other values can best be safeguarded and sustained". He said:
" An academy of peace and conflict resolution could strengthen and extend the understanding, in government and out, of the practical processes for keeping Nato effective in support of its goals of peace, stable security and freedom. An academy such as proposed could further the understanding of peace and security in relation to nuclear weapons. The desire for peace-high minded as it is- and the concern over the destructive potential of such weapons, now very much in evidence, could in fact become a danger to peace and to the other values of our society, unless, coupled with sober, sustained development of the military and diplomatic instrumentalities most appropriate to facing the realities of the world we live in. Working out a proper inter-relation, for example, between arms control negotiations and a well-designed military posture--each an important arm of a coherent and comprehensive security policy--is a continuing task of the highest order of importance to the peace, safety and freedom of our people. It demands the thorough, well-targeted training of key diplomatic and military officials".

" The complexities and the deep-rooted difficulties inherent in the issues involved strongly suggest that the proposed academy should be primarily oriented toward the education and training of experienced and able mid-career personnel concerned with foreign and security policy, and should be conducted at the graduate-school level. With access to classified official information it should be able to maintain realism and emphasize application as well as theory in its curriculum to an extent not possible for private or public universities".

Compare these statements with the Mission of the National Defense University at Fort Leslie J. McNair.

continuation- Senator Denton from Bayne-page three

> " To insure excellence in professional military education and research in the essential elements of National Security, and their interrelationships, and the development of executive skills in order to enhance the preparation of selected personnel of the Department of Defense, the Department of State and other agencies of government, to perform senior policy and staff functions involving the planning and inplementation of National Strategy, and the management of national resources for National Security."

As Commandant of the National War College, and the first President of the National Defense University, I had something to do with the development of that Mission statement. The National Defense University with a student body composed of selected individuals from many government agencies; three quarters already possessing graduate degrees in many disciplines; mid-career professionals who historically over the years have risen to policy levels in their agencies: this University fits the formula suggested by General Goodpasture. The curricula are varied; the military and civilian faculty, the distinguished speakers from all over the world, represent all aspects of the elements which make up stability and the lack of it; the research programs range from studies on worldwide climatology to terrorism. These assets are remarkably unrecognized and underutilized by our decision makers today.

Writing in the Fall, 1976, issue of Strategic Review, in an article entitled "The National Defense University-a Strategic Asset", I suggested that:

> " The time spent by officers selected to attend professional educational institutions, testing their ideas against their peers, as well as senior policy makers, and other individuals with authority in the matters being studied, is the best insurance that wisdom will be brought to bear on the perplexing problems awaiting those officers upon graduation. After all, those who spend their lives pursuing directly the defense of the beliefs of our nation, do so to allow the full expression of those beliefs to flourish- in art, in music, in science, in philosophy- else we have no reason for our profession.
>
> Only in the light of events past is it possible to determine precisely where pragmatism yields to the fundamental principle of a basic belief."

If we examine these two example of higher educational insti-

continuation-Senator Denton from Bayne- page four

tutions in our society: one supported by public funds, the other private, we find they portray rather well the already well developed institutional capabilities for the study of peace. If the National Defense University (a name chosen deliberately to symbolize the passive aspects of National Security) cannot satisfy the Congress that it espouses the full range of the philosophies and studies embodied in the search for peace, it should become the subject of Congressional focus. If the School of Foreign Service is found to use its new Intercultural Center at varience with the enabling legislation which made it possibe, it also should feel the impact of Congressional oversight. These organizations exist! A description of the purpose of the School of Foreign Service, now being developed to reflect the anticipated efficient use of its new facilities, reads in part:

> "Thus the ethic of International Responsibility emerges, from a greater understanding of the need for worldwide cooperation rather than competition."

There is, of course, temptation to identify a desired condition by an illustrative name. The name is the easiest part of the equation. It raises new hopes that different and more effective prescriptions can be found for the timeless complexities of human interaction. Before such a notion is approved, before the use of limited National funds require justification to the nation's people, The Congress should insure that existing institutions under their control are fulfilling the purposes for which they were designed, and if not require them to do so. Perhaps the funds contemplated for use in new ventures can be used more efficiently in improving old ones. Perhaps a need does not exist to expend additional funds. Congress should also examine carefully any concept for an Academy of Peace to insure that it meets all the tests so well defined by General Goodpasture. Even if a determination is made that a new institution is best suited to inquire into our Nation's search for peace, it is likely that the expenditure of funds will accomplish only a new edifice with a new name carved over the entrance, and with the same people doing the same things on the inside. Our country is not deficient in its search for peace and stability. It pursues that search with more vigor than any Nation on Earth. There are ample historical examples to support that statement. Use of assets which exist; more visible Congressional support for low priority National Security educational programs; programs which define Security not only in terms of systems of weapons but also in terms of educated minds; such emphasis will do far more to project the true image of this peaceful Nation, than the establishment of a new Academy which will inherit all the frustrations, the hopes, the search for academic talent, the criticism and opposition long endured by the institutions which exist.

Very respectfully,

M. G. Bayne

Senator RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman?

Senator STAFFORD. Senator Randolph.

Senator RANDOLPH. I think I have said it often, and I happily repeat it, that I have both a personal and an official affection and respect for my colleague, Senator Denton. I do not think that that is involved because we can disagree not only on this measure, but many measures. I do not know whether you might join me on a change in the rules so we would have, you know, Senators vote from their desks so that we might have some decorum.

Senator DENTON. I consider you not only a good guy, sir, but an expert in many fields that I would humbly ask your opinion on. In this one I am not overly pessimistic about my own background.

Senator RANDOLPH. We could not have a Senator with a better background to consider this matter objectively, and I believe you are objective.

I do want to say that I must take exception with what you were saying, that the Secretary of Education was not informed about this matter. He was informed in early February that we were going to set a hearing. He was asked whether he would have testimony, and so forth. I think the record can all be documented. I will ask the staff—they do not need to be named—is this correct?

Senator DENTON. He told me this morning that he only received the letter yesterday and that he had to wait for the letter before he can clear his testimony. I would hope that we would go into that and find out the bottom line on it.

Senator STAFFORD. I think, if the chairman could intervene here, that the reason he got a letter yesterday was because it was asking him for written testimony since he was unable to appear in person. So maybe everybody is partially right here.

Senator RANDOLPH. Well, I just wanted to make the record clear on that matter. Senator Denton speaks of the Secretary's supportiveness for title VI, but I believe the President has said that he would not recommend funding for that title. I want to be sure; does the Senator know that the President seeks no funding for title VI of the Higher Education Act?

Senator DENTON. Yes, sir, and I think the House is going to put that money in, and I believe we all know that.

Senator RANDOLPH. I do not know it; but anyway, there is a difference of opinion even on that subject between the President and the Secretary of Education. I supported Secretary Bell for the position. I have known through the years, and have a very sincere regard for his ability.

Senator DENTON. Both you and he are better men than I, but I will not agree with each of you on everything.

Senator RANDOLPH. Well, I think we have gone far enough on that score. [Laughter.]

But I did have to point out that when some statements are made that I believe are in error, then I feel I have to try to present what seems to be an answer. My statement has been given. I wish that I might have gone ahead and spoken much longer.

Hubert Humphrey often said, "I will be brief," and then he violated it on every occasion. God bless him, though. And I have the same problem. What are we going to do now, hear the witnesses or hear Senator Matsunaga for a brief statement?

Senator STAFFORD. The Chair intends to invite Senator Matsunaga to make an opening statement, since he is a coauthor, original cosponsor of this legislation if he cares to do so. And we will keep the meeting going until the rollcall begins when we will have to recess.

Senator Matsunaga.

Senator MATSUNAGA. What time is it now?

Senator STAFFORD. It is about 2 minutes after 11. Senator Matsunaga.

Senator MATSUNAGA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of saving time, I will summarize my statement and ask unanimous consent that my full statement be included in the record as though presented in full.

Senator STAFFORD. Without objection, it will be so included.

Senator MATSUNAGA. Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want to thank you very much for your continued strong support of the bill to establish a U.S. Peace Academy, and for scheduling these public hearings promptly in the 98th Congress.

As you know, we did hold hearings last year. We passed the bill out of not only the subcommittee, full committee as well, and the bill was scheduled for Senate action on the floor. However, due to lack of time, it was left on the Senate Calendar. S. 564, the U.S. Academy of Peace Act, was introduced on February 23, 1983, with 53 cosponsors, including myself, of course, and the three Senators here, including the chairman.

The bill is identical to legislation introduced in the 97th Congress which was the subject of hearings before this subcommittee, and which subsequently was favorably reported by the full Committee on Labor and Human Resources. The bill would implement the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution. It was my good fortune to chair that commission.

The bill would establish a semiautonomous, nonprofit corporation to be called the U.S. Academy of Peace. This Academy would have three major functions: first, it would perform research of its own and fund research at other institutions; second, it would provide graduate and postgraduate educational programs for which students at institutions of higher education would receive academic credit, and it would provide continuing educational services, such as seminars and workshops for individuals and organizations in both the public and private sectors; and, third, it would establish an information service to gather and disseminate its findings relating to the field of peace learning.

S. 564 authorizes funds in the amount of $31 million for the U.S. Academy of Peace: $6 million for the Academy's first year of operation, $10 million for its second year of operation, and a one-time authorization of $15 million for the acquisition of facilities. I might say that a total of only $31 million would be one-tenth of the cost of one B-1 bomber.

While it is anticipated that the Academy's core funding would come from the Federal Government, it would be authorized to accept gifts and donations from the private sector, and for example, could obtain some funding from private foundations.

One might well say that the Peace Academy is an old idea whose time has come at last, for the concept dates back to the American Revolution. The modern U.S. Commission on Proposals for the National Academy for Peace and Conflict Resolution offered in support of its principal recommendation eight major findings which I believe explain why the establishment of an academy is imperative today.

First, the Commission found that a U.S. Academy of Peace would advance the national interest by developing peace making skills that can reduce the chance that this Nation or any other will breach peace and risk nuclear war by escalating conflicts into violence.

Second, the Commission found that the United States has a special capacity to promote peace in the world as well as domestically, and that the U.S. Academy of Peace would build upon and expand this heritage.

Third, the Commission found that the U.S. Academy of Peace would strengthen national security and reduce the cost of international conflict through its research and training in a wide range of effective options to conflict.

Fourth, the Commission found that the Academy, through its education, training, and information services would sharpen and harness the peace making capabilities of Americans in government, private enterprise, and voluntary associations, thereby enhancing this Nation's world leadership in promoting peace.

Fifth, the Commission found that the U.S. Academy of Peace would amplify the field of peace learning and extend peacemaking expertise by focusing national attention on peace research, education, and training at the academy and at other educational institutions.

Sixth, the Commission found that the U.S. Academy of Peace could use both international and national peacemaking and conflict resolution experiences in designing its education and training and information services and should give priority to research and cultural differences in peace and conflict processes.

Seventh, the Commission found that the absence of a coordinated national commitment to peace research, education, and training has caused neglect of peacemaking knowledge and skills to the detriment of this Nation's effectiveness in policy making and policy implementation in international affairs, conflicts, and war.

And, finally, eighth, the Commission found broad public and governmental interest in a Federal institution devoted to this Nation's peacemaking capacities that would have complementary programs of research and education, training, and information services that would serve people in and out of Government, and would be sheltered from undue Government or private domination.

Mr. Chairman, S. 564 embodies the Commission's findings. The proposed Peace Academy would complement and strengthen existing public and private institutions, and it would immeasurably enhance the role of the United States as a peacemaker. I urge the prompt approval of this bill. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Matsunaga follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MATSUNAGA

Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I want to thank you very much for your co-sponsorship and continued strong support of the U.S. Academy of Peace Act and for scheduling these public hearings promptly in the 98th Congress.

S. 564, the U.S. Academy of Peace Act, was introduced on February 23, 1983, with 53 cosponsors, including myself. The bill is identical to legislation introduced in the 97th Congress which was the subject of hearings before this subcommittee and which subsequently was favorably reported by the full Committee on Labor and Human Resources.

The bill would implement the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution, which I chaired. It would establish a semi-autonomous, non-profit corporation, with headquarters in Washington, D.C., to be called the United States Academy of Peace. The Academy would have three major functions: first, it would perform research of its own and support research at other institutions; second, it would provide graduate and post-graduate educational programs for which students at institutions of higher education could receive academic credit, and it would provide continuing education services such as workshops and seminars for individuals and organizations in both the public and private sectors, designed to strengthen their conflict resolution skills; and, third, it would provide information services, gathering and disseminating its findings relating to the field of peace learning.

A Center for International Peace would be established within the Academy to which leaders and prospective leaders from this country and abroad would be appointed to study, the Academy would also establish the award of a Medal of Peace to be presented annually by the President of the United States.

The cost of the proposed Academy of Peace is modest indeed. S. 564 authorizes funds in the amount of $31 million for the Academy; $6 million for the Academy's first year of operations, $10 million for its second year of operations, and a one-time authorization of $15 million for acquisition of the Academy's facilities. While it is anticipated that the Academy's core funding would come from the federal government, it would be authorized to accept gifts and donations from the private sector and, for example, could obtain some funding from private foundations.

One might well say that the Peace Academy is an old idea whose time has come at last, for the idea dates back to the American Revolution. The original "Plan for a Peace Office" has been attributed both to Benjamin Rush, a prominent physician who was a signer of the declaration of Independence, and to Benjamin Bannecker, a black mathematician who was the publisher of the almanac in which the "Plan" first appeared. George Washington himself endorsed the idea of a "proper peace establishment" within the federal government.

In this century, the concept was reintroduced in 1935, when Senator Matthew M. Neely of West Virginia introduced legislation providing for the establishment of a Federal Department of Peace. The proposed Department strongly resembled the Rush/Bannecker Peace Office.

A Bureau of Peace and Friendship, to be located in the U.S. Department of Labor, was also proposed in 1935 by U.S. Representative Fred Bierman of Iowa. The Bureau to be headed by an "eminent sociologist," was to carry out research on matters pertaining to peace and war. Research was also the focus of two resolutions introduced in the House in 1945 and 1947 by then-Representative Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois. The Dirksen Resolutions would have established a Division of Peace within the U.S. Department of State.

Research and education were the focus of these early proposals, but, in later years the concept of a federal insitution devoted to peace was expanded. In 1945, Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin introduced legislation to create a small, high-level Department of Peace with the Secretary serving, among other things, as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations Security Council. In that same year, then-Representative Jennings Randolph of West Virginia introduced a Department of Peace bill which included for the first time the concept that the international exchange of people and ideas is an effective means of promoting international peace. I am happy to report that Jennings Randolph, now a United States Senator, remains a principal sponsor of legislation to establish a national institution devoted to peace research and training. The Randolph concept is an integral part of S. 564.

Although hearings were held on the measures introduced in 1945 and 1947, the real developments in the the field of foreign affairs in that era were the successful creation of the Marshall Plan and the subsequent addition of a technical assistance program in 1949.

In 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower pointed with concern to the "unprecedented destructive power of (the) new weapons and the international tensions which powerful armaments aggravate." He appointed a Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. That individual, Governor Harold Stassen of Minnesota, was given cabinet rank and was often called "The Secretary of Peace."

Also in 1955, Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana and Representative Charles Bennett of Florida proposed the creation of a Joint Congressional Committee for a Just and Lasting Peace and Representative Harold Ostertag of New York introduced a bill which included the concept of a National Peace College which would carry out both education and training.

Between 1959 and 1961, the proposal which eventually became the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency took shape in Congress. Two of the most prominent sponsors of the 1960 bills were Senator Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, who proposed a national peace academy, and Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, who proposed an arms control research institute.

In 1963, President Kennedy, speaking at the American University Commencement Exercises in Washington, D.C. observed that "The pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war, but we have no more urgent task." He spoke of peace as "the necessary rational end of rational men" and made it clear that he was not referring to some vague concept of universal goodwill, but to a practical and attainable peace, "based not on a sudden revolution in human nature, but on a gradual evolution in human institutions."

Mr. Chairman, no doubt Benjamin Rush and Benjamin Bannecker and the long list of able men and women who have sponsored legislation to establish a national institution devoted to peace research, education and training, would agree that peace is a hard idea to sell. In 1977, when I took my seat in the U.S. Senate, I joined Senator Randolph and Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon in introducing legislation which provided for a federal study of the various proposals for a national academy of peace. Our bill passed Congress as part of the Education Act Amendments of 1978 and, in the latter part of 1979, an appropriation was approved and a nine-member study commission appointed. The U.S. Commission on proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution held twelve public hearings, met with officials of governmental and private agencies, visited three major military service academies, and extensively reviewed the existing literature relating to peace research, education and training.

That brings us up to the present day. The modern U.S. Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution offered in support of its principal recommendation eight major findings which, I believe, explain why the establishment of an Academy of Peace is just as important today, if not more so, than it was in the time of Benjamin Rush and Benjamin Bannecker.

First, the Commission found that the U.S. Academy of Peace would advance the national interest by developing peacemaking skills that can reduce the chance that this Nation, or any other, will breach peace and risk nuclear war by escalating conflicts into violence.

Second, the Commission found that the United States has a special capacity to promote peace in the world as well as domestically, and that the U.S. Academy of Peace would build upon and expand this heritage.

Third, the Commission found that the U.S. Academy of Peace would strengthen national security and reduce the cost of international conflict through its research and training in a wide range of effective options to conflicts, in addition to military capacity.

Fourth, the Commission found that the Academy, through its education, training, and information services, would sharpen and harness the peacemaking capabilities of Americans in government, private enterprise, and voluntary associations, thereby enhancing this nation's world leadership in promoting peace.

Fifth, the Commission found that the U.S. Academy of Peace would amplify the field of peace learning and extend peacemaking expertise by focusing national attention on peace research, education, and training—at the Peace Academy and at other educational institutions.

Sixth, the Commission found that the U.S. Academy of Peace could use both international and national peacemaking and conflict resolution experiences in designing its education and training and information services, and should give priority to research on cultural differences in peace and conflict processes.

Seventh, the Commission found that the absence of a coordinated national commitment to peace research, education and training has caused neglect of peacemaking knowledge and skills to the detriment of this nation's effectiveness in policymaking and policy implementation in international affairs, conflicts, and war.

Eighth, the Commission found broad public and governmental interest in a federal institution devoted to this nation's peacemaking capacities that would have complementary programs of research, education, training and information services; would serve people in and out of government; and would be sheltered from undue government or private domination.

Mr. Chairman, S. 564 embodies the Commission's findings. I strongly believe that the proposed U.S. Academy of Peace would complement and strengthen existing public and private institutions, and it would immeasurably enhance the role of the United States as a peacemaker. As others here will no doubt point out, the United States annually spends a considerable portion of its national treasure preparing for war. I propose that we spend a modest amount of our national resources preparing for peace. To paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, some people see things as they are and ask "Why?" Others see things as they should be and ask "Why Not?" I say, why not a United States Academy of Peace.

Thank you very much.

Senator RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman.

Senator STAFFORD. Senator Randolph.

Senator RANDOLPH. For the record, I would like to commend the continuing commitment of Senator Matsunaga who has just spoken.

Senator STAFFORD. I would join you, Senator, in that, and in fact, I would like to commend both you and Senator Matsunaga for your efforts in connection with this legislation. On a somewhat lighter note, the Chair has duly been impressed by all of the agencies who have been quoted as having some position with respect to this legislation, but I am unaware that the Environmental Protection Agency has thus far indicated to us its position on the matter. [Laughter.]

I would say to my colleagues that we are now in a live quorum which at any moment will go to a rollcall, and it would be my intent rather than to interrupt a witness in the middle of his statement to recess the hearing now until the rollcall has occurred to resume as soon as we can after the vote. And here goes the rollcall, by the way.

But I hope that staff has warned witnesses that as always—and I say this with regret and apology, we never have enough time to properly hear the very distinguished witnesses that come before this and our other committees.

Senator RANDOLPH. And we will not until the rules are changed.

Senator STAFFORD. That is right. But as a result of no rule change and everything else that presses on us, we will have to ask witnesses to summarize their written statements in 5 minutes, and full written statements for each witness, if supplied, will be included in the record as if read.

So I simply put you on notice of the situation when we resume hearings, which we will do as speedily as we can after voting.

Senator MATSUNAGA. Mr. Chairman.

Senator STAFFORD. Senator Matsunaga.

Senator MATSUNAGA. I ask unanimous consent that the statements of Dr. Gunnar Myrdal, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; Mr. Herbert Cornuelle, the James Campbell Estate; Dr. Philip E. Jacob, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii; and the Pasadena chapter of the United Nations Association be included in the record at the appropriate place.

Senator STAFFORD. Without objection, they will be so included.

[The statements referred to follow:]

1983 MAR 16 AM 9:14

3/15/83 To: EM Fr: EY

Svalnas Alle 12B
S-182 68 - Djursholm
Sweden
March 10, 1983

Senator Robert T. Stafford
Chairman, Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanitics
U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Stafford:

I am delighted to hear that the United States Senate has initiated a proposal to establish a National Peace Academy dedicated to peace education and the training of a professional staff in conflict avoidance.

America has always been my second home and although I have been distressed by the high level of armament expenditures in recent years I have faith in the integrity of the voters and their honor for law rather than war as a way of settling disputes between nations.

Creation of a United States Academy of Peace will send signals around the world that the United States is concerned to find peaceful alternatives to conflict. It will have a tremendous impact on perceptions of your priorities.

There is a vast need for research exploring ways to approach and handle international conflict. Young people should study facts if they are to bring about the changes needed.

A Peace Academy that would provide professional training, and disseminate accurate international information garnered from many sources including research institutes like SIPRI, could make a vital contribution in accord with the historic ideas of just and peaceful human relations set forth by your great leaders Franklin, Jefferson and Lincoln.

Sincerely yours,

Gunnar Myrdal

DATE: 3/16/83
TIME: 9:14 am
VIA: tc
Rec'd by: jl

Testimony presented by Herbert C. Cornuelle, Chairman of the Trustees of the Estate of James Campbell to the Senate Subcommittee on Education, Arts, and Humanities on S 564, a bill to establish a United States Academy of Peace.

While I am not an expert on the organization of a National Academy for any purpose, nor have I had experience and training in conflict resolution, I do have two concerns I would like to describe to you today, along with three modest suggestions for your consideration.

First, as a businessman with many past activities stretching across the Pacific Basin, and as a director of the Private Investment Company for Asia (P.I.C.A.), I am particularly interested in the role business should take in building peace among nations.

Second, as a former chairman of the Board of Regents for the University of Hawaii and as a member of the Board of the East-West Center, and a member of the Board of The Asia Foundation, I have a continuing concern for the training of young people--American and foreign--in the realities of international affairs to guide their careers in business, government, and the professions.

I want to place both these concerns in a Pacific Basin perspective.

The Pacific Basin contains some of the most dynamic and certainly the most diverse peoples on earth. They are, in fact, so diverse that their only common denominator now is the ocean which washes all their shores.

The facts are: The Pacific Basin is more than 70 million square miles and two-thirds of the world's population. Its ocean rolls ashore on five continents, more than thirty countries, and countless territories and islands.

Its nations include super powers, the world's largest consumer market, some of the world's fastest growing economies, the world's most populous nation, and some of its least populous.

It cradles the world's oldest civilizations and some of its youngest. Its political institutions span the spectrum: Communist, military dictatorship, constitutional monarchy, and parliamentary and constitutional democracy.

Its economies include both those which are centrally-controlled and those which are market-oriented, though the trend is toward central control.

Its nations differ greatly in population, climate, religion, language, culture, history, and philosophy.

21-097 O—83——3

Pacific nations are individual--different from one another and different in sum from the Atlantic nations. This situation has vital economic and social implications, calling for a fundamental reorientation of thinking on the part of many Americans, a reorientation which should permeate the program of a National Peace Academy.

In this regard, I would urge the proposed Academy to take a fresh look at the role businesses and business people can play in facilitating international unity. Multi-national business is an instrument of international interchange, contributing to international understanding and, hopefully, peace. I believe that businessmen going about the world making promises and keeping them, doing business across international borders, can surpass the work of the foreign service and foreign policy itself in promoting peace among nations. French political economist Fredrick Bastiat wrote 150 years or so ago that--"when goods and services do not cross borders, soldiers will." I believe that free trade and economic interdependence among nations, particularly nations politically hostile toward each other, can make a lasting contribution to the preservation of peace.

This, I believe, is the fundamental reality which the National Peace Academy should convey in training oncoming leaders for an active role in conflict resolution.

Finally, some suggestions:

1. I propose that the organizational pattern of Howard University in Washington be looked upon as a model for the Academy. The essentials are an independent, sovereign Board and funding directly from Congress, supplemented by private voluntary contributions.

2. The private, voluntary sector also deserves plenty of representation in the organization and functioning of the Academy. In my view, the Academy will be useful only if it is divorced from the patterns and paths government officials and foreign service people have followed for so many years. The Academy will have usefulness only if it avoids duplication of present efforts and explores new ways and avenues.

3. It is better to start modestly and grow than to try to begin with a large enterprise which simply cannot become effective quickly enough and certainly enough to avoid disappointment. The target is elusive indeed, and merely throwing a lot of funds toward it will not do the job. This bill, S 564, appears to meet this suggestion.

But whatever is done, please consider (1) the Pacific people and experience as significant as those of the Atlantic, and (2) the ways the experience and the channels of business people may be helpful.

March 9, 1983

Senator Robert T. Stafford
Chairman, Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

Re: S.564

Dear Senator Stafford:

My name is Philip E. Jacob. I am Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Hawaii. Previously, I have been Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania for 25 years.

I have authored a major text on international relations, The Dynamics of International Organizations (Dorsey Press). With Karl W. Deutsch and others, I wrote The Integration of Political Communities (J. B. Lippincott). My Changing Values in College (Harper) was an exploratory study of the impact of general education on student values. Propaganda by Shortwave, with J. Whitton and H. Childs was the first systematic study of the influence and strategies of foreign broadcasts to the United States (at the beginning of World War II). I have authored four other books, numerous articles, reports and monographs primarily concerned with international problems, community values and education.

My degrees are from Yale, University of Pennsylvania and Princeton.

Recently a report session on legislative action for the United States Academy of Peace was held at the Hawaii State Capitol. I would like to submit for your Committee's record a copy of that agenda and of my remarks entitled "What's The Opposition?"(enclosed).

Sincerely yours,

Philip E. Jacob
Professor Emeritus

encl.(2)

REPORT

ON THE UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE

February 7, 1983, 7:00 pm. The State Capitol
Senator Neil Abercrombie and Betty M. Jacob, Co-Chairmen

INTRODUCTION OF HONORED GUESTS -- Senator Neil Abercrombie

WHAT IS THE U. S. ACADEMY OF PEACE?

Betty M. Jacob, Coordinator, Hawaii Coalition for a U.S. Academy of Peace

UPDATE FROM CONGRESS

U. S. Senator Spark Matsunaga

HAWAII LEGISLATIVE ACTION

Senator Neil Abercrombie
Senator Duke Kawasaki
Representative Kathleen Stanley

RESPONSE FROM THE HAWAII CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION

Hon. Daniel K. Inouye
Hon. Daniel K. Akaka
Hon. Cecil Heftel

WHAT'S THE OPPOSITION?

Philip E. Jacob, Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii

HOW DO WE STAND?

Gerald A. Sumida, partner, Carlsmith, Carlsmith, Wichman & Case
Frederick Reppun, MD., Physicians for Social Responsibility
Msgr. Daniel Dever, Superintendent, Catholic Schools of Hawaii
Rabbi Arnold Magid, Temple Emanu-el
Rev. Robert Midgley, Central Union Church
Rex Wade, Dean, Division of Humanities, University of Hawaii
Barbara Fischlowitz, President, American Association of University Women
John Radcliffe, Executive Director, Hawaii State Teachers Association
Ah Quon McElrath, formerly Administrative Assistant ILWU
Bill Ogoshi, International Association of Machinists
Raymond Eblacas, American Veterans
Earl Fedje, Commander, U.S. Navy (retired)

DISCUSSION FROM THE FLOOR

WHAT'S THE OPPOSITION?

Remarks by Philip E. Jacob at the Community Report Session on the United States Academy for Peace

February 7, 1983

The State Capitol

We have a problem. From various quarters a formidable opposition has now formed to block legislation for the Peace Academy. A few of my colleagues at some universities say the Academy is not needed, because peace studies are already in good hands, particularly their own. Predictably, this view is shared by some in the State Department and the Pentagon, who maintain that peace is their business and they're doing a pretty good job taking care of it.

Then there's the Heritage Foundation which maintains that the government should not get into the business of education - this is against the American tradition of "pluralism." You may make an exception for military training but it would be unAmerican to have the federal government support even in part an institution specifically designed to train people professionally to help resolve conflict. This must be the prerogative of us political scientists and instructors in international affairs at Harvard, Tufts, Stanford and the University of Hawaii. This ill-deserved compliment has led some members of Congress to conclude that all's well. For example, last session six Senators opposed the Peace Academy bill in committee, for this reason.

The President is on record in opposition, worried about the cost.

Then from an unexpected group of deeply concerned persons about our relationships with the rest of the world comes a feeling

that an American-initiated institution such as this might give the impression that we are trying to preempt the peace issue. The Academy would appear, justified or not, as another ploy in the game of American global diplomacy.

So - this is what we confront. From some academics, some government leaders (executive and legislative), some internationalists. I emphasize some because as was evident during the Commission Hearings here and throughout the country, and in subsequent commentary, and in the tremendous support generated in Congress around Senator Matsunaga and his colleagues, backing for the Academy is widespread and deeply grounded. But we must be prepared to face the opposition on its merits.

First, the question of cost. The Senate bill calls for $31 million to get the Academy operating, including setting up modest facilities and covering two years of operation. The Commission estimated fullscale operations thereafter might approximate $15 to $20 million annually. Use any base for comparison you wish - this is a bargain. Let's not talk about cruise missiles or aircraft. The President has just come forward with something more immediately relevant. For $65 million, he feels he can set up Centers of American Democracy in Europe, to explain what Europeans should know about how we run a democracy and how arms control should operate. For the same amount, he would have the product of four years of the Peace Academy - professionally trained international peacemakers, focused research on conflict resolution, regional centers for public information and a global network of interchanges with experienced practitioners from other countries on a basis of mutual concern, rather than "Hear ye, what us Americans have to tell you about making

democracy and arms control work."

Now, how about the case that the Academy is unnecessary? Here, I speak from personal experience and knowledge as a professor of international relations, with considerable awareness of what's going on at the best schools in the country. My conclusion quoting from a letter I wrote to Bud Smyser about an editorial he wrote on the Heritage Foundation report was: "Let's not be put off by some self-serving scoffers who blandly tell us to leave everything in the safekeeping of the 'great research institutions of this country.' I don't feel safe in their hands...You shouldn't either. Let's get on with the Peace Academy and do what is not being done."

The point is that those of us teaching in this field at the universities have quite a different job than the Peace Academy is being created to undertake. We are either introducing students to the field as part of their general education, or preparing them for careers in national diplomacy, the law, or academia. This is not specialized professional training in international conflict management. What the Peace Academy is designed to do is diminish our dependence on accident in finding and preparing a dependable core of persons on whom we and other countries can draw for what the late United Nations Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, called preventive diplomacy - the kind of diplomacy which forestalls or limits resort to violence in this dangerous world.

I do not want to belittle in any way the present trend toward peace studies programs at colleges and universities. Fortunately, such a program is just now being started at the University of Hawaii. But this is not professional training. It does for the field of conflict management what an undergraduate major in political science

does for someone going into law. These programs hopefully lay a solid preparatory groundwork. They do not make a lawyer.

This case was excellently made by the Chairman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, one of the institutions with highest credentials for expertise in the field. He wrote to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, who chairs the committee responsible for the Peace Academy bill, that "these schools (of international affairs) are an important element in developing the peacemaking capacities of the nation, but they hardly replace the potential of the Academy of Peace. Not only are they limited in the number of people they reach, but they have not been successful in producing and sustaining top quality comprehensive research on peace matters. The Academy should be a tremendous boon to education and training in international affairs. ...There is too much isolation in this critical area. The Academy can help break the logjam, create the critical mass of scholarship, educators, and trained personnel, and be the catalyst to move the United States to the forefront of peace efforts in the world."

Finally, what about the sensitive issue of the Academy becoming tarnished as an instrument, albeit unwitting, of U.S. diplomatic maneuver? The question was raised in a very perceptive way at a hearing last spring before the House Judiciary Committee here. I consider it the most serious of the issues with which we must deal, in view of the present distrust of U.S. policies abroad, both among our allies and in the Third World.

It calls for a range of action responses. Fundamental is the unequivocal commitment of the Academy's sponsors to its stated objectives of the maintenance of peace and the prevention of war -

with no explicit or implicit political or ideological qualifications. The peace objective cannot become a facade for any country's specific political or economic interests, including those of the United States, or the Academy's integrity will be suspected.

Then, the Academy should at once involve extensive participation in its activities of persons from other countries, especially countries outside our own "bloc." These should include specialists, practitioners as well as scholars; officials; and interns (the latter probably funded non-governmentally).

Another important policy should be to maintain close association with United Nations agencies and with non-governmental organizations such as the International Peace Institute and the Stockholm Institute on a basis of shared concern.

Furthermore, wherever possible, without seeming to intrude, the Academy should cooperate in the establishment of fully indigenous counterpart academies in other countries, and arrange for interchanges of staff and participants.

The ultimate clincher of effective denationalization of the Academy would be organization of joint projects with counterpart institutions, where trainees from several countries could work together during their programs, leading possibly to their involvement in internationally sponsored and internationally fielded assignments in conflict resolution attempts.

This is the time for maximum push. Mobilization of fully informed public support is essential. Properly directed, our efforts may have the result of convincement. Many persons may be open to thoughtful consideration of the issues we have been raising; and may themselves contribute helpfully to exploration of other problems. But other we shall simply have to overcome, in the conviction that, as with matters of supreme principle, we simply have to lay ourselves on the line, while respecting those who differ. This after all is not our cause - it is not an American cause alone - it is the life or death of all people on our planet.

1983 MAR 14 AM 9:18

UNA USA

UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Working Together for Peace, Freedom and Justice

Pasadena Chapter
723 East Green Street
Pasadena, California 91101
Telephone 449-1795 or 681-9244

Subcommittee Hearing Date
on S 564: March 16, 1983

STATEMENT TO THE U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, ARTS AND HUMANITIES IN SUPPORT OF ESTABLISHING THE U.S. ACADEMY OF PEACE

The United Nations Association, Pasadena Chapter, is in support of the establishment of a U.S. Academy of Peace.

It is is essential for the United States to focus its attention on developing and teaching techniques to resolve disputes peacefully instead of by military build-up of armed capacity for international violence. Implementation of this bill would be a most important and practical investment in peace research, education, and peacemaking skills.

The 450-member Pasadena Chapter urges passage of S 564.

Mrs. Evelyn Pickarts, President
United Nations Association
Pasadena, California, Chapter

Senator STAFFORD. And now we will stand the committee in recess until the chairman and members can return.

[Brief recess.]

Senator STAFFORD. The committee will please come to order. My apologies to all of you who appear in front of us for the situation on the floor. We are still in a rollcall vote, and it is possible I will be forced to return to the Senate. Instead of one rollcall, we had three. That means that this Senator envies all of you who work in places where things run in an orderly progression.

In any event, and again with apologies to our witnesses, we are virtually going to have to insist on a 5-minute time period now. We have had the light system installed, and all of you—and I do not like to do this—will get 4 minutes on the green, 1 minute on the yellow, and then the red, which is something most of us go through in the morning on the way to work.

And we are going to ask, if you are willing, that all questions, which members of the committee wish to ask be submitted to the witnesses in writing for responses in writing. And I will not repeat that for each panel because time is forcing us to be brief.

So, may I invite Ambassador Low, who is the scheduled first witness, to come to the witness table. Ambassador Low is the Director of the Foreign Service Institute at the Department of State here in Washington. Ambassador, we welcome you here and appreciate you taking the time to testify and assist this committee in its deliberations on the Peace Academy.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEPHEN LOW, DIRECTOR, FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador LOW. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I——

Senator STAFFORD. Those are very poor mikes. It will be necessary for you to speak right into it close up or people in the back of the room will not hear, which always reminds me of a meeting I recently attended. I asked the audience if they could hear me, and the people in the back of the room indicated they could not, at which time the people in the front row indicated they would like to change places with those in the back of the room. [Laughter.]

Ambassador LOW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this opportunity to respond to your invitation to Secretary Shultz to testify before the subcommittee on the bill to establish a U.S. Academy of Peace.

I will try to summarize my written testimony rapidly.

I am Stephen Low, Director of the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute. I previously served as U.S. Ambassador, first to Zambia and then to Nigeria. As a matter of background, I have taught political science at the University of California, and received a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School.

I have personally been involved, Mr. Chairman, in the matter of, under discussion, efforts to resolve international disputes between 1976 and 1979. I was a member of all of the Anglo-American missions that traveled to Rhodesia in those days and engaged in the ultimately successful effort to end the conflict in Rhodesia, and

now Zimbabwe, through an internationally acceptable agreement based on majority rule and independence.

I have written a chapter for a book, which I hope will appear shortly considering that effort and comparing it to others to see whether there are any lessons which we may draw from it.

Just a word, Mr. Chairman, about the Foreign Service Institute. It was established by the Congress in the Foreign Service Acts of 1946 and 1980 to provide training for all U.S. Government employees in the field of foreign relations. It is a school engaged in language, area, and professional studies designed to give the more than 20,000 U.S. Government employees enrolled in its courses each year a better understanding and further training in order to enable them to cope with the world in which our diplomacy is carried out and in which we must support efforts toward peace.

One of the activities we have recently established at FSI is the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, aimed at coordinating research, giving Foreign Service officers an opportunity to reflect and write.

One of the first activities of that center was a roundtable on negotiation which is preparatory for a conference to be held later in the year in the State Department on negotiation.

One of the first people assigned to it is doing a study on the use of multilateral forces in peacekeeping operations. FSI, of course, has a course on negotiations, and it has incorporated that course into the midcareer program; the midcareer program to which all officers are now assigned upon receiving their appointment of tenure into the Foreign Service.

The negotiations course is also taught to the executive seminar, the most senior course at FSI. The Foreign Service Institute also, of course, has a whole school of area studies. We study conflicts in specific terms in those area contexts. The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence Research funds research in the field.

ACDA, as has been pointed out, has in its charter responsibility for expenditure of funds for these purposes and has a Hubert Humphrey fellowship program. I do not mean to imply that the U.S. Government is satisfied with everything we are doing, but we are in contact, we are aware, we are incorporating as research goes on, as teaching techniques go on, we are incorporating that.

These Government activities, of course, are only a part; there is a lot that goes on privately, both studying the roots of conflict and techniques to resolve them. I will not review them; they are reviewed at length in the commission report. But the administration, Mr. Chairman, has to ask itself a number of questions. Why do we need another, a new institution devoted to the same things, covering the same grounds that our academic institutions are covering well?

What is it that this institution would study or teach which is not already being studied or taught elsewhere? Where would the students come from and where would they go should the U.S. Government become involved beyond the training of its own employees in the creation of a new, essentially academic institution?

Mr. Chairman, our conclusion—and the conclusion of not only this administration, but the previous administration—is that there is considerable work now underway within the Federal Govern-

ment in developing research and teaching in the field of negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution. In the private sector a number of new institutions and parts of older ones are engaged in research and development of thought in this field, and it is not clear that the academy could add anything new to this activity. If it goes beyond the work on techniques of dealing with disputes, it would then be entering the more traditional area of study of sources of conflict, political, social area studies, language studies, which is the work of our academic institutions around the country and abroad. In these areas, the academy would be duplicating or competing with the academic structure in place.

Therefore, the administration is forced to oppose this bill and the expenditure of funds for the purpose contemplated. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Low follows:]

Statement by Stephen Low

Director, Foreign Service Institute

Department of State

Before the Subcommittee on Education, Arts, and Humanities

of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources

United States Senate

March 16, 1983

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to respond to your invitation to Secretary of State Shultz to testify before this Subcommittee on S-564, a bill to establish the United States Academy of Peace.

My name is Stephen Low. I am the Director of the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute. Previously, I have served as United States Ambassador to Zambia and Nigeria. My background includes a doctorate in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

My comments, Mr. Chairman, do not differ from those of my predecessors who represented both this Administration and the previous one on the subject under discussion. We have all opposed the expenditure of public funds to create a U.S.

Government-sponsored and supported education and research institution of this kind.

A primary objective of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Department of State, must be and is maintenance of world peace. To this end, no effort can be spared, no piece of information or research overlooked, no idea left unconsidered. And, yet, our resources are limited and, therefore, we must make certain that both our human efforts and expenditures of funds are directed in the most effective possible ways toward stimulation of conditions which will maintain world peace. I would like to describe for you, Mr. Chairman, my own background of interest in this field and some of the things we are doing at the Foreign Service Institute in connection with it before giving you the reasons why the Administration opposes this legislation.

I have been personally involved in efforts to resolve international disputes by peaceful means for a number of years. Between 1976 and 1979, I traveled over half a million miles, and was a member of nine different Anglo-American missions engaged in the ultimately successful effort to end the conflict in what was then Rhodesia through an internationally-acceptable agreement based on majority

rule and independence. I have recently written a chapter analyzing that mediation effort for a book soon to appear which describes and compares mediation techniques applied in a number of different conflict situations where peace was seriously threatened. It is my personal view that the United States will be called upon frequently and insistently to play a role in helping defuse and resolve conflict situations around the world for the foreseeable future.

The Foreign Service Institute, which is charged by the Foreign Service Acts of 1946 and 1980 to provide training for all U.S. government employees involved in foreign affairs, is conscious of its obligation to include the subjects of negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution. It is a school engaged in language, area, and professional studies designed to give the more than 20,000 U.S. Government employees enrolled in its courses each year a better understanding and training to cope with the world in which our diplomacy must operate and peace must be sought. FSI recently established a Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs. One of its first activities was to sponsor an initial roundtable which brought together authorities on the subject of negotiation from around the country to consider it from various points of view and how it is

taught. That roundtable was preliminary to a more formal conference on negotiation which will be held in the State Department later this year. The Center intends to spend more time on this subject, drawing on the expertise of many Department officers who have spent a lifetime engaged in efforts to bring peace to one part of the world or another. One of them is now completing a study of the use of multilateral forces in peace-keeping operations.

FSI includes an element on negotiation in many of its courses. It has a course devoted exclusively to that subject. Elements of the Mid-Career and Executive Seminar courses also include simulations and discussions of negotiation techniques. We are assisted by the American Arbitration Association and by some distinguished retired American diplomats and others from the private sector in putting on these courses. FSI coordinators for Political Training recently surveyed current literature on the art of negotiation and published an article on it. The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research is funding a number of studies which lead to better understanding of conflict situations through its Office of Long Range Assessments and Research.

The Charter of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provides that it should undertake research and educational activity in its field. It has several programs underway. One of these is the Hubert Humphrey Pellowship Program which each year sponsors a number of study grants. It also supports a research program which assists scholars and research institutions.

I do not mean to imply that the U.S. Government is satisfied with what it is doing in the area of negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution. The field is a comparatively new and very active one. We are following development of studies in the area closely and are in touch with academic leaders in the field. We will incorporate into our courses and study useful new material as it is developed.

But these government activities are, of course, only a fraction of the studies, research, and teaching going on around the country which are aimed at helping understand both the roots of international conflict and the techniques of peaceful settlement. Meaningful study must include both these kinds of subjects. In the first category are the classic disciplines--political science and legal studies of international relations, international politics,

international law, international organizations. To these have more recently been joined the related fields of economic studies, psychology, cultural anthropology, organizational behavior, analytical methods. Graduate schools devoted entirely to international relations have come into existence and joined together in an Association of Professional Schools in International Affairs. Area and language study centers have grown up.

More recently some of the older schools have been joined by newer, independent research and study organizations to investigate the techniques of conflict resolution. Harvard has a negotiations project, Yale a Conflict Management Center, George Mason University in Northern Virginia a Center for Conflict Resolution. Organizations like the Institute for East-West Security Studies, the Futures Group, and the Negotiation Institute are a few examples of groups doing serious and worthwhile work in the field.

In the face of both this traditional and new imaginative activity, the Administration must ask a number of questions: Why do we need another new institution devoted to the same things and covering the same ground? What is it

that this institution would study or teach which is not already being studied or taught elsewhere? Where would the students come from and where would they go? Should the United States Government become involved, beyond the training of its own employees, in the creation of a new, essentially academic institution?

These are the considerations, Mr. Chairman, which led this administration as much as the one before it to oppose the proposal in S-564. As President Reagan wrote Senator Matsunaga, "In a time of severe budget stringencies, I find it difficult to justify the expenditure of...federal funds over the next several years for research, educational, and informational activities in an area where much work is already being done by private universities, institutes, and foundations."

In sum, Mr. Chairman, the Administration is forced to conclude that there is considerable work now underway within the Federal Government in developing research and teaching in the field of negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution. In the private sector a number of new institutions and parts of older ones are engaged in research and development of thought in this field. It is not clear

that the Academy could add anything new to this activity. If it goes beyond work on techniques of dealing with disputes, it would then be entering the more traditional area of the study of sources of conflict; political, social, area, and language studies which is the work of our academic institutions around the country and abroad. In this area, the Academy would be duplicating or even competing with the academic structure in place. The Administration, therefore, opposes this bill and the expenditure of funds for the purpose contemplated.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. We will be submitting some questions to you in writing, I am sure, not only from the chairman, but from the members of the committee. We are grateful to you for joining us.

The Chair would now invite panel I, if you would, to come to the witness table: Dr. James Laue, Vice Chairman, National Academy of Peace Commission, and director, Center for Metropolitan Studies, University of Missouri in St. Louis, Mo.; Mr. William Lincoln, commissioner, National Academy of Peace Commission, president, National Center Associates, Montpelier, Vt.; and, Rear Adm. Edward F. Welch, Jr., retired, past President, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

It would be my suggestion and thought, gentlemen, if it is agreeable to you, to go in the order in which I have announced your names, which means, Dr. Laue, you would be the leadoff witness. I probably have mispronounced your name, for which I apologize.

STATEMENTS OF JAMES LAUE, VICE CHAIRMAN, U.S. COMMISSION ON PROPOSALS FOR THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION, AND DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR METROPOLITAN STUDIES, AND PROFESSOR OF SOCIOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, ST. LOUIS, MO.; WILLIAM F. LINCOLN, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PEACE COMMISSION, AND PRESIDENT, NATIONAL CENTER ASSOCIATES, MONTPELIER, VT.; AND EDWARD F. WELCH, JR., PAST PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, R.I.

Mr. LAUE. I am glad to be here, Mr. Chairman, for I was, as you indicated, Vice Chairman of the Federal Commission which studied the idea of a peace academy. I was very pleased to be able to serve under the chairmanship of Senator Matsunaga, and I do commend you and the subcommittee for the work that you have done on this issue in the past.

In addition to what I have indicated in my testimony, I would add that I am chair-elect of the section on world conflicts of the American Sociological Association. This is another indication, I think, that these professional associations are getting more interested in the field of peacemaking and conflict resolution.

Your letter inviting us to testify asked three questions having to do with the need for the Academy, the format of the proposed Academy, and budget and oversight. I would like to highlight some points of my testimony in the few minutes I have available.

I will offer only a brief word now on the question of need, primarily because it seems to me that—as we look at the past record and as we have heard the testimony of Ambassador Lowe and other people on the second panel—there is general consensus that there is a need to strengthen and improve the way this country deals with conflict, particularly when it escalates to violence.

So it seems to me that most of the witnesses support the need to strengthen how we deal with conflict—the need, as one witness will say, to use our resources to pursue peace most effectively. The disagreement, of course, is on whether there ought to be a special institution of the U.S. Government to help center and focus that work.

I want to spend a little time, then, on the question of the format for the proposed institution. For your reference, I am on page 13 of my testimony, calling your attention to what is subtitled "Further Clarification of the Purposes of S. 564."

I note in point (1) in this section the federally chartered, nonprofit nature of the Academy. I talk then about the Academy as presented in S. 564 as being designed to take advantage of the extensive experience of Americans already in resolving conflict. And then we note under point (3) that the format proposed for S. 564 has as one of its major purposes the strengthening of existing activities and institutions in the peacemaking and peacekeeping fields. Those provisions under powers and duties, which is section 5(b) of the bill, all support the conscious aim of the Commission to work closely with existing schools and governmental units who have responsibility for research, training, or direct implementation of conflict resolution strategies. This section of my testimony explains, I think, some of the major provisions that would relate to existing activities.

On page 14, there is a section entitled "Good Relations with Existing Schools of International Relations." Here we particularly focus on section 5(b)(6) of the proposed legislation, which talks about degrees, certificates, and other forms of recognition. This section was drafted specifically with the interests and strong capabilities of the international relations and diplomacy schools in mind. I list a series of points here to indicate that 5(b)(6) does not say that the Peace Academy would grant degrees or would give degrees to students; rather, it says that the Academy may develop educational and research programs which may lead to degrees, certificates, and other forms of recognition. This language is intended to keep open the prospect for a dialog with the existing schools inside and outside the Government which carry on this type of activity.

One of the concerns of people who have been interested in the field but do not necessarily support establishment of the Peace Academy, is whether we would be developing a Federal institution which is too centralized, too much of a monolith in this field. I would answer that whenever the United States has taken on a

major national mission, it has taken the position that our existing schools and universities and other institutions are important, but if we are making a major Federal commitment to the problem—if we really are serious about a national mission—we generally form a budgetary and institutional commitment to pursue it. As I look at models for the U.S. Peace Academy, my point of view is that the question of proper format does not have as much to do with whether it grants degrees or not, but whether there is a rigorous core of scholarship at the Academy itself to be able to relate to the institutions already existing, rather than only serving as a passthrough for research funds or a conference coordinator.

I ask, for example, does the Smithsonian undercut or duplicate the work of American historians in universities? Does NASA undercut or dilute or make a Federal monolith out of space research? Do the National Institutes of Health do that to medical schools? I think the answer is, of course, no. These institutions are warmly welcomed as sources of intellectual ferment, coordination, guidance, exchanges, and, of course, research funds.

As a university research administrator, I am particularly sensitive to the need for focusing the efforts and the money that we put into research and development at this time in the Nation's history, and I think the Peace Academy would do just that in this field.

I would close by saying that the breadth and depth of support that exists for the Academy goes for beyond academics alone. I have 2 or 3 pounds of support materials to leave with you when I finish. Here you will find support letters from 10 university presidents, including Lattie Coor, the president of the University of Vermont, and Father Hesberg, the president of Notre Dame. There are endorsements from General Goodpaster, Vice Admiral Weymouth, John Richardson, the former Assistant Secretary of State, Lieutenant General Gregg, Maj. Gen. Leroy Anderson, Harold Saunders, also a former Assistant Secretary of State, Landrum Bowling, and a number of national organizations that have endorsed the concept, ranging from the Federation of American Scientists, the YMCA's of the United States, National Education Association, American Association of Retired Persons, AAUW, American Arbitration Association, the American Veterans Committee, and on and on.

Thank you for the chance to talk with you.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much. This is one place where you can run the lights once without getting a warning. [Laughter.]

Mr. LAUE. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Laue follows:]

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TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. LAUE
ON S. 564, THE U.S. ACADEMY OF PEACE ACT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, ARTS AND HUMANITIES
OF THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE

430 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

March 16, 1983
10:30 a.m.

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Mr. Chairman, Honorable Senators, Friends:

My name is James H. Laue. I am Director of the Center for Metropolitan Studies and a professor of sociology at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. My field of study and professional practice is conflict resolution, with a focus on mediation and conciliation. I had the honor of serving as Vice Chairman with Chairman Senator Spark M. Matsunaga on the Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution, having been appointed to the Commission by President Carter in December 1979. As you know, S. 564, which we are considering today, is a result of the work of our Commission, so I am especially pleased to be able to appear before you.

It is also gratifying to appear before this Subcommittee because your forerunner body had the foresight to conduct the first hearings in our nation's history on the idea of a Federal institution devoted to the systematic study of peace and peacemaking. Senator Pell chaired those initial hearings on S. 1776, the George Washington Peace Academy Act, in May 1976 -- hearings which began the process that has brought us these many steps closer to a visible national commitment to the study and teaching of peacemaking today.

For the record, I wish to commend to your serious attention the final report of the Commission, To Establish the United States Academy of Peace. It should be a part of the official record of this hearing in its entirety, for it reports on the work of the Commission in Washington and in 12 cities where public hearings were held throughout the nation, analyzes the need

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This testimony draws heavily on materials I presented to a joint hearing of House Subcommittees on International Operations, International Security and Scientific Affairs (both of the Committee on Foreign Affairs) and Postsecondary Education (Committee on Education and Labor) on July 20, 1982.

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for an Academy and the unique experience and capabilities the United States would bring to such an endeavor, documents the growth and content of the field of peacemaking and conflict resolution, and offers specific recommendations for the establishment of a federally-chartered, not-for-profit corporation, the United States Academy of Peace. S. 564, which was reported out of Labor and Human Resources in the 97th Congress, closely follows the draft legislation in Appendix A of the Commission's report. As Vice Chairman of the Commission, I spent many days in helping organize and edit the final report, and I can confidently recommend it to you as an accurate and judicious record of what the Commission learned.

I want to express thanks for the leadership of Senator Matsunaga in bringing the Commission into existence and in moving the idea of a formal national commitment to the study and practice of peacemaking as close to becoming a reality as it is today. The Senator's staff and those working with us in the Department of Education were living tribute to the highest ideals of government service through their conscientious work on this project.

I also am grateful for the roles played by Senators Jennings Randolph and Mark Hatfield in championing this practical approach to peace for many years, and for the sponsorship which you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of this Subcommittee and the full Committee have given to S. 564.

It gives me pleasure, too, to publicly thank the other seven Commissioners for their hard work and cooperation in discharging the responsibilities of the Commission. We were blessed with an excellent staff, and they deserve a great deal of credit for the thorough process, the final report and the legislation which is before you today. I am especially grateful to William J. Spencer for his leadership as Staff Director of the Commission, and Charles Duryea Smith who, as Special Assistant to Chairman Matsunaga during the latter days of the Commission's life, was responsible for the organization and writing of the final report which serves as the basis for your deliberations on these critical matters.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

My message to you today may be summarized as follows:

Interest in constructive approaches to peacemaking, and the fear of nuclear war, are at all-time highs among the American citizenry today.

There is a great need to apply what we know about peacemaking to contemporary world conflict situations. Recent and current examples include the Iranian hostage situation, the Middle East conflict, Central America, arms control talks, and the attempted mediation in the Falkland Islands crisis.

A substantial intellectual and practical base has been built for a field of "peace learning", whose creativity and practicality flows from the interaction of many disciplines, perspectives and persons with a common quest for just and lasting peace.

The United States Academy of Peace offers an immediate practical step that can be taken to respond to the expressed interest of the American people and to promote the peace and security of the nation and the world.

Following a long and effective American tradition, the Academy would conduct research, education, training and public outreach on international peacemaking and conflict resolution, paying close attention to what we have learned about the efficacy of such techniques as negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration in community and national settings as well.

Establishment of the Academy would be a cost-effective, practical and constructive step -- a signal to the entire world that the most powerful nation accepts its role as peacemaker with great seriousness and vision.

The organization of my remarks follows the outline of questions proposed by the Subcommittee:

1. The need for a federal institution designed to offer graduate and post-graduate programs, research opportunities and information services in peace studies and conflict resolution.

2. The appropriate format for such an institution, especially in reference to the provisions of S. 564.

3. The appropriate level of funding authorization and degree of federal oversight for such an academy.

NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE

There is nearly unanimous agreement among persons who have examined the proposals to establish the United States Academy of Peace -- opponents and proponents alike -- on the need for greater attention to development of the necessary personal skills and institutional capabilities to promote peaceful resolution of international conflicts. They have represented a full spectrum of views from liberal to moderate to conservative. Included among them are Dean Theodore Eliot of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, Senators Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa) and Jeremiah Denton (D-Alabama), Dr. Richard Pipes of Harvard and the Reagan Administration's national security staff, Admiral Edward Welch (former President of the Naval War College), and General Andrew Goodpaster (former Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point). But there is disagreement, of course, on the appropriate means.

Documentation of Need by the Peace Academy Commission

The need for a federal institution to focus the Nation's commitment to peacemaking is documented in the final report of the Peace Academy Commission, To Establish the United States Academy of Peace. After more than a year's study and hearings, the Commission concluded that the analysis of the experts and the concerns of citizens who testified on America's role in promoting peace and security were remarkably similar. World conflict has intensified -- and with it the threats to our national interest -- in at least four critical ways:

-- intensive struggles over resource control and use, complicated by the emergence of new nation-states and shifting national group alliances;

-- clash from different and often opposing political and cultural interests;

-- danger from proliferation of both mundane and sophisticated weaponry including nuclear arsenals; and

-- frustration over increasingly incapacitated international and multilateral institutions (p. 31).

In a broader sense, the need for, and the interest in, the United States Academy of Peace, are amply documented in the pages of the Commission's report -- and daily on the pages, screens, and speakers of our media. Millions of Americans from every station and state are struggling to find their appropriate roles in peacemaking. In dozens of city councils, hundreds of town meetings and a number of states, citizens have voted for a nuclear weapons freeze. Physicians, lawyers and other professionals now have organizations to promote peace. Thousands of house parties have gathered millions of signatures for a freeze. Every major religious body in the United States -- and many throughout the world -- have made peacemaking their highest priority for action during the opening years of the 1980s. The National Peace Academy Campaign has increased its membership tenfold from 3,000 to more than 30,000 since 1981. The United Nations special session on disarmament last June drew unprecedented public interest in the U.S. Within the last two weeks, both the National Governors' Conference and the National League of Cities have issued a formal call for reductions in defense spending. More than ever before, the American people are attempting to give concrete form to their deep yearning for peace and security.

In my view, the need for a federal commitment in this field is strong and clear. If America's interests -- and indeed those of all the world's peoples -- are to be advanced in our increasingly volatile international setting, we must respond to the pressing need for more rational and systematic ways of dealing with conflict and violence. We need a sustained and systematic effort to identify the conditions of conflict and the options for successful resolution for the United States and other nations in the world. Too often we find ourselves forced to respond to situations without having fully explored the causes for the conflict and the options available to us. Every experienced mediator knows that a major aim of all constructive conflict resolution is to get the parties to consciously select their actions from options available -- rather than automatically responding with force of violence to a perceived threat, thus cutting off a whole range of other possible responses.

It does not make sense for our leaders to have to literally "start over" each time a conflict arises; the causes, issues, poses, face-saving devices, processes and settlement packages -- and, therefore, the options available to the parties -- are similar from conflict to conflict. I am not suggesting that there is a pat answer to all conflicts, or even that all conflicts can be settled in a win/win fashion without a fight -- only that we should have adequate systematic data and advice

to be able to consciously chose how we want to proceed in any given conflict, whether the United States is a first, second or third party.

This need for a federal commitment is made clear in the Declaration of Findings and Purposes in Sec. 2(a) of S. 564, which focuses on several themes:

-- the "deep public need for the Nation to develop fully a range of effective options, in addition to armed capacity, that can leash international violence and manage international conflict;"

-- the lack of broadly-held skills, here and elsewhere, for dealing with a range of international conflicts;

-- the need to capitalize on the developing knowledge base in a variety of disciplines and the growing experience of nations and peoples in using such techniques as negotiation, conciliation, mediation and arbitration.

Improving America's Capability to Respond to Conflict

Professor Roger Fisher, Director of the Harvard Negotiations Project and a much-traveled consultant on problems of international conflict resolution, summarized the need before the House Subcommittees last summer:

> Peace is not a static state in which all differences have ended. We must expect an endless and ever-increasing number of complex international problems. War is one way to deal with them; peace is another. If we wish to reduce the risks and costs of war, we need to improve the processes of peace...
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> Today, there is no physical means of providing security for the people of the United States. Our survival depends upon decisions made in Moscow -- and Soviet survival depends upon decisions made here. To some extent we may influence Soviet leaders to become more peaceful by ourselves becoming more bellicose, and by threatening them with nuclear weapons. But we know how we react when they build large numbers of SS-18s and SS-20 missiles. Essentially, they will respond to the choices they see themselves as facing. Our skill at serving up realistic choices that are in their interest while advancing ours is the key to improving the odds on our survival...
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> Some suggest that the best way to deal with the urgent problem of improving the process of coping with international conflict is to leave it up to the universities -- to adopt a laissez faire policy. This totally misperceives the contrast between the kind of practical action that should be taken and the kind of academic approach to this subject universities have been taking...
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> On an urgent basis, much practical action could and should be taken. Some teachers and theoreticians of conflict resolution should be brought together and asked to produce materials reflecting the current "state of the art." These should be organized in the form of "draft handbooks" of immediate use

to practitioners, and in the form of teaching materials for use at various levels, from grade school to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Greatly expanded courses in negotiations and mediation should be taught at the Foreign Service Institute, [the] Air War College, the Naval War College and the National Defense University. Army, Navy and Air Force academies should all have courses which relate the use of military force to influence.

We need some organized "research and development" projects on negotiating cease-fires, on war termination, on negotiating limits on ongoing conflicts, and on joint crisis management among adversaries so that we know how to back out of a crisis without turning our backs. (We need to learn how to back up without backing down.) In addition to a hot-line teletype, we need to know what to say. We should have on hand some standard pre-negotiated cease-fire agreements with which both sides will be familiar.

We need some better designs for international meetings than Roberts Rules of Order and current diplomatic practice. Too often, today, international negotiations are conducted by first adopting unilaterally an opening "position" and then talking. It is usually wiser to talk first and decide later. Rather than opening with stated positions and then quarrelling, we need to design some meeting formats that permit the efficient use of human resources.

A working international conference might, for example, go through the following steps:

-- explore some alternative "bite sized" pieces of a conflict;
-- identify the real parties with interests in the piece;
-- clarify their interests to themselves and to each other;
-- generate a number of options that might reconcile those interests;
-- suggest appropriate criteria by which to measure which options are better;
-- select an option on which to work;
-- improve that option in the light of successive criticism;
-- formulate a "yesable proposition";
-- recommend it;
-- produce a decision, yes or no.

To say that universities by themselves will do what is needed is like saying that we do not need an army because we have ROTC on college campuses. It is like saying that we did not need a Manhattan Project because we had university physics departments, or that we did not need a government space program because we have university observatories.

University teaching of international relations and diplomacy falls as far short of what is needed as university teaching of the history of wars falls short of training a rapid deployment force. Academic teaching of cryptography at universities is no substitute for the Defense Intelligence Agency...

The Need to Capitalize on a Growing Field of Knowledge -- Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution

Critics who say that there is no field around which to construct a Peace Academy, or that the field is not analytically distinct from other disciplines, may not be familiar with chapter VI of the Commission's report, "The Field of Peace Learning." Here the history of peace research is analyzed, and the three major fields of activity of peace learning (peace as the absence of war, peace as social justice, and peacemaking techniques) are described. A 35-page bibliography of books, periodicals and compendia barely scratches the surface of the growing literature in the field. In other parts of the report, successful applications of conflict resolution to such international situations as hostage negotiation and the development of the Camp David Accords are detailed. The report describes the extensive experiences of Americans in resolving conflicts about labor relations, the environment, racial segregation, social services and conditions in prisons, and a discussion of what we may learn about international peacemaking from these activities.

To me the implications are clear: in the face of limited resources and no broad national commitment, nevertheless a field of peacemaking knowledge and techniques is growing, directly responsive to the interests and fears of the American people. The Congress faces a unique opportunity to nourish the field at this point in history.

I would argue that the "field" of peacemaking and conflict resolution (or peace learning) is not yet a "discipline" or a "profession", but is displaying a number of the characteristics of each: a sense of public need, a growing and cumulative literature, institutions and organizations, and some agreement on a common body of practice skills and ethics, for example.*

Dealing with Challenges to World Peace and Security

The need for a focused federal commitment to peacemaking is most clearly demonstrated in the challenges to peace and security the world presents us daily. The Iranian hostage situation ultimately yielded the results we wanted, but dramatically demonstrated the need for greater channels and skills in "second-track" diplomacy (informal contacts and negotiations when formal diplomatic recogition is not possible). The Camp David Accords showed the effectiveness of the single negotiating text in an international setting -- and the value of a tenacious mediator (President Carter). But the ongoing Middle East conflicts now present us with the need for dozens of Philip Habibs from the United States and from other countries. Non-Americans may, in specific situations, offer a better base for mediation. The confirmation debate surrounding Mr. Adelman reveals the desperate need for continuity and adequate analytic back-up for American negotiators. The explosive situation in Central

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*For a similar view and enthusiasm about the rapid recent development of the study of negotiations, see William Zartman (ed.), The Negotiation Process: Theories and Applications (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978), p. 7.

America cries for creative approaches born of joint problem-solving rather than military or litigational models. It will be recalled that last year Mexico offered to mediate between the United States and various Central American countries; where was the analytical and strategic capability to follow up on that offer?

The good offices role of the Secretary General of the United Nations has tremendous potential for dealing with international conflicts and crisis -- but only if strong nations endorse and support it. It appears to me that the United States has offered its support only in a limited way. The Falklands/Malvinas crisis is a case in point. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, who was eager to use his office for good in the Falklands crisis, lost precious weeks while waiting for the attempted mediation by the United States to run its unsuccessful course.

Indeed the Falklands case most dramatically shows the need for the United States to develop a serious, systematic and sustained focus on its role in world conflict situations. This country was placed in an untenable situation by trying to "mediate" the dispute, apparently through simple lack of a concept of the required preconditions for effective dispute resolution. Secretary Haig undertook a mission under conditions which no experienced mediator would touch.

We have a desperate need as a nation to learn from that -- and other -- situations. Consider what might have happened if there had been a sustained and disciplined group of researchers at the U.S. Academy of Peace helping think through the strategies and options for American activity in the Falklands situation.

First it must be said that the Reagan administration took a highly commendable -- and bold -- step in dispatching Secretary Haig to attempt to mediate the dispute and avoid violent confrontation. Secretary Haig's mediation attempts involved a herculean effort on his part and that of his staff. They have been fair game for analysis and second-guessing during and since the activity. I offered an analysis while the mediation effort was under way, in my testimony to this Subcommittee on April 21, 1982. Much of what follows now is consistent with that statement. Within a framework of admiration and appreciation for what Secretary Haig and the Administration did, I want to offer the following discussion so the Subcommittee can see how conflict analysts might have approached this situation.

a. The Decision to Intervene. There are five distinct roles that emerge in any conflict situation as possibilities for third party intervention -- activist, advocate, mediator, researcher, and enforcer.* Of first importance is an analysis of the background, parties, issues, power of the parties, underlying issues, potential face-saving devices, etc., in the specific situation. If, after such analysis, the potential third party decides to intervene, then the crucial question is, "In what role?"

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*See James H. Laue and Gerald W. Cormick, "The Ethics of Intervention in Community Disputes," in Gordon Bermant, Herbert Kelman, and Donald Warwick (eds.), The Ethics of Social Intervention (Washington, D.C.: Halsted, 1978), pp. 205-32.

I believe the U.S. mission had a low probability of success from the very outset because of a basic role conflict between our expressed role as "mediator" and our actual underlying alignment as an advocate for one of the parties -- Great Britain. The Secretary of State of the most powerful nation in the world has special difficulty being perceived as "neutral" in such a conflict. Clarifying, carrying messages, facilitating communication, floating potential solutions -- all these common functions of the mediator are undermined if all the parties do not have confidence that his professed alignment or non-alignment with the parties is, in fact, his real position. How could Argentina trust the role of the U.S. as mediator when it was clear that, should negotiations break down, we would side with Great Britain? Indeed, in the final days before Secretary Haig declared his mission unsuccessful, it was known by all the parties and all the world that the State Department was drafting a statement of support for Great Britain! It was as though I were asking two of you to trust me to help solve your problem, when both of you are certain that I will favor one of you when the crunch comes.

Note that the basic role confusion described above exists independently of the good intentions or skills of the third party -- it is a basic structural problem that must be taken into account in selecting an appropriate intervention role. If I were a member of the U.S. Congress, I would want to know whether this kind of analysis of base and role options was conducted before the Administration's decision to intervene. America's decision about our role in attempting to solve world problems peacefully must be based on sound evidence and logic, not on good will and good intentions alone. Is there a source where the Administration and appropriate Committees of the Congress can turn for this kind of analysis and advice when we face a future Falklands?

A better approach to the Falklands crisis, given our base and relationship to the parties, would have been to immediately support mediation by the Office of the Secretary General of the United Nations while simultaneously using our informal good offices to help secure the necessary Security Council backing, encourage the parties to engage in face-to-face discussions under the auspices of the Secretary General, and stress our bottom-line position that armed aggression cannot be tolerated. Then the United States also would be in a position to assume the benign object-of-blame role when the major parties need to make face-saving gestures about why they are even talking to the enemy or offering apparent concessions.

The United States need not play the center-stage role in every such situation. Often there are better ways to assist in peacemaking. It is hard for me to believe that Secretary Haig would have been thrust into this no-win role had an in-depth role analysis been undertaken first.

b. Establishing the Right Forum. The parties to the Falklands/Malvinas dispute never found the right forum for their bargaining activities, in my view. They were continuously engaged in what labor-management specialists call "forum-shopping" -- seeking the arena of discussion that will give your interests the best chance to prevail.

The proper conditions for constructive negotiations in this situation would have included at least the following:

-- face-to-face meetings of Prime Minister Thatcher and President Galtieri -- or at least of Foreign Secretary Pym and Foreign Minister Costa Mendez -- under the auspices of a third party (presumably the U.N. Secretary General) strong enough to attract and hold them;

-- a common site for the negotiations;

-- some provision for representation of the interests of a major party to the dispute -- the 1,800 Falklanders who had previously rejected British efforts to re-align their interests in the islands;

-- a skilled mediation team, probably involving professionals in international conflict resolution from several countries, with a wide variety of orientations, skills, and networks.

c. The Dynamics of the Negotiations. The fact that several of the conditions noted above were not met, placed the negotiators and Secretary Haig in an extremely difficult position. A situation involving an 18-hour shuttle between the parties clearly undermined the process, precluding the informal staff-level interaction where solutions often are developed, and permitting the parties to back down or formalize opposition to positions fashioned nearly one day earlier. The mediator-with-muscle or star mediator model used by Secretary Haig actually promoted an adversarial relationship, with the parties and the media continually referring to "the Haig peace proposal" or "the American peace proposal" (and eventually the Argentine proposal or the British proposal carried by Haig) instead of "our proposal". If the process is to work, the third party should be assisting the parties at-interest in developing their own joint proposal -- not placing them in the position of having to respond to a proposal "owned" by a third party whose underlying interests are clear to all. American administrations, accustomed to owning the process as well as the levers in conflicts, will have to consider the prospect that the parties themselves -- those who have the primary stake in the conflict -- should develop and own their own joint peace plans.

Any attempt at mediation at this level places 24-hour demands on the mediator. In this case, the Secretary of State already had a 24-hour-demand job, and the conflicting role obligations on him must have been fierce. Did he have adequate back-up staff, asking the right questions and drawing on persons skilled in analyzing strategies and options in conflict situations? Again, I would think the Congress would want to know.

The basic role-conflict in the U.S. position took its toll throughout the mediation effort, with the Argentinians immediately warming up to the efforts of U.N. Secretary Perez de Cuellar (a Latin diplomat) and those of his native Peru to attempt to establish a new forum. Secretary Haig had difficulty maintaining continuity with a fractionated Argentine junta suspicious of U.S. intentions. On a number of occasions he had to put out messages that he "stands ready to go back to Buenos Aires" to continue his mediation -- a weak position for the mediator in contrast to the implied power that flows from the mediator's identification with and control of a neutral site for negotiations. And Secretary Haig's

position as a "mediator" must have become untenable as armed confrontation approached and the U.S. prepared to issue its statement of support for Great Britain and condemnation for Argentina -- as both sides knew would happen from the outset if negotiations failed.

So, our attempt at peacemaking and conflict resolution in the Falklands crisis failed. We had the best of intentions. We had the formal power, but could not use it. We had the highest level of the Administration committed to helping "mediate" the crisis. We burned much midnight oil and jet fuel in a dramatic and debilitating shuttle diplomacy approach.

We can only ask whether we had the best of advice, whether the same amount and quality of analysis, planning, care, staff, and back-up capability that we so successfully apply to space ventures and military missions were available and utilized in this peace mission.

* * *

We need, then, to capitalize on this unique opportunity for the United States to regain leadership as a major force for active peacemaking in the world. We cannot afford to be out-negotiated rather regularly by the better-trained Soviet negotiators (according to Pipes and others) or, in the complaint of Rep. Paul Simon (D-Illinois) last summer, send delegations to United Nations special sessions on disarmament unprepared to take advantage of major opportunities to establish a strong scenario for ongoing peace and disarmament talks.

Pipes told the Commission in Boston that the U.S. needs to pay "far more attention...to the teaching of negotiating techniques" so we can stand a better chance of producing the "superb negotiators" turned out by a six-year training course in the Soviet Union (p. 144, Commission Report). The heads of the three service academies were unanimous in their support of the idea of an institution like the Peace Academy to offer intensive instruction in negotiation and conflict resoluiton to their graduates. Others, including Roger Fisher, have noted the receptivity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the NATO commanders, the strategic gaming units of the Defense Department, the Naval War College and others to these approaches. And in the last several years the Foreign Service Institute in the State Department has turned to the American Arbitration Asscciation to conduct training for mid-career and advanced Foreign Service officers in negotiating techniques.

So it must be said that the need is present, the interest of the American people in sound new approaches to peacemaking is high, and a healthy bi-partisan share of the Congress is supportive. The legislation is ready to move forward through the Congress.

FORMAT FOR THE UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE

The format proposed for the United States Academy of Peace in S. 564 directly and efficiently responds to the need for a focused federal

commitment to the study and teaching of peacemaking. The Peace Academy would be

> "an independent, nonprofit, national institution to serve the people and the Government through the widest possible range of education and training, basic and applied research opportunities, and peace information services on the means to promote international peace and the resolution of conflicts among the nations and peoples of the world without reccurse to violence" (Sec. 2.b).

Basic Functions

The three basic functions (education, research, and outreach) would be centered on four specific approaches to peacemaking and conflict resolution: negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration.

The Academy would not be a policy-making or direct intervention body, just as the service academies do not themselves make military policy or fight wars. But the work of the Peace Academy could have immediate and direct relevance for the peacemaking and peacekeeping activities of the U.S. government. For example, the Academy could:

-- maintain a computerized data bank of all existing treaties and the issues, conditions, time limits, historical background and negotiations patterns relating to the treaties and the nations involved;

-- provide a working group of specialists in, say, the negotiating behavior of the Soviets and other nations, or common characteristics of successful international mediators;

-- conduct seminars for the Congress and administration officials about current crises;

-- create from its pool of faculty and researchers advisory groups on conflict situations such as the Falklands or Middle East conflicts, drawing on specialists in the particular geopolitical area or the interests at issue, as well as experts in conflict resolution in the cultures involved;

-- pursue highly specialized research in peacemaking and peacekeeping through ongoing relationships (including grants and contracts) with such existing institutions as the schools of international relations, the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, the International Peace Academy, and in the new U.N. University for Peace;

-- draw together a critical mass of thinkers over a substantial period to pursue an understanding of the causes of sustained peace among nations, in contrast to the narrow crisis-response nature of much current fact-finding and research.

Further Clarification of the Purposes of S. 564

Several items in the legislation deserve further clarification and discussion here.

1. The Academy would be a federally-chartered, nonprofit corporation modeled along the lines of the Smithsonian Institution and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. It would be subject to Congressional oversight, but would not be an agency or instrumentality of any branch of the federal government. There would be a private endowment, individual and organizational memberships, and a board composed predominantly of private citizens. This structure is intended to provide for the maximum degree of breadth and autonomy in pursuing its mission independent of the pressures of special interests both in and out of government.

2. The Academy as presented in S. 564 is designed to take advantage of the extensive experience of Americans in resolving conflict. Seminars, programs, internships, exchanges and other outreach activities all may be envisioned under S. 564 to draw on the considerable skills and interest in conflict resolution developed in the United States -- in particular in the last several decades.

3. The format proposed in S. 564 has as one of its major purposes the strengthening of existing activities and institutions in the peacemaking and peacekeeping fields. The following provisions under "Powers and Duties" (Sec. 5.b) all support the conscious aim of the Commission to work closely with existing schools and governmental units with responsibilities for research, training, or direct implementation of conflict resolution strategies. The Academy may:

-- establish a Center for International Peace which would attract major scholars for a period of up to two years (5.b.1).

-- enter into formal and informal relationships with other institutions, public and private (5.b.3).

-- develop programs to make international peace and conflict resolution research, education, and training more available and useful to persons in government, private enterprise, and voluntary associations (5.b.5).

-- provide peace education and research programs at graduate and postgraduate levels that lead to degrees as well as to certificates and other forms of recognition (5.b.6).

-- establish a clearinghouse and other means for disseminating information (5.b.9).

-- undertake extension and outreach activities by making grants and entering into contracts with a range of educational institutions (including postsecondary) and other organizations such as libraries, public departments and agencies of all levels of government, etc. (5.c).

Good Relations with Existing Schools of International Relations

This last potential power of the Academy is especially important in the promotion of good relationships with existing schools of diplomacy and international relations and with the federal departments involved in peace and security activities. The purposes of the grants would include basic and applied research, promoting the study of international peace and conflict resolution by educational and other institutions, educating and training, and assisting the Academy in its publication, clearinghouse and other information services programs (5.c.1-4).

Of specific concern to some of the critics of the Academy who are based in existing instituitons of higher education (especially those in schools of international relations and diplomacy) is provision 5(b)6, which deals with "peace education and research programs at graduate and postgraduate levels that lead to degrees as well as to certificates and other forms of recognition." Apparently they fear that the Peace Academy would be, in essence, a federal graduate school of international relations which would unfairly compete with their own schools, drawing away students and financial resources and leading to an unhealthy "certification" of diplomats and negotiators that would work against their interests as well as the public-private pluralism which has served this country's education needs so well.

I am sorry that this interpretation has developed, for this section on "degrees", "certificates" and "other forms of recognition" was written specifically with the interests and strong capabilities of the IR/diplomacy schools in mind:

1. This provision is one of more than a dozen "powers and duties" the Academy's directors may (or may not) chose to exercise.

2. The programs would lead to degrees, certificates and the like. This section was written in this manner to leave the way open for cooperation with existing degree-granting institutions, who could send students to the Peace Academy for some of their work while maintaining control of their matriculation toward a degree offered by the sending institution.

3. Retaining this provision of the legislation would promote early and extensive interaction between the Peace Academy and the existing foreign service schools (in the government as well as the universities) as they develop mutually agreeable courses, internships, exchanges, field experiences, and, optionally, compensation and credit arrangements.

4. Some diplomacy school leaders have expressed primary interest in research, training and the scholarship monies potentially available to them through the Peace Academy. These would be important functions of the Academy -- but if it is to fulfill its critical national mission it must have at its base a critical mass of scholars pursuing the most rigorous possible program of research on the causes and strategies of peace.

It is not enough for the Peace Academy to be staffed only by grants administrators and conference coordinators. Unless the Peace Academy has a strong substantive intellectual life of its own, it will be open to the devasting cooptation or take-over by existing special interests that we have seen all too often in well-intentioned new institutions.

The need for early, substantial cooperation with the diplomacy/IR schools is great. There is ample evidence that these schools have done magnificant work in advancing our understanding of the world system, international relations and in some cases, the practice of formal diplomacy. But an analysis of the curricula of such schools indicates that very little attention is paid to the specific focus of the Peace Academy: research and hands-on training in the theories and skills of negotiation, mediation, conciliation and other approaches to conflict resolution. Only a few schools -- Syracuse, Pennsylvania, and George Mason among them -- offer graduate degrees specifically in conflict resolution or peacemaking. Most of the some 100 programs affiliated with the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED) are peripherally-funded undergraduate certificates or emphases in "peace studies".

The most serious confusion on this issue lies in the statements of some of the critics (among them diplomacy deans, federal executives and Members of Congress) equating the study of "internation relations" or "international affairs" with the specific research and training goals of the proposed Academy in conflict resolution and peacemaking. Training in conflict resolution techniques surely must be conducted against a backdrop of the knowledge of historical context and international relations, but it goes far beyond in its specificity, focus, and use of case materials, training exercises and hands-on apprenticeships.

It should be noted that there is ample precedent for the establishment by the federal government of institutions to meet demonstrated national needs: the war colleges, the Foreign Service Institute, the National Defense University, the graduate school of the Department of Agriculture and, most prominently the Department of Defense's medical school in the NIH complex in the northwest suburbs of Washington. Last yest the Defense Department spent approximately $30 million on its medical school, training some 500 students not only in general medicine but in "military medicine". It is a well-established way of doing things: the U.S. government decided that the need for a certain set of skills is so critical for our future national security that a new institution was created, even though we have the finest network of medical schools in the world.

The Peace Academy should be viewed by the diplomacy schools not as a threat, but rather as a great new resource with important potential for advancing the interests of these schools as well as broader national goals. If only our vision were as broad as the community of medical researchers; we hear few complaints from hospitals or medical schools about competition from NIH on cancer research or the compromising of our "private" education by the enormous proportion -- some estimates say as high as 90 percent of the total cost -- of the education of medical studetns supported by public funds. If only our vision were as broad as those who formed NASA; without them and their insistence on a coordinated,

institutionally-focused space program as a national priority, the space shuttle would not yet be on the launching pad or even the drawing board.

In short, there is plenty of work for all of us to do. There is no single "correct" track to peace and security. I am personally disappointed that some members of the educational establishment view the idea of a Peace Academy as a win/lose threat to the limited existing activities in the field rather than a timely opportunity to bring together diverse interests pursuing the common goals of peace, justice, and world security. As the director of a university research center immersed in the fiscal woes of higher education in the 1980s, I urge scholars to pull back from their fixation on scarcity, and regain the vision that has been required to spur every major educational and technological advance.

The Position of the Higher Education Community on the Peace Academy

Some administrators at schools of international affairs have raised objections to certain permissive powers of the proposed Peace Academy, as noted earlier in this testimony. It appears, however, that the vast majority of educators in peace-related fields are supportive of the Academy. Supporters include the recently retired Superintendent of West Point, General Andrew Goodpaster; the International Studies Association and the American Sociological Association; the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (whose leadership and membership turned, upon thorough study of the proposal, from opposition to support); and hundreds of individual faculty members and administrators from private and public institutions, including some from the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State.

Of particular note are the following comments. First, an excerpt from a letter of this Subcommittee last year from Dr. Barbara Standord, President of COPRED:

> [COPRED is] convinced that a National Academy of Peace would complement rather than conflict with existing academic programs. First, peace studies is an interdisciplinary field of studies, related to but quite different from international relations and foreign service training. Peace studies is an interdisciplinary field drawing knowledge about conflict management from such diverse fields as psychology and labor relations... Like military studies, peace and conflict studies is closely related to international relations and foreign service studies, but it focuses on special skills in managing conflicts before they deteriorate into violence or in stopping wars and moving conflicts from the battleground to the negotiating table. The fact that the Falkland Islands conflict has deteriorated into a war that neither side apparently wanted is good evidence that existing institutions are not meeting all of our needs for international conflict management expertise.

Dr. Guthrie S. Birkhead, Dean of the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, submitted a statement to the Subcommittee on April 29, 1982, from which the following passages are drawn:

> ...The establishment of a Peace Academy will enhance our activities, not harm them. I anticipate three kinds of institutional benefits for our school. First, encouraging work for peace should expand the number of students in the field. This should mean more students taking degrees to prepare for the specialized training of the Academy. Second, the increased support for research will enable our faculty and graduate students to conduct needed studies and improve the quality of information we transmit in our teaching. Third, the outreach programs of the Academy should alert more people throughout the country to the possibilities of learning how to cope effectively with conflicts. This too will help us since more persons will seek additional education and training.
>
> The U.S. Peace Academy can be organized so as to further its basic programs in collaboration with existing institutions...

1. The Academy should provide and channel funds for research, training, and evaluation to scholars and institutes in well-established institutions.

2. The Academy should thus enable scholars from different institutions to collaborate in research, training, evaluation, and outreach. A few scholars could have extended periods of residence at the Academy.

3. The Academy faculty should concentrate on research and short-term training. I do not favor the development of an undergraduate degree program at the Academy.

4. The establishment of a few regional centers, in addition to the central offices in the Washington area would increase the usefulness of the Academy. Regional centers could best be placed at established institutions, where faculty, students, and experience already exist. Such a center then could serve as a focus for linking and expanding regional activities...

I have noted a few, but not all, of the ways in which the proposed U.S. Peace Academy would benefit and enhance existing schools of public affairs. A national Peace Academy would not only serve as an important symbol of the U.S. commitment to nonviolent resolution of conflicts but also serve to advance and strengthen our national commitment to citizenship education and involvement in public affairs.

Dr. Roberta Balstad Miller is Executive Director of the Consortium of Social Science Associations, which represents 10 disciplinary and professional organizations, including all of the major social science groups and the American Association of Law Schools. She speaks from a much broader base than those whose concern is focused on only one type of educational institution -- the diplomacy or international relations school. She told this Subcommittee in the 97th Congress on April 21, 1982:

> ...There is a significant, large and growing research community that is concerned with 'peace research.' The establishment of a Peace Academy at this juncture would not only be an extremely valuable asset to this community, but it could also supply the impetus for major research discoveries. Most researchers in this area work independently and largely within the isolation of their own universities. While they attend meetings, give papers and publish their results, there is currently no institutional framework within which they can meet and interact for prolonged periods of time... A Peace Academy could bring together a number of major researchers for extended periods of time and by releasing them from other university responsibilities, could provide a medium for interaction and collaboration that could be critical for the future development of this research field.
>
> A second area of great need is in the training of new peace researchers... There are no post-doctoral fellowships for students in this field, as there are in physics, chemistry, etc.... A post-doctoral fellowship program at a Peace Academy would provide these students with the opportunity to interact with other researchers and the time to further their own research.
>
> Finally, but perhaps most importantly, a Peace Academy would play a critical role in funding and developing further research... The research on conflict processes that is currently being done would be greatly enhanced, stimulated and furthered by the establishment of a Peace Academy. For this reason, it goes without saying that the research community would welcome and work with such an institution.

I urge the cooperation of higher education leaders -- in the diplomacy schools, in the major universities and in the associations -- in fashioning an Academy that will strengthen their own work while also strengthening the nation's development of the field of peacemaking and conflict resolution. I believe the provisions of S. 564 will allow us to do just that, but I am eager to work with others in higher education who may be concerned about the current language to see whether we can develop provisions that are even more responsive to the needs.*

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*There are ample models in and out of government on which the Peace Academy could draw in building an intellectually rigorous core and solid cooperative relationships with existing institutions, among them the National Institutes of Health, the war colleges, the Woodrow Wilson Center of the Smithsonian, the Brookings Institution, and the American Enterprise Institute.

In summary, I suspect that what we are seeking is a Peace Academy that would be:

-- responsive to the national interest in and need for improving the nation's role as a peacemaker, but not hampered by undue interference from any of the branches of government or private interest;

-- capable of drawing and holding the very best minds for work on the specifics of international peacemaking and conflict resolution;

-- in a close and cooperative working relationship with the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State, with the schools of diplomacy and international relations, with the higher education community, and with private and citizens sector organizations throughout the country whose energies can be mobilized for the serious study and practice of peacemaking techniques; and

-- capable of improving this nation's research, training, and practice in the skills of negotiation, mediation and coping peacefully with international conflict.

FUNDING AND FEDERAL OVERSIGHT FOR THE U.S. ACADEMY OF PEACE

Having spent many days in the work of the Peace Academy Commission in helping develop funding and oversight provisions for the Peace Academy, I am convinced that the structure outlined in S. 564 is appropriate. Some comments are in order, however.

Benefits and Costs of a United States Academy of Peace

The $31 million appropriation proposed for the first two years of the Peace Academy (which includes capital funds) is a modest public investment, which is expected to help generate private funds for operation and endowment. This investment amounts to a seven-cent annual cost for each American citizen, compared to $1,100 per capita for defense. The Commission and Congressional supporters of the Peace Academy are not proposing the building of elaborate new buildings or purchasing expensive land for a campus. Recycling a surplus federal facility has been suggested, and at least three tentative and unsolicited offers of other land (with some facilities on some of the parcels) within easy reach of Washington have been made.

While cost/benefit ratios are hard to calculate in this area, the Commission and many others believe that effective application of recognized conflict resolution techniques could significantly lower many costs -- in wars averted, in increased economic development, in lives saved. The Falklands crisis cost Great Britain $2.5 billion and Argentina $3.5 billion, not counting, of course, the cost in lives and the threat to world security.

The cost issue comes down to this:

1. The Academy will require a small amount of federal funds, especially in the early years.

2. This amount is significantly smaller than that now committed to the military academies, war colleges, defense-related research, and related activities -- now at least $23 billion annually.

3. Federal funds for the Academy should not be pirated from existing programs for international affairs, area studies, diplomacy training, language studies and the like.

4. The major issue is not one of cost but one of priorities: is the systematic and explicit pursuit of peace a serious enough national cause to invest a small amount of public funds for specific study and training, in the face of the billions of federal dollars that are available annually for R & D on military and defense-oriented approaches to peace?

Two of your colleagues from the Senate put the issue in perspective in testimony before this Subcommittee in April 1982. Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon), Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, said:

> I am, of course, quite sensitive to the budget problems which face us. I remind my colleagues, though, that we are currently engaged in cutting waste from the federal budget. There are those who are charging that this proposal is extravagant, but I submit the opposite is true: this is no extravagance -- it is a necessity.

Senator Roger Jepsen (R-Iowa) spoke eloquently:

> ...Historical lessons reinforce my support for America's defense build-up. I never want to see the fate of American lives dependent upon the good will of our enemies.
>
> But history teaches other lessons as well.
>
> There are many instances when massive bloodshed has been avoided by negotiation. There are many instances when international agreements have been kept. Such savings of life through diplomacy are among the bright spots of history. Yet negotiations, however sincerely entered into by both sides, have not always triumpted...
>
> Today the stakes of war are...great..., but the chance of a needlessly lost peace remains. The United States Academy of Peace is designed to train people capable of reducing the risk of such a lost peace and this is why it is important. This is a modest claim but it is enough.
>
> To enthusiastically support the United States Academy of Peace, one need not believe either that one can negotiate away all wars, or that the training given at the...Academy... will

enable its graduates to prevent every war that is, in theory, preventable. Rather if this added focus on the peace process -- if this added training to our future negotiators prevents even one small war that otherwise would have started, the Peace Academy will rank among the best expenditures ever made by this government.

...I will say the same thing for peace as I said in response to how much is enough for our defense: we must do whatever we must do to maintain the peace. The same goes for the Peace Academy. The proper amount that we should spend on that to keep the peace is whatever it will take. $31 million is a bargain. (emphasis added)

Federal Oversight of the Academy

The provisions for federal oversight in S. 564 are adequate and appropriate, in my view. I would call special attention to the following:

1. The federally-chartered nonprofit nature of the Academy is designed to keep the various interests in balance in the governance process -- the Congress, the Executive Branch, the citizens, and various interest groups such as the universities and diplomacy schools.

2. Congressional oversight would be accomplished through the annual appropriations process and the bill's provisions for reports to the Congress and Congressional hearings.

3. Protection from dominance by the Executive Branch was an important concern of the drafters of this legislation. The corporate structure of the Academy and the private memberships and endowment to be solicited are seen as helping protect the institution from attempts at dominance or cooptation.

4. Similarly, the lack of provisions for involvement of the Academy in policy-formation or direct dispute intervention is another check against attacks on the work of the Academy by special interests within and outside the government.

5. I favor Congressional appointments to the Academy, for I think the appointments process would provide another built-in mechanism for ongoing Congressional oversight. Each year, each Congressman and/or Senator would have to conduct a procedure for determining who in his or her jurisdiction should receive an appointment to the Peace Academy. This process in itself would cause each Congressional office to stay in close touch with the Academy and with those constituents involved in peace and conflict resolution.*

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*I can envision, for example, both diplomats and officers of transnational corporations receiving Congressional appointments for an intense mid-career seminar of, say, four to six weeks, in theories and skills of negotiation and mediation with a diverse group of participants from throughout the nation and the world.

A CONCLUDING NOTE: A PEACE PRESIDENT AND A PEACE CONGRESS?

It is frustrating to me to see an Administration and a Congress so dedicated to world peace and security take so little advantage of what is known about the causes of peace and the strategies of peacemaking and conflict resolution. I do not carry a naive belief that every conflict can be "resolved" or that every fight can be avoided. But I am convinced that we must broaden our systematic and scientific pursuit of peace, that there is no one sanctified road to peace (as a budget analyst might conclude from face-value assessment of our Defense commitment), and that we must pay greater attention to other roads before us.

I often have observed in recent months that, in many ways, President Reagan is one of the most important leaders of the peace movement today. On the one hand, he has been a catalyst to (if not a direct cause of) the revitalization and broadening of the base of peace movements in the United States and Europe through his proposed Defense spending, the tough talk to the Soviets emanating from the White House (and State and Defense), and his statements on nuclear deployment and warfare in Europe. On the other hand, his speeches always have stressed negotiation in concert with military strength, he has said that he could not imagine a situation "in which a nuclear war would be winnable", and he has authorized mediation in various trouble spots -- most noteworthy among them the work of Haig in the Falklands and Habib (and now former President Carter) in the Middle East.

President Reagan's commencement address last year at Eureka College in Illinois placed him even more firmly in the camp of advocates of peacemaking and conflict resolution. In a statement that could have been written by proponents of the Peace Academy, he said:

> Peace is not the absence of conflict, but the ability to cope with conflict by peaceful means. I believe we can cope. I believe that the West can fashion a realistic, durable policy that will protect our interests and keep the peace, not just for this generation but for your children and your grandchildren.

He went on to say that such a policy consists of five points: military balance, economic security, regional stability, arms reduction, and dialogue -- an approach which we all can applaud. The first four points were spelled out in some detail in the remainder of the speech. But the dialogue component was not developed beyond the statement of the President's life-long belief "...that people's problems can be solved when people talk to each other instead of about each other" and a reassertion of his desire to meet with President Brezhnev at the U.N. disarmament session in June.

How symbolic of precisely the problem proponents of the Peace Academy emphasize: that our understanding of and capability for sustained dialogue in all its forms is grossly underdeveloped compared to the other planks for world peace and security. When to talk and when to fight? With whom, and where? Under whose auspices and toward what ends? With what kind of preparation and understanding of the dynamics of such talk?

How much longer can we wait to make a formal and sustained national commitment to get at these life-and-death questions about peacemaking? Not longer than the 98th Congress, I hope.

After the Eureka declaration on peacefully coping with conflict, I cannot understand how the Administration can oppose the Peace Academy -- a national institution to help put flesh on those words about peacemaking. Now you and your colleages in the Congress have the opportunity to take the lead. As you deliberate, I urge you to keep in mind the concept of peace which has motivated the Commission's work and my testimony today:

> The Commission rejects emphatically any insinuation that peace -- any more than love, church, justice, family, or flag -- is soft and naive. The Commission believes timorous attitudes toward peace do not advance the national interest or reflect the American character. Peace is neither utopian nor a sign of weakness or cowardice. Peace is not to be measured simply by absence of tension or quietude of complaint. Peace is not only a desired state; it is a process that is vigorous and includes devotion to those life-affirming values that have made "American" a cherished concept. Peace requires knowledge, judgment, and skill no less complex than what is required for war.
>
> (To Establish the United States Academy of Peace, p. 21)

The 98th could go down in history as the Peace Congress. Please help make that happen.

Thank you very much.

Senator STAFFORD. Mr. Lincoln, it is nice to have a fellow Vermonter here, and we would be pleased to hear from you next.

Mr. LINCOLN. My pleasure, sir. I do want to say that while I am a member of the board of directors of the U.S. Peace Academy Campaign as well as of the Peace Academy Foundation, I am not here representing either of those agencies today. I am here instead as a former Federal Commissioner.

I basically support—not basically—highly support the Peace Academy legislation, and yet at the same time I find it deficient and believe several amendments should be recommended by this committee.

I believe these amendments would lower the small pockets of opposition to the Academy. I believe they would increase the public constituency for the Academy, and I believe the amendments would also increase a political constituency as well.

There are two corrections in the written testimony, one on page 3, one at the bottom of the page needs to insert "e" in their list of proposed amendments. (E) would be for the reduction in the initial budget. And the second correction needs to be made on page 4 in section (a). S. 564 needs to be substituted by H.R. 1249.

The first amendment is in terms of the name itself. S. 564 calls for U.S. Academy of Peace. H.R. 1249 calls for U.S. Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution. If both bills were passed by the respective Houses, you would be in conference committee on that alone.

We do not have a consensus on the name, and I would suggest to you that throughout the report we talk about equity; we talk about justice; we know that if we want peace, we need to work for justice, which is defined by the disputants with all things considered. And I would ask this subcommittee to take the initiative and call it the U.S. Academy of Peace and Justice.

And second, in terms of the intranational concerns, need to be explicitly included. I refer you to pages 6 and 9 in my written testimony to justify that. Throughout the Commission report we refer to "the internationally" and "in this nation" or "In this nation" and "in this world." And it is conspicuously absent in the legislation.

While the bill does not exclude "intra," the bill does put a primary focus in terms of international. There is a definite relationship between the various sectors. I want to point out that the American Arbitration Association does training and negotiations for the Foreign Service Institute, for example.

Such an inclusion is small but significant. It would not cost one penny more. It would be more cost effective and I think also that it would reduce some of the resistance from the schools of foreign service and international study because they would see a coordinated approach with the inclusion of intranational concerns. I ask you to look over those pages for its justification.

I think we need an amendment, recommendation for amendment that explicitly states in the bill what the Academy will not be as does the Commission report. I refer you to pages 9 and 11 in my written testimony. It is clearly the recommendation of the Commission that the Academy neither be an intervention agency and it not be a policy setting agency. Let the Academy be an institution of higher education and not fall in even any kind of indirect or ad hoc capacity to be doing the functions of the State Department or the Foreign Service Institute or let it become a mini-Federal Mediation Conciliation Service of community relations service of the U.S. Justice Department. No intervention. No policymaking. It should be restricted.

Fourth, I think the change in the structure for the selection of the board of directors is needed. I refer you to pages 11 through 14 in my written testimony. I think it needs to be increased to 25. I think we need more equity between the Senate, the House, and the executive branch. I need the assurance, I think, of inclusion of special interest groupings such as the schools of foreign service and international study.

The model that I give you on pages 13 and 14, in that model would assure that the schools of international study would have four members on the board of directors. Also, a reduction in the initial budget; I refer you to pages 14 and 16, why I believe that the $15 million for the capital fund should be maintained. I think that we should reduce the budget in year 1 to $1 million, in the year 2, $1.5 million. There is no way that in the first 2 years we will even have one student.

The Commission worked for a year and a half with 9 commissioners and 12 staff persons for $500,000. There is a lot of work to set up an institution, and I think that we should greatly reduce that budget. We really do not need any more than that to establish it. It

is so reduced in terms of the House, and we ought to look at that very carefully. I refer you to other amendments, six, seven, and as in the written testimony, in establishing regional site centers and the inclusion of a sunset clause, a 30-year sunset clause.

My last comment will be in terms of the matter of degree granting. Either in the legislation we should restrict the degree to exactly what it would be in terms of graduate work in conflict resolution, so we are not duplicating things that are being done anywhere else, or we should just exempt the bill entirely from any reference whatsoever to degrees and let us deal with it later, 2 years, in terms of oversight, when we see what the Academy structure really is going to look like.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lincoln follows:]

21-097 O—83——6

To: The Honorable Robert T. Stafford, Chairman
Subcommittee on Education, Arts and The Humanities

Re: S. 564: To Establish a U. S. Academy of Peace
Recommendations for Amendments

I. IDENTIFICATION AND CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESS:

My name is William F. Lincoln. My presentation to you is NOT in my capacity as a member of the Board of Directors of either the National Peace Academy Campaign or the National Peace Academy Foundation although I serve an active membership on both. Instead, I come before you as one of the nine former Federal Commissioners of the U. S. COMMISSION TO HEAR AND EXAMINE PROPOSALS FOR A NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION. I am also a practitioner, educator, and trainer of theory and skills in negotiations and mediated negotiations, working toward the equitable and efficient prevention, management, and resolution of dysfunctional conflict.

II. JUSTIFICATION OF THE CALL FOR AMENDMENTS:

My testimony to you will be candid: I strongly support the need for and general concept of the proposed Peace Academy. However, I feel that Senate Bill S. 564 is inadequate and faulty in its present form. Furthermore, the bill requires significant amendment if the proposed Academy

is to have functional and symbolic credibility with the citizens of this nation and with the peoples and governments of the world.

Contrary to what others may testify, Senate Bill 564 is NOT representative of the Commission's final report and recommendations. (I invite you to refer to the text of the report--not the model legislation provided--to verify this statement.) Unfortunately, many dedicated supporters of the proposed Academy are hasty to accept any legislation which would create such an institution without full regard for the originally conceived purposes, functions, and potential products of the Academy. In the process, they are overlooking the testimony of witnesses and the Commission's findings. These sincerely dedicated but anxious advocates have crossed the line which distinguishes means from ends.

The Academy should not be an end product. Rather, the proposed Academy can be one means of developing a two-track approach to the prevention, management, and resolution of dysfunctional conflict. One track, of course, requires an ever-ready and responsible law enforcement and military capability which can deter, control, or resolve conflict. The second track involves developing diverse capabilities and processes for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict without forceful intervention.

It is important that the proposed Academy is not an end in and of itself. Instead, it should function as a means to achieve and maintain intra and international peace with justice. It should not be established to placate a constituency or to foster a sense of self-satisfaction. Such an accomplishment would be an empty success. It would also be unconscionably wrong and wasteful.

III. THE CHARGE BEFORE THE SENATE:

You, the members of the Subcommittee on Education, Art, and the Humanities and of the full Committee have the historic responsibility of assuring that a correct and complete report and recommendation is presented to the full Senate.

IV. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

A. To change the name of the Academy
B. Explicit inclusion of intranational concerns
C. Explicit inclusion of what the Academy should NOT be
D. Change governing body provisions
E. Establishment of regional site centers
G. Inclusion of a sunset clause

F. Reduction of the Initial Budget

Hereinafter I will avoid offering precise legislative language for amendments. Rather, I will identify the substantive areas which require your attention and justify the need and merits of those proposed amendments. Naturally, I commit myself to work with individual members of this body and their staffs to do whatever is necessary to expedite the proposed amendments to S. 564.

A. Name Change of the Proposed Academy:

H.R.1249 ~~S. 564~~ calls for the proposed Academy to be called the "United States Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution." Obviously, if both chambers of Congress pass their respective bills, a Conference Committee would be needed to resolve the name of the Academy. But both name designations are inadequate. I urge this subcommittee to take the initiative to recommend an amendment to S. 564 TO ESTABLISH A "UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE AND JUSTICE".

Justification:

The concepts of equity and of justice were ever-present throughout testimony presented to the Commission and during the Commission's deliberations. Peace is not merely the elimination of overt and covert behaviors; rather, peace is justice achieved by the realization of interest satisfaction at levels acceptable to disputants.

Almost thirty years after the "end" of the Korean Conflict-- indeed, War--there is no peace. We have instead a truce which is tentative, effective most of the time, and undeniably more desirable than actual combative interactions. But what Korea has is a truce, not a peace. The conflict still exists. Not unsimilar situations exist between Israel and Egypt, between the United Kingdom and Argentina, and throughout much of the world including various entities of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Central America, South America, the Carribean, and Africa. And this is also the case in this world's racial, ethnic, and economic ghettos.

In the interests of intra and international security, justice is the goal, justice is the mission. We do not have to be members of the Judeo-Christian world to understand the meaning of the words "If you want peace then work for justice." While peace in the form of truce is better than war, that kind of peace can also institute avoidance, repression, and the suppression of justice. The ever-present concern for equity and justice reported by the Commission is <u>not</u> reflected in the proposed legislaton, S. 564.

Therefore, let the peoples and governments of the world see the true mission of the proposed Academy. I urge that you recommend an amendment to S. 564, TO ESTABLISH THE UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE AND JUSTICE.

B. Explicit inclusion of Intra National Concerns:

Of all the amendments I propose, this particular concern is surely the most important consideration before you.

Throughout the Commission's report, words such as "...in this nation and through the world..." are used consistently. The proposed legislation, however, gives extensive emphasis to international affairs at the costly exclusion of intranational concerns. In instances where the proposed legislation refers to "national" concerns, it merely implies borrowing knowledge acquired from our own international conflict scenarios. I therefore urge you to recommend an amendment to S. 564 TO INCLUDE EXPLICITLY INTRANATIONAL CONCERNS AT EACH PLACE WHERE THE WORDS "INTERNATIONAL" AND/OR "WORLD" APPEAR IN THE BILL.

Justification:

The consistent phraseology of the Commission's report

justifies the proposed amendment "...in this nation and throughout the world..." or similar language. But the vast amount of testimony to the Commission makes an even better case for the needed amendment. The Academy should house a balance of both intra and international concerns for many reasons:

1. Intra and international theorists, practitioners, and experiences have much to offer each sector. If the generic and specific aspects of conflict resolution are to be expeditiously advanced, the Academy must house the broad and diverse aspects of both intra and international conflict resolution.
2. The coupling of intranational concerns with international concerns is more cost effective than addressing either sector separately.
3. An Academy which excludes intranational concerns will have little credibility at home and will have even less credibility with other nations. The Academy would be ever vulnerable to accusations by U. S. citizenry that our government is more concerned with others than with its own plights. As a result, the Academy would also be vulnerable to the cries of other nations that the United States should put its own house in order before attempting to export its conflict resolution technology to the world at large.

4. The United States serves as the ideal natural setting for the development of cross-cultural conflict resolution processes and skills which could influence conflict resolution behaviors throughout the world.

5. Politically speaking, the inclusion of intranational concerns would (a) create a broader home constituency for the Academy, (b) reduce resistance to the Academy's development by schools of foreign services and international studies, and (c) perpetuate more support for the Academy in both chambers of Congress.

6. An error made by the National Peace Academy Campaign (N-PAC) would be corrected. N-PAC has focused its attention unwisely on the threat of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. That approach has some obvious validity and, of course, it appeals to the public. N-PAC fails to recognize, however, that if START were totally successful in achieving the "zero option", and if efforts to control nuclear proliferation and nuclear arms control among other nations were to succeed, the threat of war would still be present. The Academy is needed beyond the issue of nuclear war.

When will we address the validity of the 1979 Brandt Report on North-South Survival and the U.S. Department of State's 1980 Global 2000 Report? Increased conflict will occur in and between nations as a result of the rights of citizens and governments to

exist at all. Much of the cause for intra and international conflict will be related to: inadequate natural resource management and inadequate environmental protection; economic interests; racial and ethnic discrimination; the deprivation of human rights related to economic opportunity, availability of services and goods, and the general quality of life; and the impact of all of the above on political stability. No nation is exempt from these concerns. Already we are an interdependent world and we become increasingly so. We share intranational concerns which affect international relations. And, most importantly, the manner in which nations resolve their internal conflicts certainly influences their international behaviors.

I, therefore, urge that you recommend an amendment to S. 564 to order that the bill will EXPLICITLY INCLUDE A BALANCED FOCUS BETWEEN INTRA AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS.

C. Explicit Inclusion of What the Academy is NOT to Be:

The Academy should be a high quality academic institution of research, education, and training. The Commission's report is very explicit when stating that the Academy must not and can not be the bane of negotiators, mediators, and policy makers. But such restrictions and

limitations are conspiciously absent from the proposed legislation. I urge you to recommend an amendment to S. 564 TO EXPLICITLY STATE THAT THE ACADEMY WILL BE NEITHER AN INTERVENTION AGENCY OR POLICY-MAKING BODY.

Justification:

The Academy--its officers, staff, faculty, and students--must not be distracted from its purposes and functions. Neither must the Academy be permitted to interfere or compete with the laws and policies of the United States government or its agencies. The Academy itself, directly or indirectly, should not be permitted to become an independent or mini ad hoc State Department, Foreign Service Institute, CIA, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, or Community Relation Service of the U. S. Justice Department. The restrictions I propose are necessary if the Academy is to enjoy and maintain academic freedom, integrity, and credibility. The rightful status of the Academy cannot be established or protected if the Academy is permitted to perform functions which it will not be capable of performing.

In all due respect, I say we must trust a "trickle up theory." If national policy making functions or modus operandi are to be changed, the advocates of the Academy must trust the political process which makes, implements, and controls such functions. Perhaps the graduates and the

products of the Academy will influence such matters, but it cannot be the purpose or the function of the Academy to do so.

Admittedly, there exist some supporters of the proposed Academy who prefer a Cabinet-level Department of Peace. Such an aspiration may be worthy in merit. Presently, I am unable to offer an opinion on that matter. But I do know this: The Academy can be neither a substitute nor a reasonable facsimile of some other institution or motive. I, therefore, urge that you recommend an amendment to S. 564 TO RESTRICT THE ACADEMY FROM BECOMING EITHER AN INTERVENTION AGENCY OR A POLICY MAKING BODY, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY.

D. Change in the Governing Body Provisions:

The current bill, S. 564, greatly restricts the criteria which determine those who would be available for selection to serve on the Board of Governors of the Academy. I urge you TO RECOMMEND AMENDMENTS WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE PROVISIONS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS.

Justification:

The current bill explicitly states that two members of the Senate, one from each major political party, are to be appointed by the Senate President pro tempore, and two members of the House, one from each

major political party, are to be appointed by the Speaker of the House, to serve on the Board of Directors. Eleven additional Directors--of which no more than six can be of the same political party--are to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The current bill is unclear: Do the Directors appointed by the Senate and the House always have to be sitting members of their respective bodies? If one were to be defeated, retire, or resign from Congress, would s/he also have to vacate her/his office as a member of the Board of Directors of the Academy? These questions must be resolved by an appropriate amendment to the current bill.

Also, in the traditional spirit of checks and balances, I ask that consideration be given to a more equitable distribution of appointments to be made by the Executive Office, the Senate and the House.

And finally, I urge that the proposed Board of Directors for the Academy be expanded from fifteen (15) to twenty-five (25) members with explicit designation of interest to include the private corporation sector, schools of international studies, the legal profession, and the professional vocation of conflict resolution.

A possible model for the Board of Directors would resemble the following:

Eight (8) to be appointed by the Senate President pro tempore:

- two members of the Senate, one from each political party
- six non-members of the Senate, two from each political party and/or registered Independent voters
  - (1) the private corporate sector
  - (1) the schools of international studies
  - (4) the professional field of conflict resolution
  - (2) the international sector
  - (2) the intranational sector

Eight (8) to be appointed by the Speaker of the House:

- two members of the House, one from each political party
- six non-members of the House, three from each political party and/or registered Independent voters
  - (1) the private corporate sector
  - (1) the schools of international studies
  - (4) the professional field of conflict resolution
  - (2) the international sector
  - (2) the intranational sector

Nine (9) to be appointed by the President of which not more than six (6) can be of any one political party and/or Independent voter registration

(2) the private corporate sector

(2) the schools of international studies

(1) the legal profession specifically

(4) the professional fields of conflict resolution

(2) the international sector

(2) the intranational sector

Such collective diversity would create broad credibility and cooperation while satisfying the legitimate interests of the schools of international studies.

E. Reduction in the Initial Budget:

Well-meaning, liberal academicians might rush to establish an institution without practical forethought. The best way to assure that the Academy is developed methodically and meticulously is to reduce the authorization for the Academy's initial start-up years. I therefore urge you to recommend amendments to S. 564 TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS TO BE $1,000,000 FOR THE FIRST YEAR, AND $1,500,000 FOR THE SECOND YEAR. This budget reduction represents a savings of $13,500,000 over the $16,000,000 currently proposed.

The $15,000,000 suggested for capitalization ought to be allocated for year two. Thus the $31,000,000 currently proposed would be reduced to $17,500,000.

Justification:

The Academy must be developed correctly and, therefore, the entire first two year's budget must be authorized for start-up purposes. The Academy cannot just "open its doors" as some will contend. Programatic tasks are too numerous to mention but some of those tasks include:

- the national search and selection of the Academy's President
- the development of job descriptions for administrative staff and faculty
- the recruitment and selection of administrative staff and faculty
- the development of student criteria as well as a recruitment and selection process
- the implementation of a student recruitment and selection process
- the identification of a site for the Academy
- the lease/purchase of a site for the Academy
- the preparation of an annual operations budget

Candidly speaking, if the Commission's report is lacking any credibility, it is in the area of a projected budget. Despite thorough study of institutional budgets, the Commission was unable to recommend the size of a student body! We must conclude that the Academy cannot and should not open its doors until all administrative and programatic development has been carefully designed. Such an approach cannot be interpreted as delay, but as avoidance of waste. It is the only responsible manner in which to establish the Academy. Can the Academy be developed in the first two years for $2,500,000 plus the $15,000,000 capitalization fund? Of course. As evidence, we should be reminded that the entire Commission operated for more than a year on a $500,000 budget.

should be noted, too, that the Academy's annual operating budget will probably be closer to $25,000,000 than the $10,000,000 stated. But none of us know, do we? And we won't know until the initial planning years commence.

I urge you to recommend amendments to S. 564 in such a way that THE FUNDING AUTHORIZATION RETAINS A $15,000,000 CAPITALIZATION FUND, THAT DEVELOPMENTAL YEAR ONE IS NOT TO EXCEED $1,000,000, AND THAT DEVELOPMENTAL YEAR TWO IS NOT TO EXCEED $1,500,000.

21-097 O—83——7

F. Establishing Regional Site Centers:

The Commission's findings determined the need to have the Academy decentralized in order (1) to make the Academy accessible to much of this nation's public, and (2) to prevent an unhealthy sense of "ivory tower elitism" which a centralized Academy could create and perpetuate. Again, the legislative bill before you does not explicitly provide for this recommendation to be legislated. The bill merely authorizes the Academy's governing body to establish various schools as deemed necessary. Personally, I object to such camouflaged language or the intent to weaken the commitment. I, therefore, urge you to recommend an amendment to S. 564 so that AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACADEMY'S CENTRAL CAMPUS, FIVE REGIONAL SITE CENTERS TO BE AFFILIATED WITH EXISTING INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION LOCATED IN THIS NATION'S NORTHEAST, SOUTHEAST, MIDWEST, NORTHWEST AND SOUTHWEST WILL ALSO BE ESTABLISHED.

Justification:

I have already mentioned the need to avoid "ivory tower elitism" and to assure the Academy's accessibility to the diverse American publics. But it is important to note that the regional site centers would differ from the central campus in form and function.

First, regional site centers located on existing campuses would be staffed only by four or five administrative personnel in addition to a handful of interns and/or undergraduate institutions. Secondly, the functions of the regional site centers would not include teaching. The purpose and functions would be to organize seminars, workshops, and training programs; offer technical assistance in curriculum development for other schools and agencies; collect and disseminate information; supervise internships; and coordinate regional networks. The cost for each regional site center should not exceed $1,500,000 and these monies would be allocated from the general annual operating budget of the Academy. Thus, if the Academy's annual operating budget was $25,000,000, $7,500,000 ($1,500,000 x 5 site centers) would be designated for the maintenance and operations of the regional site centers located on the campuses of existing institutions of higher education.

This decentralization concept is both meritorious and affordable and, therefore, recommended for explicit inclusion. I urge you to offer such a recommendation to the full Committee and to the full Senate.

G. The Inclusion of a Sunset Clause:

Admittedly, this last concern is not a recommendation of the Commission. However, it is my opinion that it is necessary and in order. I urge you to recommend that S. 564 be amended to include a SUNSET PROVISION AT THE END OF THIRTY YEARS BASED ON THE ANNUAL AND CONTINUAL INDEPENDENT EVALUATIONS BY TWO IMPARTIAL PROFESSIONAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION AGENCIES.

Justification:

The Academy represents a new concept in function and symbolism for this nation and the world. If it does not prove itself, it should be revised in concept and form. If necessary revision and corrections are impractical or non-operative, the Academy's existance should be evaluated and/or terminated. A thirty-year period is a fair and reasonable length of time in which this nation can determine the Academy's relevance, effectiveness, and credibility. If it is possible to name the evaluating agencies in the legislative bill, I recommend that they be (1) the NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION which is basically a granted foundation for experimentation and (2) the sixty year old AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION which is the world's

largest private dispute resolution agency. Both would be impartial in that neither would have a vested interest in the Academy.

V. CONCLUSION:

The above seven recommendations for amendments are serious matters presented for your deliberation and action. If S. 564 is so amended, the Academy would become the functional symbol which the United States and the world needs. Additionally, the proposed amendments will...

- provide the Academy more direction than is currently given
- make the Academy more accountable without sacrifice of academic freedom or integrity
- broaden the constituency of the Academy
- improve the effectiveness of the Academy
- extend and heighten the credibility of the Academy
- reduce the initial two year start-up costs of the Academy
- reduce the small pockets of resistance to the Academy concept and possibly convert such opposition to support.

Again, I acknowledge my appreciation for the commitment and activity of both the National Peace Academy Campaign and the National Peace Academy Foundation. I contend that the legislation, as proposed, is inadequate and in need of the amendments indicated above. If there is to be an Academy, let us develop one which is effective and practical. The proposed amendments would further those criteria; the current bill does not.

William F. Lincoln
Former Federal Commissioner
U. S. Peace Academy Commission

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Lincoln. Admiral Welch, in true Navy fashion, we have arranged for you to be last in and first out simultaneously as the third witness here. So we would be happy to hear you.

Admiral WELCH. I am always happy to be tail end Charlie, Mr. Chairman.

I am a graduate of the Naval Academy. I have a master's degree from Harvard, and also I am a graduate of the National War College. Although I am a submariner by profession, I spent most of my later years in the field of international negotiations. I served on the U.S. delegations at Helsinki in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

I was on the U.S. delegation to the SALT II Summit in Vienna in June 1979. I served in 1977 and 1978 as the Deputy U.S. Commissioner of the United States-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, and for the past 3 years, prior to my retirement, I was President of the Naval War College.

I would like to talk just a little bit about the War College. Because of——

Senator STAFFORD. Admiral, before you do, could I ask a personal question.

Admiral WELCH. Yes, sir.

Senator STAFFORD. You said you were a submariner. Did you ever know a Thomas B. Stafford——

Admiral WELCH. Thomas Stafford, yes.

Senator STAFFORD. Yes. He is my brother.

Admiral WELCH. Really?

Senator STAFFORD. Yes. We will have to meet after this is over sometime. Excuse the interruption.

Admiral WELCH. There are evident misperceptions of the role of war colleges and the curriculums with people asserting that we do a lot of studying of war but very little studying of peace. I would like to make several points which I think are relevant to this topic.

Next year the Naval War College is going to be 100 years old. It is the oldest institution of its kind in continuous existence anywhere in the world. Its founding president, Commodore Stephen B. Luce organized the Naval War College, and I quote here, "as a place of original research on all questions relating to war and the statemanship connected with war or the prevention of war."

Today the Naval War College is a graduate level institution, and I think it remains remarkably faithful to those ideals. In all of its courses, the prevention of war as well as the conduct of naval warfare receives considerable emphasis. A great deal of the curriculum is devoted to an historical perspective of wars, ranging from Athens and Sparta to Vietnam, examining through case studies, guest lecturers, and seminar discussion the recurring themes which have marked conflicts throughout history.

By understanding the causes of war and the failures to maintain the peace, the student gains a good appreciation of the mistakes of the past and the root causes of conflict. In other parts of the curriculum, crisis management, negotiations, conflict resolution, organizational psychology, decisionmaking and policy formulation, and international law also receive considerable attention.

In addition to the core courses of policy and strategy, defense economics and decisionmaking and selection and application of naval forces, an electives program offers such diverse courses as U.S. foreign policy in the 20th century, foundations of moral obligation, responsibility in armed conflict, the laws of war, and contemporary Middle Eastern problems.

For 2 years I personally taught a course in international negotiations.

The primary focus of the Naval War College is understandably our naval strategy and tactics. War gaming has been an integral part of the curriculum since the 1890's. This is not solely an exercise for opposing forces, but rather it brings into play also aspects of international crises, crisis management, negotiation, conflict resolution, and conflict termination.

This facility is used not only by our own seagoing forces and our U.S. students, but also our NATO allies, Canadian and German staff colleges, and a large number of inter-American war colleges, and Government officials from various agencies participate from time to time in the games there.

The student body at the Naval War College is composed of all of the military services plus members of other Government agencies, including the State Department. In addition, about 100 foreign officers attend each year. The Naval War College also conducts off-campus courses in the Washington area and has an extensive correspondence course program.

I think that one of the greatest contributors to international understanding and peace has been the Naval Command College for highly selected foreign officers. It is interesting to note that in the

26 years of its existence, this course has graduated 759 officers, 361 of whom have risen to flag rank, and 60 have become heads of their navy. This course is not limited to allies. Sweden, Finland, Burma, Saudi Arabia, and India are examples.

The junior foreign class recently had its first Yugoslavian graduate. Most of these officers bring their families with them. All of them gain a firsthand impression of the United States, our people, and our aspirations for peace.

I make these points to assure those critics who hold that war colleges do little more than teach students how to wage war, that peace is especially important to those officers who will have to fight in the wars. A study of peace and conflict resolution is very much on the agenda of the war colleges.

I was puzzled when I testified in Boston about the ultimate utility of this program. Today after reading the literature available to me, the Commission report, I remain puzzled and I remain skeptical. While it is asserted that the proposed Academy is "a critically essential element in our national security framework for the future," I find little persuasive evidence to that effect.

I do believe that strengths which the United States enjoys in its existing educational institutions and Government structure can and should be drawn upon to promote international peace in the future.

Mr. Chairman, we all want peace. I do not think that we as a nation should be ashamed of our record in promoting and maintaining peace. I do think the proposed U.S. Academy of Peace, as it has been presented, is not a viable instrument for contributing significantly to international peace in the years ahead.

Thank you.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, Admiral. We appreciate your candid assessment and your help to this subcommittee in the task in front of us at the present time.

As I said earlier, we will ask our panelists to respond to questions in writing in view of the tumultuous situation on the floor of the Senate today and our very tardy business here in the subcommittee.

Is that agreeable to you, Senator Randolph.

Senator RANDOLPH. It would be, Mr. Chairman. I want to cooperate fully with you, but if perhaps one question might be asked and a very short answer given, and then additional information could be supplied in answer to the question if necessary because I would like to have the record reflect that I am asking Admiral Welch a question.

I assure you that I would not expect him to answer it completely, but certainly enough for us to rivet on the question that I am asking, if that is agreeable.

Senator STAFFORD. Well, that is certainly agreeable.

Senator RANDOLPH. Admiral Welch, I am familiar with your testimony given at the time of the Commission's findings and I have studied the testimony of others in considerable detail as that Commission attempted to study proposals for establishing a peace academy.

As for your statement today, Admiral Welch, I have had only the opportunity to check it in a cursory fashion. But I want to be com-

pletely fair in this question, because I do not want the interpretation to be wrong. I want it to be right.

I am still unsure, Admiral, whether you are unalterably opposed to the Peace Academy proposal, or that you are in the stance of being merely skeptical at the present time. Now, I ask that in your reply you be somewhat more specific than you have stated, telling us if you believe there is any value in S. 564 and what is your feeling about it. Can you see that changes might be made in our approach that would make it acceptable from your standpoint? I want you to understand, Admiral, that I am not opposed to the military academies as they are now constituted that you have mentioned; certainly not in any sense of the word.

I am only saying that you, as a man who has found it necessary to participate in wars, wars in which this country has been engaged, that you do realize that changes take place. I authored a bill to create a separate Air Force. There was opposition to that bill by the Army and by the Navy. But it came into being. And therefore we were creating another agency, or another arm of our defense structure.

And yet I am not sure that you would say now that the Army and Navy in opposing the U.S. Air Force Academy were wrong.

What would you answer?

Admiral WELCH. I was a midshipman at the time, Senator, and——

Senator RANDOLPH. You were what?

Admiral WELCH. A midshipman.

Senator RANDOLPH. Well, that is all right.

Admiral WELCH. And——

[Laughter.]

Admiral WELCH. I would say in response to your question that I did state that my opposition to the bill and to the U.S. Peace Academy is "as presented here," and of all the things that are claimed for it.

I think that the creation of a U.S. Air Force has proved to be a very highly successful venture. It is a very powerful part of our defense establishment, a very capable one, and if you proposed it, you are indeed to be complimented, sir.

Let me just say something about my concerns in the way that this is presented here. That is how the student at this school would move into the prominent roles that are promised by many of the proponents of the bill. And General Goodpaster is cited as being in favor of it. I think you should read very carefully what General Goodpaster has to say. I think he took a very measured, deliberate, and careful approach to it. I think that he detailed in his proposal that this schooling would be for midcareer personnel, presumably in the Government structure, either the military, the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, or wherever, and that they would have access to classified information, where they would be in contact with reality.

I think that might have some merit. That might bear some investigation. But to have it as a type of university duplicating the work that is done in other highly proficient schools, I do not think it stands a chance of succeeding.

Senator RANDOLPH. Thank you. The Heritage Foundation has, correctly or incorrectly, through statements made said that those Senators us who are for this proposal are the "Jane Fondas" of the Senate.

Would you agree with that statement?

Admiral WELCH. No; I do not think so. I think that is a pretty crass statement.

Senator RANDOLPH. Well, when there are those of us who sponsor the legislation who have been in the armed services of the United States, as you know; who have been in combat, as you know. I think, Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask permission to include in my remarks what took place in my own case.

On August 11-12, 1941, when I was a Member of the House, we were faced with a rollcall vote as to whether to continue to extend the selective service draft or drop it. I remember that vote, bitterly contested by many; I will never forget the evening when the vote was cast. I voted with the majority; the final vote was 203 to 202.

I had been asked previously to write a column for what is now the Washington Post—it was then the Washington Herald-Times. It was to be a "guest" column requested by columnist Peter Carter, who, in fact, was a woman, and she called her column "Peter Carter Says." I wrote the column, as I rode the train into West Virginia, and I commented on the depth of my feelings about the very close vote that authorized the reinstatement of the selective service draft. The column appeared on August 26, 1941—14 days after that remarkable vote of 203 to 202 in the House of Representatives. I request permission to have a copy of that August 26 Herald-Times article inserted as part of the record.

[The article referred to follows:]

THE WASHINGTON HERALD-TIMES
TUESDAY, AUGUST 26, 1941

BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JENNINGS RANDOLPH
OF WEST VIRGINIA

"THIS COLUMN IS BEING WRITTEN, AS THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO TRAIN ROLLS AND SWAYS WESTWARD THROUGH THE MARYLAND HIGHLANDS. IT'S BETWEEN 9 AND 10 O'CLOCK OF TUESDAY NIGHT, AUGUST 12, AND MY PENCIL SEEMS TO WOBBLE A BIT, NOT ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF THE CAREENING OF THE OBSERVATION CAR, BUT DUE TO THE SHAKINESS WHICH STILL CLINGS TO A MEMBER OF CONGRESS WHO ONLY A FEW MINUTES EARLIER HAD HURRIED TO THE STATION FROM AS CLOSE A ROLL CALL VOTE AS ONE SELDOM SEES DURING A HECTIC ERA IN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.

"WHEN I LEFT THE FLOOR IT APPEARED THE TALLY ON THE DRAFT SERVICE EXTENSION HAD CARRIED BY AN UNCERTAIN ONE-VOTE MARGIN. A RECHECK WAS IN PROGRESS WHEN I LEFT THE BEDLAM WHICH HAD RIPPED-OUT AFTER MINUTES OF TENSION FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE AISLE.

"ALREADY ABOARD THE TRAIN WHEN I ARRIVED WAS MY COLLEAGUE FROM EAST ST. LOUIS, E. M. SCHAEFER. HE HAD VOTED IN THIS HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL SUBJECT BUT SENSING ALSO THE CLOSENESS OF THE COUNT HAD ASKED HIS SECRETARY TO SEND A WIRE ON THE RESULT.

"SENATOR JOHN H. OVERTON, HOMEWARD-BOUND FOR A LOUISIANA REST, SOON JOINED US. HE WONDERED, AS DID SEVEN OR EIGHT OTHERS IN THE CAR, AS TO THE ACTUAL RESULT.

"AN EFFORT WAS MADE TO TUNE THE RADIO TO A NEWS BROADCAST, BUT THE FADING RECEPTION KEPT THE SECRET TO AN ETHER WAVE NOT CAUGHT BY THE EARS OF THOSE ANXIOUS ONES PRESSING CLOSE TO THE CABINET SET.

"THE DIPLOMAT, POWERED BY A DIESEL ENGINE, KEPT POKING ITS STEEL NOSE DEEPER INTO THE HILL COUNTRY, AND IT WAS NOT LONG UNTIL THE LIGHTS OF MARTINSBURG APPEARED BESIDE THE WINDING TRACKS.

"HARDLY HAD THE TRAIN STOPPED WHEN A TELEGRAM TO SCHAEFER ARRIVED, BEARING THESE WORDS:

"BILL PASSED BY ONE VOTE. 203 YEAS, 202 NAYS."

"AND THUS WE KNEW THE RESULT! NO CHEERS -- NO EXULTATION -- NO LAUGHTER -- WE WERE RATHER QUIET, FOR IT WAS IN OUR HEARTS AS IN THE HEARTS OF MOST AMERICANS -- JUST A TIME OF QUIET REFLECTION ON A STEP TAKEN.

"THIS WRITER DID ONLY WHAT HE FELT WAS BEST FOR HIS COUNTRY. AND I LIKE TO THINK THAT, EVEN THOUGH THE HOUSE WAS DIVIDED THERE IS A UNITY DOWN DEEP WHICH WILL STAND AGAINST THE DAYS OF TRIAL WHICH WE FEEL ARE SOON TO COME.

"PETER CARTER WOULD HAVE WANTED ME TO WRITE A GAY COLUMN, BUT I'VE FAILED; AND YET, I KNOW SHE WILL FORGIVE, FOR SHE'S BUILT THAT WAY. . .

"MY COLLEAGUES HAVE 'BEDDED DOWN' FOR THE NIGHT. SOON AFTER MIDNIGHT, THE LONG LINE OF COACHES AND SLEEPERS WILL COME TO A GRINDING STOP ATOP THE ALLEGHENIES. THERE, AT THE OLD MOUNTAIN LAKE PARK, I'LL FIND THE WIFE (MARY) WAITING WITH THE CAR. THEN THREE MINUTES TO THE COTTAGE, WHERE OUR OLDEST BOY, 7, IS ASLEEP. HE KNOWS NOTHING OF THIS TERRIBLE WAR WHICH COMES EVER CLOSER TO OUR HOMELAND. IT'S EASIER PERHAPS FOR ME TO SAY AT THIS AGE THAT I WOULD WANT HIM TO SERVE HIS COUNTRY IN ITS HOUR OF NEED, BUT I CAN'T HELP BUT EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT HE WOULD BE READY IN HIS TIME TO DO WHAT LADS IN THEIR TWENTIES ARE DOING NOW -- AND THAT IS TO STAND STRONG AND TRUE AGAINST THE EVIL WINDS WHICH BLOW AGAINST OUR CITADEL OF FREEDOM. HIS PARENTS WOULD WANT IT THAT WAY!"

Senator RANDOLPH. I really feel, Admiral, that the closeness of that vote might have been a reason for the attack by the Japanese on December 7 of that year. They felt that this country was divided, was not unified, and could not make the effort necessary to defend itself in a conflict which was on the horizon.

And so it has been my record always to be in favor of the defense of our country; always I have voted for draft registration and have spoken for it. I supported and was a cosponsor of Senator Kassebaum's amendment requiring women to register as well as men. We lost by a small margin. Our womanpower should be assessed the same as our manpower.

I appear to be a little off base here, but I am really not. I am trying to have you understand that there are those of us who are strongly supportive of our country's defense who are equally in strong support of the peace measure that is pending.

You understand that, do you not?

Admiral WELCH. Yes, I do.

Senator RANDOLPH. Yes. And I appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, Senator. I thank all of you on the panel. We very much appreciate your appearance here, and we apologize for the rushed atmosphere we find ourselves in.

The next panel, panel II, will be composed of Dr. Harvey Picker, dean, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Dr. Duncan Clarke, professor, School of International Service, American University here; Dr. John Funari, dean, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa.; Dr. William Zartman, School of Advanced International Service, Johns Hopkins University; and, I will be personal to say, an old and dear friend, John Dellenback, Commissioner, National Peace Academy Commission, and president, Christian College Coalition, Washington, D.C.

Gentlemen, again my apologies for the compression of these hearings. As usual, Senators have several different things they should be doing, and this Senator should be somewhere else right now, but I am going to stay here and get this done.

So let us go in the order I have introduced you, and that means, Dr. Picker, you will lead off.

STATEMENTS OF HARVEY PICKER, DEAN, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY; DUNCAN L. CLARKE, PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY; JOHN FUNARI, DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH; WILLIAM ZARTMAN, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY; AND JOHN R. DELLENBACK, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY COMMISSION, AND PRESIDENT, CHRISTIAN COLLEGE COALITION

Mr. PICKER. Thank you, Senator Stafford. I would almost like to answer one of the questions Senator Randolph spoke to because what I am going to say is really how I think this can be improved structurally.

Although I have spent 25 years as the chief executive officer of a high technology, multinational corporation, in my testimony today, I would like to draw particularly on my years on the National Science Board and my 10 years as dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.

My task as dean makes me responsible for 10 research institutes; among them is the Harriman Institute of Russian Studies, and the Institute of War and Peace Studies, which was founded under the direction of President Eisenhower. My testimony will try to show that although the basic objectives of the Peace Academy bill are excellent, the institutional arrangements can be modified to provide a better way of achieving the goals desired.

For example, the creation of a university consortium will obtain more of the desired benefits and will overcome some of the handicaps which the Peace Academy would face. We all agree that the achievement of a fair, just, and durable peace is one of the highest goals of this Nation. Whatever the resources of money and experts are available should be used as effectively as possible to achieve this peace.

How can they be used most effectively? The idea of a peace academy is appealing. It is a demonstration of our dedication to its purposes. The added funds provided for the field can be used effectively. However, I propose to show that such resources can be much more effective if used to enhance our current capacity instead of creating one more division in the scholarly community.

The present university community is far better fitted to pursue advanced research and education toward peace than would be at all possible with a Peace Academy. Why will the existing universities provide better research? They will do so because peace research requires outstanding scholars from a wide variety of disciplines, disciplines from which the Peace Academy cannot draw the best scholars as universities can.

Peace research will require not only political scientists and historians, it will demand that these scholars work closely and continuously with outstanding physicists and engineers to understand the technicalities of arms control. Psychologists and economists will have to join the team to help determine how to overcome the causes of aggression. There will also have to be legal experts as well as those with impressive backgrounds in the practical workings of national and international organizations.

But the finest physicists, engineers, psychologists, and economists will not leave their laboratories and their colleagues in their departments to go to a peace academy. They will, however, gladly stay at the universities where they are doing their primary research and join the team working on peace research.

A peace academy just will not be able to draw on as many brilliant minds for continuous help as the best of the universities working in this field. Fund universities appropriately and they will be able to bring better minds to the task of research.

Why will the existing universities provide better education than a peace academy? Again, it is because of the diverse talents available in the universities. The present U.S. academies educate students to join specific organizations. West Point graduates are educated for the Army; Annapolis educates for the Navy. For what or-

ganization is the Peace Academy to train its students? It will not be enough if they are simply educated to go into the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

If the peace we seek is to be achieved, appropriately educated people must serve at the policy level of many Government, intergovernment, and private organizations. My work at the school has impressed on me the importance of preparing graduates for the type of organization in which they will serve.

Education for public administration is straightforward. For international affairs, people have to be trained with adequate backgrounds in organizations such as communications, in organizations such as journalism, and in business, as well as Government administration.

A peace academy graduate to be effective must be educated to enter one of a wide span of organizations; it is unlikely that a peace academy standing alone will be able to provide as good training for careers in journalism, law, government, or business as will the current schools of international affairs, which are embedded in universities.

Let me turn to my last point: Why do I suggest a university consortium? During my tenure at the National Science Board, I saw that this was a remarkably effective device for furthering knowledge in fields as diverse as high energy physics, space exploration, or social science research.

A consortium created under the aegis of the U.S. Government will show that the Government gives the subject great importance. The consortium will have a cohesive effect to induce universities to work on the subject together. A consortium provides a simple funding mechanism which can be guided by the finest and wisest in the land.

Instead of further fractionating the effort, as a Peace Academy would, it will provide strong support for research and teaching, draw more good people into the field, and be the most effective use of the resources which you will make available.

Thank you, sir.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, Dr. Picker. Mr. Clarke.

Mr. CLARKE. Mr. Chairman, I appear in opposition to S. 564 which draws heavily and expressly from the findings of the Commission authorized by Congress to examine proposals for a peace academy.

Both S. 564 and the Commission value the theories and techniques of the field of peace learning. How promising is this so-called field? First, I say "so-called," since even the term "peace learning" was invented by the Commission. Its attempts to define or clarify this vague field are markedly unsuccessful.

Second, S. 564 and the Commission find that peace learning and a peace academy will have great policy relevance. This is the keystone in the arch of support for a peace academy. The burden of proof is on its proponents. Peace learning, says the Commission, is anchored in the behavioral sciences. How pertinent are the behavioral sciences in the real policy world of international affairs?

The experience of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is instructive. In its earliest years, ACDA let numerous contracts to

behavioral scientists. There was universal agreement among the ACDA officers I interviewed for my book on that agency that none of these studies assisted the agency in policy-related matters.

Nonetheless, in 1972, ACDA contracted with a group of behavioral scientists at Ohio State; the express purpose of this contract was to ascertain precisely how behavioral scientists could help ACDA. But the study, which involved interviews with ACDA analysts and multidisciplinary inputs from behavioral scientists across the Nation, concluded—that is, the behavioral scientists themselves concluded that, and I quote, "No substantive knowledge from the behavioral sciences appears of immediate and unambiguous relevance to ACDA's problems."

The evidence that supports the general propositions of the behavioral sciences, the study said, and I quote, "appear to be only trivial verification of folk knowledge."

It is noteworthy that the two most respected foreign institutes for the study of international conflict have wisely avoided identification with the kind of peace research propounded by the American Peace Academy advocates. Even the Commission acknowledged that theory in the peace research area, "is in the early stages of creative development." It has been in this stage for 30 years and is likely to remain so.

And because of a difference in roles and values between Government officials and peace researchers, a peace academy would at best be destined for policy irrelevance; at worst, it would be a lightening rod for criticism from the broad mainstream of America's security and arms control experts.

The one area where peace learning may make a modest contribution concerns certain techniques of negotiation. The Commission devoted 14 percent of its report to three case studies that allegedly illustrate this point, but none of the three are convincing.

Third, scores of American universities have major centers or research groups in the peace learning area: Yale, Harvard, Duke, Syracuse, Kent State, USC, Michigan, and on and on. We have more peace research groups than any other nation, and the field is integrated into the curricula of at least 80 American colleges.

How, then, can supporters of S. 564 and the Commission conceivably assert that, "peace learning is not adequately prominent in the curricula of higher education," that private institutions are not doing an adequate job, that Federal intervention is essential to the field's vitality. Peace supporters cannot argue in order to demonstrate their field's legitimacy that it is well established on college campuses, and then, in order to make the case for Government involvement, that it is not well established.

Fourth, the Commission states that it heard from "relatively few witnesses" who opposed a peace academy. This is not surprising since of the hundreds of people listed as having testified before or otherwise interacted with the Commission, only a tiny percentage had a solid background in security affairs or arms control.

More disturbing is the glaring absence of most of the prominent, moderate, mainstream experts in these areas. This could only skew the report in one direction. This result was probably foreordained anyway since several of the Commission members had voiced support for a peace academy before the Commission was even author-

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ized. Other Commission members were prominent peace researchers. Consequently, many of the report's normative assumptions, most of which are unstated, do not reflect values and assumptions commonly held in the international security policy area or in the arms control community.

This is a serious matter. Many cosponsors of S. 564 might reflect on whether the values and assumptions of the peace learning school accurately reflect the views of their constituents.

Most of my professional life, Mr. Chairman, has been devoted to the study of arms control and reducing the threat of nuclear holocaust. It is difficult, as its proponents well understand, to testify against something called a peace academy. This is especially so when there is such an urgent need for Soviet-American and global arms limitation. Congress should be concerned about the lack of movement in arms control, and it should prod the President in this area.

But a peace academy as envisaged in S. 564 is the wrong vehicle to use as a prod. The notion does not and should not fly. Congress, I would suggest, should return to the drawing board and create instead what I call a U.S. Academy for the Study of International Security and Arms Limitation. Its legislative charter could roughly approximate S. 564 with the deletion of references to conflict resolution techniques, peace learning, et cetera, and appropriate redrafting.

We are out of time, Mr. Chairman. I delineate my proposal in more specificity in my prepared statement.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Clarke follows:]

Prepared Statement of Duncan L. Clarke, Professor, School of International Service, The American University

Subcommittee on Education, Arts, and Humanities
Committee on Labor and Human Resources

My name is Duncan Clarke. I am a professor of international relations in the School of International Service at The American University. I appear in opposition to S.564 which seeks to create a U.S. Academy of Peace.

The proposed legislation draws heavily and expressly from the findings and conclusions of the Report of the Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution, entitled, To Establish The United States Academy of Peace.[1] But the Commission's rationale for a Peace Academy is seriously defective.

"FIELD"OF "PEACE LEARNING"-"PEACE SCIENCE"-"PEACE RESEARCH"-"PEACE STUDIES"-"CONFLICT RESOLUTION"

"The Commission bases its recommendations upon legislatively-mandated studies of theories and techniques for conflict resolution

between nations..."[2] S.564 uses similar language and the Commission repeatedly lauded the theories/techniques derived from the variously described "field" of "peace studies," "peace science," "peace research," and - the preferred term, invented by the Commission[3] and incorporated into S.564 (Sec. 5b(9)) - "peace learning." Since the proposed legislation and most of the Commission's findings are premised on the assumption that there is an identifiable field here, and that it offers useful "theories and techniques," two key questions are: (1) Is there a field of "peace learning?" (2) Does it offer theories/techniques of such utility as to justify the creation of a Peace Academy?

When even the term "peace learning" was concocted as recently as 1980, there is reason to question its stability and legitimacy. Nowhere does the Commission adequately define or describe this vague "field."[4] The Commission report stated that: "Describing the field of peace learning is no less complicated than defining the field of health."[5] While Congressman Ashbrook's dissenting opinion is flawed in several respects, he effectively dispatches this attempted analogy between the health and "peace learning" fields,[6] and the Commission hardly strengthens its case by asserting that a crucial difference between health and "peace learning" is "the expenditure of immense sums of money [in] the health field..."[7] A real field - law, mathematics, history - while it may be invigorated by federal funding, has its own justification and its own roots. One's understanding of "peace learning" is further clouded by such awkward statements as : "Peace learning has its

roots squarely in the humanities and the arts, including religion, and scientific learning, both in methodology and technology, increasingly is applied to questions of peace."[8] What does this mean?

It is asserted that "peace studies" "is a distinct and definable field of learning for three reasons:"

- it has "a literature, courses of study, and professional organizations." So does astrology.
- it has "well-defined assumptions and definitions, and a variety of research methodologies." "Peace researchers" do share common assumptions (which are often at variance with those prevailing in the country and the Government), but when even the "field" is ill-defined, a "show-me" attidude is advisable when assessing the alleged clarity of its definitions. As for methodologies, the Commission itself delicately acknowledged that "peace research exhibits substantial debate over methodology."[10]
- it has "a strong applied component in the practice of conflict intervention." The Commission may somewhere have defined "conflict intervention," but I did not find it. Assuming it refers to such things as negotiating techniques, the "field's" contribution is slight and, at any rate, does not justify creating a new bureaucracy.

POLICY RELEVANCE OF "PEACE LEARNING" TECHNIQUES AND RESEARCH

While S.564 states that "the Academy shall not be considered a department, agency or instrumentality of the Federal Government,"

a fundamental assumption of this bill and the Commission report is that a Peace Academy will have great policy relevance. Indeed, this premise is the keystone in the arch of support for a Peace Academy. As the report states: "Peace studies and conflict resolution are pointless...if they are without practical application in the real world."[11]

"Peace learning" is heavily anchored in the behavioral sciences. Says the Commission: "To a large extent, research in peacemaking techniques...draw from the behavioral sciences." The Commission makes its own orientation clear: in criticizing the "peace as social justice branch" of the "field" (e.g., Dr. Gene Sharp), it finds that "the work in that part of the field tends to adopt the more traditional analytic interpretive style of research, rather than the more methodologically sophisticated behavioral science approach."[12] How useful, how policy relevant are the behavioral sciences when applied to international affairs?

The experience of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is instructive.[13] In its earliest years (1961-64) ACDA let numerous contracts to social and behavioral scientists; indeed, its external research expenditures in this area exceeded any subsequent period in its history. There was universal agreement among the dozens of ACDA officers and analysts I interviewed that few of the social science and none of the behavioral science studies directly and unamibiguously assisted the Agency in policy related matters, though some of the <u>former</u> did provide useful background information and suggest new avenues of inquiry. Both ACDA's

leadership and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were uneasy about subsidizing behavioral scientists when there was no clear - or even probable - policy payoff. Consequently, by the late-1960s, contracted social science research was reduced sharply and behavioral science contracts were eliminated altogether.

However, in 1972 some members of Congress urged ACDA to reexamine the possible utility of the behavioral sciences. In response, the Agency reluctantly approved a contract with a group of behavioral scientists at Ohio State University, the express purpose of which was to ascertain precisely how the behavioral sciences could help ACDA accomplish its mission. It was to be consumer-oriented and was seen as a key test by the Agency. But the study, which was completed in 1974 and involved interviews with ACDA analysts and multidisciplinary inputs from many behavioral scientists from across the nation, was an acute disappointment. The multivolume study concluded that: "no substantive knowledge from the behavioral sciences appears of immediate and unambiguous relevance to ACDA problems." Indeed, it continued, the evidence that supports the general propositions of the behavioral sciences "appears to be only trivial verification of folk knowledge."[14] Professor Morris Janowitz of the University of Chicago agrees that much behavioral science research supposedly relating to arms control has been "trivial, naive."[15]

It is noteworthy that the two most respected foreign institutes for the study of international conflict, international security, and arms control - the International Institute for Strategic

Studies (in London) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) - have established their reputations through sound, traditional research directly pertinent to national and international policy concerns. Both institutes (despite SIPRI's title) have avoided being identified with the kind of "peace research" propounded by American Peace Academy advocates.

Congress expects, and the Commission agreed, that the products of a Peace Academy have instrumental value for the U.S. Government and the cause of peace. With one minor exception, this does not appear to be the case. Even the Commission acknowledged that "theory," in the "peace research" area, "is in the early stages of creative development."[16] It has been in this stage for thirty years and is likely to remain so. "Peace learning" theories and methodologies are often complex and sophisticated; they are also largely creatures of academics usually far-removed from, to use the Commission's word's, "the real world."

Within the Executive Branch, perhaps regrettably, several words and phrases evoke an almost instinctive negative response: "theory," "model," "systems analysis" (despite its wide use in DOD), and "it's academic." Though the term "peace learning" is currently unknown to government officials - and, indeed, to many academics within that "field" - it is destined to join the list. Hence - because of a difference in background, perceptions, instincts, roles and values between government officials and "peace researchers" - a Peace Academy would, at best, be destined for policy irrelevance; at worst, it would be a lightning-rod for

7

intense criticism from the broad mainstream of America's governmental and nongovernmental experts in the international security and arms control areas.

The one area where "peace learning" and the behavioral sciences may make a modest contribution concerns certain techniques of negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration. The Commission devoted 14 percent of the entire substantive portion of its report (27 of 192 pages) to three case studies that allegedly illustrate this point. None of the three are convincing.

(1) Ambassador Diego Asencio related his experience negotiating with Columbian terrorists who had taken him hostage. Without the "benefit" of formal behavioral science training, the situation came out well largely because of the Ambassador's extensive diplomatic experience and good judgment. He related that "one of the most important factors" in the final outcome was his "ability to bridge different cultures" which, he says, any good Foreign Service Officer has.[17] Ambassador Asencio referred to "the Stockholm syndrome" (a fondness for one's captors) and suggested that a Peace Academy could study this.[18] But surely this could be examined by the Government itself or any of dozens of scholars/private institutions.

(2) Professor Roger Fisher of the Harvard Law School described his minor role in the "successful" Camp David negotiations. Fisher readilly admits that the outcome was due to many (and, I might add, many more important) factors than his peripheral role. He supported a Peace Academy that would, among other

things, design effective negotiating procedures. But, again, this could be done and, indeed, is being done by the State Department. A course on this very subject is taught, sometimes by Fisher himself, at the Foreign Service Institute.[19] (3) Rev. John Adams told of his part in the Iranian hostage crisis. Yet he played a useful (though minor) role despite an apparent lack of familiarity with the theories and techniques of the behavioral sciences.[20] Like Ambassador Asencio, Rev. Adams relied on sound judgment and past (domestic) experience.

The Commission asserted correctly that negotiation and mediation techniques "are teachable."[21] But: (1) They are taught within and without Government. (2) Though one can instruct someone on being an adequate negotiator, or, for that matter, an adequate university-level instructor, one becomes a great negotiator or a truly inspiring professor only through experience and the possession of intangible innate qualities that cannot be "taught." (3) It is nowhere demonstrated, either in the three case studies or elsewhere in the Commission report, that the behavioral sciences have more to contribute in this regard than many other branches of knowledge, like law. (4) Hence, it is evident that a case has not been made - on these grounds - for a Peace Academy.

IS ENOUGH CURRENTLY BEING DONE IN THE "PEACE LEARNING" AREA?

Scores of American universities have major centers, institutes, or research groups in the "peace learning" area: Yale, Harvard,

Duke, Syracuse, Kent State, Michigan, Wisconsin, Hawaii, USC, Missouri-St. Louis, and many more.[22] The United States has far more research groups in the area (79) than any other nation and the Commission found that "the research component of the field of peace learning is lively and full of ferment."[23] There is a massive literature encompassing thousands of books, articles and journals[24] and the "field" is integrated into the college curricula of "at least 80" American colleges.[25] How, then, can the Commission conceivably assert that "peace learning is not adequately prominent in the curricula of general higher education;" that private institutions are not doing an adequate job; and that federal intervention (a Peace Academy) is essential to the "field's" future vitality?[26]

Peace Academy proponents argue as follows: (1) An Academy would represent a permanent, long-term, nationally-sanctioned commitment to "peace learning." (2) The "peace learning" area is struggling on many college campuses because it must compete with more established fields for limited financial resources. (3) A Peace Academy would provide funding for the "field" to survive, prosper, and gain acceptance; current federal assistance via, for example, Title VI of the Higher Education Act, the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Arts, and the National Science Foundation is too impermanent.

These arguments are rebuttable: (1)Since "peace learning" is largely unrelated to what the Government does, it is not deserving of public support. [Milton Mapes of the National Peace Academy

Campaign argues that, "Once the Peace Academy was established, the symbolism of destroying it would be an almost overwhelmingly powerful protective shield, and the attempt would mobilize in its defense many powerful...forces in our society."[27] This is an excellent reason for defeating S.564 now.] (2) Peace Academy supporters cannot argue - in order to demonstrate their "field's" legitimacy - that it is well-established on college campuses and, then - in order to make a case for Government involvement - that it is not well-established. In fact, it is doing fine, far better than the merits of the "field" warrant. If it cannot compete with established fields, it does not deserve support. (3) A Peace Academy would certainly benefit a select group of academics, but it will not enhance the acceptability of "peace learning" because of what it <u>is</u> (or is not). Indeed, a Peace Academy might deflect energy away from the thousands of scholars, citizens, and private organizations presently pursuing far more promising "real world" approaches to tension reduction and arms limitation.

NORMATIVE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERPINNING THE CAMPAIGN FOR A PEACE ACADEMY

"The Commission heard from relatively few witnesses who concluded their testimony in opposition to the federal involvement in the field of peace learning."[28] This is not surprising since, by a rough and generous reckoning of the hundreds of people listed as having testified before or otherwise interacted with the Commission, only 5-10 percent had a solid background in international

security affairs or arms control.[29] What is more disturbing is the glaring absence of most of the prominent, moderate, mainstream experts in these areas.[30] Where were George Quester, Thomas Schelling, Barry Blechman, I.M. Destler, Steven Canby, Michael Nacht, J.I. Coffey, Stanley Hoffmann, Edward Kolodziej, William Kincade, Herbert Scoville, Robert Harkavy, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Art, Richard Rosecrance, Robert Osgood, Richard Betts, and Samuel Huntington? Where were Gerard Smith, Henry Kissinger, McGeorge Bundy, Paul Warnke, Richard Burt, Philip Farley, Adrian Fisher, James Schlesinger, Walter Slocombe, William Colby, and Fred Ikle? The virtual absence of the core of America's expertise in international security affairs and arms control could only skew the report in one direction.

This result was probably foreordained anyway by the composition of the Commission. Of its nine members (only one of whom dissented), several, including its Chairman and Vice Chairman had stated their support for a Peace Academy before the Commission was even authorized.[31] In addition, Commissioner Elise Boulding is a prominent "peace researcher" and Commissioner Barnes was a former Vice President of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution. Also, several of those whose work or experience was quoted extensively and favorably in the report had indicated their support for a Peace Academy before the Commission was inbeing.[32]

Consequently, many of the normative assumptions underlying the report - most of which are unstated - do not adequately represent values and assumptions commonly held in either the

international security policy area or the arms control community. A case in point concerns the role and utility of military force as an instrument of national policy. Although the Commission states that "conflict is a normal part of life and is neither good nor bad" and that "there are times when compromise is wrong,"[33] the thrust and tone of the report is quite different. The first lengthy quotation cited (favorably) by the Commission is from Kenneth Boulding:

> A 'fight' is a situation in which each party to a perceived conflict over interests acts to reduce the welfare of the other. Fights almost always become negative sum and lead to a reduction of the welfare of both parties; the winner may lose less than the loser, but both parties would have been better off if the fight could have been avoided. (emphasis added)[34]

How many would argue that the United States would be "better off" if it had not fought Hitler, or had not resisted aggression in Korea in 1950, or did not combat terrorism today? There are men and governments who intend to do harm. International conflict is not always, or even usually, a matter of misunderstanding and misperception,[35] as is so often assumed by many in the "peace learning" area. Nor are people and nations, in the language of S.564, "diverted from peace by the lack of problem-solving skills for dealing with...conflicts." We have always possessed skills for avoiding war. What is lacking is the requisite desire and political commitment to avert conflict.

The Commission states: "Violent escalation of conflicts clearly is not in the United States' interest; resort to violence is a

sign the conflict is lost."[36] But in many instances since World War II the United States, through the introduction or the threatened use of military force (in any of several modes), has not only furthered its own interests, but mitigated or deterred ongoing or incipient conflicts.[37] Resort to violence is not necessarily "a sign the conflict is lost." Timely and effective use of limited force may prevent a major conflict.

Commissioner Elise Boulding states that most "peace researchers... focus on disarmament and nonmilitary solutions to conflict..."[38] The use of the word "disarmament," instead of arms control, reveals other normative assumptions. Many of us aspire to a world that will someday be shorn of nuclear weapons, but the numerous and obvious practical obstacles to "disarmament," especially general disarmament, have given this word a pejorative cast both within Government and among many in the public. This may be unfortunate, but Congress should consider whether a "disarmament" approach, especially as advocated by many "peace researchers," is any more promising or advisable than it has been in the past.

Additionally, many "peace researchers" often reject the utility of deterrence, particularly at the nuclear level. Says Milton Mapes of the Peace Academy Campaign: "for 2000 years we've been wishing for peace and preparing for war...And for 2000 years the preparations have ruled reality...[F]undamentally, we are just buying time...National security - called by its right name - means not preparing for war, but avoiding it."[39] Many of these sentiments are sound. But "buying time," which a deterrent posture permits,

is vital. While continued reliance on nuclear weapons, sooner or later, literally promises not only to end national security, but possibly mankind, adoption of a "peace learning" approach that is so palpably out-of-touch with unpleasant international realities, and probably misreads human nature as well, would expose the United States to unacceptable dangers.

Finally, there are many key assumptions commonly found in the "peace learning" area that are absent from or only hinted at in the report.[40] These assumptions are not universally held by "peace researchers," but even a casual review of the literature indicates their wide appeal within this group:

- Arms control has failed; it is a fraud, a cover for escalating the arms race.
- Reasonable men (and statesmen) can and should settle their differences amicably. The chances for conflict resolution will improve markedly through: proper education, better information and data sets about international events, cultural exchanges, greater international communications, unilateral demonstrations of good will, etc.
- Many of our social and political experiences at home are readilly transferrable to the international realm.
- "Power politics" is evil and dangerous, the product of an increasingly obsolete nation-state system. It is time to break this habit.
- Conflicts tend to escalate; consequently, even conventional warfare is fast losing its utility.

- The "Soviet threat" is vastly overrated; in many ways the U.S. is the principal threat to world peace.
- War is (take your pick): the evil machination of a few evil men; encouraged by weak domestic and international institutions; caused by "power politics;" "injustice;" "ignorance;" "imperialism/capitalism;" the "Military-Industrial complex;" etc. If "the people" could choose, they would opt for peace.
- No legitimate purpose could ever be furthered by using even one nuclear weapon; indeed, even the possession of nuclear weapons poses unacceptable risks.

This is not the place to present a detailed assessment of this partial list of normative assumptions, some of which have considerable merit. But all are defective, at least in substantial part. The matter of values must be stressed because it is essentially side-stepped or hidden by the Commission. When these assumptions are scrutinized, it is doubtful that either Congress or most of the public will support them.

CONCLUSION

Most of my professional life has been devoted to the study of war and peace and, above all, to reducing the ever-present threat of nuclear holocaust. My former students, who cut across the political spectrum, include ACDA analysts, academic arms control specialists, the present Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, the current chief U.S. START negotiator,

past members of our SALT and MBFR delegations, an employee of the National Peace Academy Campaign, and many others. It is difficult, as its proponents well-understand, to testify against something called a Peace Academy. This is especially so when, despite the urgent need for Soviet-American and global arms limitation, the Reagan administration paid some attention to this problem only belatedly and haltingly because of growing pressure from allies, Congress, virtually all the mainline churches, and much of the American public as well as (one hopes) a degree of prudence and wisdom. Some in Congress and elsewhere may be tempted to back even questionable legislation just to prod the administration. But a Peace Academy, as rationalized in the Commission report and as envisaged in S.564,does not and should not fly.

Congress should return to the drawing board and create, instead, a U.S. Academy for the Study of International Security and Arms Limitation (USASISAL). Its legislative charter could approximate S.564 with the deletion of references to "conflict resolution techniques," "peace learning," etc. and appropriate redrafting. Briefly, the purpose of and rationale for the USASISAL would be as follows:

(1) The USASISAL would be an independent, yet U.S. Government-sanctioned, institute for the study of the interrelated areas of international security and arms limitation. Tension reduction and arms limitation efforts cannot enhance international stability, reduce the danger of nuclear war and, at the same time, further

national interests unless they are informed by scholars, diplomats, soldiers,[41] and arms control professionals who possess demonstrated experience and skill in international affairs.

(2) Conversely, because national security cannot be indefinitely maintained, let alone assured, by continued reliance on weapons of mass destruction, a central concern of the USASISAL would be arms limitation and tension reduction.

(3) The USASISAL would be an interdisciplinary research and, to a much lesser degree, training institute, that encourages the use of a variety of approaches and methodologies of clear or probable policy-relevance. It would not be an "educational" institute in the sense that the Commission and S.564 generally use that term. "Peace learning," international security, and arms control and disarmament studies are all firmly established in the curricula of hundreds of American colleges and universities. Lawrence Weiler's observation, twice quoted by the Commission, that, in an "educational" (teaching) sense, arms control is a "cottage industry" on college campuses is both inaccurate and taken out of context.[42] I do, however, agree whole-heartedly with this conclusion when Dr. Weiler - who opposes the kind of Peace Academy envisioned in S.564 - applies it to nongovernmental facilities and funding-levels for arms control research.[43] In the past, individual scholars, private research organizations, and such university arms control centers as those at Cornell, Harvard, MIT, and Stanford have made important contributions to American arms control efforts. A USASISAL could markedly increase this

contribution. Unlike a Peace Academy, with its emphasis on the behavioral sciences, a USASISAL could clearly impact upon policy.

(4) Finally, a USASISAL that dealt with both arms limitation and international security issues, tapped the full spectrum of academic and governmental expertise, and reflected the whole range of values in our society, would likely garner and deserve enthusiastic support. As distinct from a Peace Academy, that inevitably would invite unwholesome tension and strident criticism, a USASISAL would be worthy of presidential and congressional backing and a truly bipartisan constituency.

1. Report of the Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution to the President of the United States and the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States Congress, To Establish The United States Academy of Peace [hereafter referred to as Commission Report] (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981). Senator Matsunaga: "The bill...incorporates the recommendations of the Commission...," Congressional Record, February 23, 1983, p. S.1526.

2. Commission Report, p. xxiii.

3. Ibid., p. 18.

4. For attempts at definition/description see Ibid., p. 18 and chap. VI.

5. Ibid., p. 117.

6. Ibid., pp. 209-210.

7. Ibid., p. 118.

8. Ibid., p. 117. Elsewhere (p. 123), "peace research" is analogized to "the discipline of international relations." Only under the broadest (and vaguest) dictionary definition of "discipline," would international relations qualify. The area of international relations is a general, multidisciplinary focus of inquiry. My own colleagues include political scientists, diplomats, theologians, area specialists, historians, lawyers, military officers, economists, etc.

9. Ibid., p. 119.

10. Ibid., p. 123.

11. Ibid., p. 151. And (pp. 43-44) a Peace Academy "can help provide the knowledge and skills necessary for a peaceful world."

12. Ibid., pp. 138-39.

13. For an analysis of ACDA's internal and external research programs between FY 1962-FY 1978 see Duncan L. Clarke, Politics of Arms Control: The Role and Effectiveness of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 122-35.

14. U.S. ACDA, Utilization of the Behavioral Sciences by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, E-221, Ohio State University, 1974, vol. 1, pp. 2,8 and vol. 2, p. 48. Also

see William A. Buckingham, Jr., "Client-Oriented Social Research: How Could Social and Behavioral Scientists Contribute to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency?," Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1974. Despite the title, Buckingham states (p. 3) that his dissertation "will probably be of little or no use to ACDA."

15. Morris Janowitz, Military Conflict: Essays in Institutional Analysis of War and Peace (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), pp. 299-303.

16. Commission Report, p. 123.

17. Ibid., p. 80.

18. Ibid., pp. 85-86.

19. Ibid., p. 90. Indeed the Foreign Service Institute offers several courses in the conflict resolution area. Testimony of Carleton Coon, Jr., Deputy Director, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on International Operations, Committee on International Relations, Hearings: National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, pp. 74-75; testimony of John Sprott, Deputy Director, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings: Proposals to Establish a U.S. Academy of Peace, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, p. 77. Fisher also relates (p. 93) that both the Israeli and Egyptian negotiators at Camp David had been trained at the Harvard Law School. There is no persuasive reason why Harvard and other nongovernmental institutions could not continue to do this.

20. Commission Report, p. 114.

21. Ibid., p. 139.

22. Ibid., pp. 75, 120.

23. Ibid., pp. 120, 146.

24. Ibid., pp. 142, 146-47, 204-206.

25. Ibid., p. 146.

26. Ibid., pp. 18, 117, 169, 175.

27. Hearings: Proposals to Establish a U.S. Academy of Peace, p. 297.

28. Commission Report, p. 173.

29. The vast majority were either behavioral scientists, other academics from outside the international security/arms control areas, or citizens from many walks of life.

30. The handful of people contacted by the Commission in these crucial areas included - "Right-Moderate Right": some military officers, Richard Pipes, and Robert Pranger; "Left-Moderate Left": Betty Goetz Lall, Jeremy Stone, Robert Johansen, and Paul Walker; "Moderate": some military officers, Burt Sapin, Francis Beer, Laurence Radway, Alan Millett, Lawrence Weiler, and Theodore Eliot.

31. Hearings: National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution, James Laue, pp. 27ff; Senator Spark Matsunaga, pp. 80ff; William Lincoln, pp. 85ff.

32. Ibid., Rev. John Adams, pp. 183ff; Ralph Goldman, pp. 218ff; Herbert Kelman, pp. 270ff; J. David Singer, pp. 329ff.

33. Commission Report, pp. 22, 154.

34. Ibid., p. 24.

35. See Arthur A. Stein, "When Misperception Matters," World Politics 34(July 1982): 505-526.

36. Commission Report, p. 43.

37. See Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978). Also, for an assessment of the utility of military force which reflects the views of many within the international security/arms control areas, yet parts with the "peace learning" school, see Robert Art, "To What Ends Military Power," International Security 4(Spring 1980): 3-35.

38. Commission Report, p. 123.

39. Text of sermon by Milton Mapes, Church of the Redeemer, New Haven, Connecticut, October 29, 1978.

40. However, Commissioner Ashbrook, albeit indelicately, cited several he found throughout the hearing record. Commission Report, pp. 211-12.

41. Some will object to having active-duty or retired military officers associated with the USASISAL. Military officers generally do not subscribe to all the aforementioned normative assumptions of the "peace learning" school. Yet they desire peace as much as any member of the Physicians for Social

Responsibility or the Nuclear Freeze Campaign. It is worth remembering that during the first year of the Reagan administration the only senior Government officials who had supported the SALT II treaty were the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While it is true that the militaries of the world are "a part of the problem," it is more accurate to say that we are all part of the problem. It can never be solved, or even addressed intelligently, unless everyone works together. In addition, arms reduction efforts that enhance stability, as well as justice and freedom, cannot proceed apart from the unique expertise of the military. When I was a Professor of Foreign Affairs at The National War College (1979-81) - where arms control is a part of the curriculum - there was broad-based support for mutual, balanced, verifiable arms control. I will long remember a Navy captain who related his experience during the atmospheric test of a high-yield thermonuclear weapon at Eniwetok. He concluded by saying, with obvious emotion: "Those weapons, if used, will destroy us all." There was prolonged silence. Everyone agreed.

42. Commission Report, pp. 98, 174. The Commission takes this quotation out of context. Weiler says that while arms control education is a "cottage industry," it is "a growing one" that in 1979 boasted 200 "full-course offerings." This figure is surely much higher today. In addition, it is somewhat misleading since most courses (including my own) deal with arms control, and properly so, as an integral part of a course on "International Security," "National Security Policy," "International Conflict," etc. U.S. ACDA, Report to Congress on Arms Control Education and Academic Study Centers, January 1979, p. 27. The Commission infers (pp. 98, 127-28, 143) that Dr. Weiler, whose experience with arms and disarmament dates from the Eisenhower era, is a supporter of the proposed Peace Academy. But, while he does desire much greater federal support for nongovernmental arms control activities, he did not testify in favor of the Peace Academy idea, partly because of reservations about the practical utility of the behavioral sciences for policymakers. (Personal conversation with Dr. Weiler, June 8, 1982).

43. For an update of his findings on this point see Lawrence Weiler, "The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations and Academic Institutions in U.S. Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation," in Hans Guenter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke, eds, Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation in the 1980s (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, forthcoming 1983), pp. 37-51. Concerning the Peace Academy proposal, Weiler says (pp. 49-50) - "There is serious question whether...the focus on the behavioral sciences, which have proved in the past to have little relevance to arms control policy issues, would result in any significant addition to the policy process."

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, Dr. Clarke. We would be very happy next to hear, Dean Funari, from you.

Mr. FUNARI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will as quickly as I can summarize my statement to you. As a student at two Woodrow Wilson schools and Oxford University and a lifetime of work in pursuit of peace, I am in the indelicate position of opposing this bill, primarily because I think we already have at least nine professional peace academies already existing in the United States, not to count hundreds of programs in international security studies and peace studies throughout our major universities.

The specific things that seem to trouble me very deeply, as dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh, is the very essence of what is proposed here: to create a degree-granting institution on a very short budget, a budget so short as to be almost ludicrous to envisage. Precisely as Dean Picker has already pointed out, peace and peace studies involve an intricate complex array of academic disciplines, of studies by departments of sociology, political science, economics, history, physics, et cetera.

To create an academy without that intellectual infrastructure is in effect to isolate it and to narrow its focus so narrow and so small as to be ineffective.

If the bill were to delete the degree-granting provisions and in some way connect itself to the enormous resources already available at American universities, and places like the Foreign Service Institute and the service colleges and services academies, it is possible that the purposes for which this bill seeks to serve could be accomplished, but only in that way.

I suggest and submit to you that you already have examples of how these purposes could be best served and a variety of models: the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars under the direction of James Billington at the Smithsonian, which gathers together and brings together for periods of a year to 2 years outstanding international scholars. There are the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Science Foundation.

There are models which the Federal Government can use to make a major contribution to these purposes and to mobilize, to serve as a clearinghouse for information purposes, to provide the kinds of funds so essential to the research and education, training that this bill seeks to serve, and that if this effort were to head into that direction, then it would have my support, and I think the support of my fellow members in the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs.

There is a major point which has already been referred to, and it is one for which I do not have a remedy to propose, but one which I think should cause us all to pause and think very carefully.

A U.S. Government funded and sponsored academy of peace would be dealing with extraordinary sensitive and intricately complex and deeply controversial questions. These controversies are as much a matter of domestic American debate as they are debate and sometimes violence on the international forum.

With the appointing authority vested in the President and the Congress, subject to the annual budget and appropriations process, it will be extraordinarily difficult, perhaps even impossible, to insu-

late this academy from the kinds of perfectly understandable and inevitable political pressures, views, conflicts—contesting over policies in areas of the world in which the United States either has a national interest or to which the United States is a party.

And if it is to maintain its credibility, a great deal of thought and a good deal more care than has been evidenced, I think, so far in this bill, will have to be done to insulate such an academy.

I urge in fact that we not go forward with the Academy, but rather investigate the opportunities or the models I have already cited, either the consortium that Dean Picker has talked about or a national foundation or endowment for peace studies.

In any case, the central point and purpose is to mobilize the enormously rich and diverse resources already at work in many of our institutions and have been at work for 25 years. We already have academies of peace in this country, and those are the ones who really need the assistance and help in pursuing education, training, research, and degree-granting authority.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Funari follows:]

Statement and Testimony of

Dean John Funari

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

University of Pittsburgh

before

The Subcommittee on Education, Arts and Humanities

on

S. 564: The U.S. Academy of Peace Act

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am honored by your invitation to testify on S. 564, a bill to establish the United States Academy of Peace. As Dean of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Pittsburgh, I am dedicated to the purposes which this bill seeks to serve; my faculty colleagues, the students of our School, and our alumni and graduates have been working for the 25 years of our existence as a School for the cause of world peace and the security of free peoples throughout the world. We have been and are already a prominent Peace Academy, with over 2000 graduates, as citizens and officials of American government governments of countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe and international organizations around the world, all working and making a daily contribution to maintenance of peace and security.

I am also my School's and University's representative in the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs.

This Association consists of nine graduate and professional schools that have provided for both the public and private sectors, for non-governmental and government organizations, education, training and research in the cause of peace. Each of us, as separate, autonomous Schools within great and prominent universities, have as our mission and goal the advancement of the cause of peaceful resolution and international disputes and prevention of violence and war. We are, in short, academies of peace already working for over, in some cases, half a century as representatives of the best values, as symbols of deepest aspirations and as examples of the quest for peace that the United States offers to the world.

It is, therefore, with greatest reluctance that I oppose the bill for the establishment of a United States Academy of Peace in its present form. While I am not empowered to speak for my fellow deans and colleagues in the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs, I believe that they would share and agree with my views expressed in this testimony. With some changes in the proposed legislation, it is possible that a number of them,and certainly I,could support a revised bill. The changes that I propose are these:

1) S. 564 proposes to create a degree-granting institution. This is a duplicative and wasteful use of the resources that authorized by this bill. There are already nine academies of peace, not to mention programs, centers, institutes and departments in

hundreds of American universities that make significant contributions to and carry out degree-granting activities in peace studies and resolution of international conflicts. If the Congress wishes to further the cause of peace and resolution of international conflicts, the most effective, direct and forceful way to do that is to provide the added margin of support to the already built, existing, operating academies of peace -- the Schools, centers and institutes of international affairs in American universities.

2) S. 564 proposes wholly inadequate funds to accomplish the purposes of the bill. The $15,000,000 for a capitalization fund could not possibly be sufficient for the construction of a building, amassing a library and information data center with all the attendant and necessary technological equipment, furnishing such an academic building and providing all the physical and tangible supporting infrastructure.

3) Far more important than the inadequate physical plant and infrastructure envisaged in S. 564 is the total lack of provision for the supporting intellectual and academic infrastructure that such an enterprise must have. The bill speaks correctly and loftily of "the social, behavioral and physical sciences and arts and humanities with regard to history, nature,

elements and future of peace processes...and economic, political, social and cultural relations..." It speaks of "...peace education and training programs, basic and applied research projects..." I submit to the members of this Committee that what the bill is describing or implying is a modern, large, active, complete university. That is precisely the strength of existing academies of peace -- the Schools, centers, programs and institutes of international studies and relations: they are able to draw upon the enormous intellectual wealth and conceptual diversity already existing in their home universities of which they are an integral part. The problems of peace are multidisciplinary, complex, intricate and require the insights and contributions from all of the intellectual and academic fields and views that the bill envisages. To create a new, separate institution, divorced from the social sciences and humanities basic and applied research, would be to create an enterprise weakened and crippled at the outset by the narrowness of its scholarly foundations and isolation of its staff from the usual interchange and interaction that gives vitality to Schools of international affairs in our large contemporary universities. The funds provided for by S. 564 would be largely vested in bricks, mortar, buildings, grounds and administrators

with very little getting where it is most needed -- research, education, training, reflection, contemplation and diffusion of information and ideas.

My criticism of S. 564 could readily be answered and I feel sure that my fellow colleagues and practitioners of education for peace would rally strongly and forcefully for this proposal with a few simple, but major, changes. This Committee already has examples of a better way to achieve the noble, even essential, purposes of this bill. There is the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars so ably administered under the imaginative leadership of James Billington. There is the National Endowment for the Humanities. There is the National Institute for Education. There is the National Science Foundation. The bill before you today speaks of an "endowment". All of the major goals and purposes of this proposal could be accomplished by the creation of a National Endowment for Peace or a United States Center for Peace, with a small, highly active and competent administrative staff which could mobilize and strengthen the resources of already existing centers and institutions -- both academic and non-academic -- of international security and peace.

I would urge the Committee to delete Section 5 (b) (2) and certainly Section 5 (b) (6). I would urge the Committee to rename the entity to be created as the U.S. Center for Peace or the National Peace Endowment or the National Institute for Peace or some similar name. By changing the name from "Academy" to

"Center" or "Institute" or "Endowment" the proposal would more fully and adequately reflect the real and significant purposes of the bill which all Americans would be proud and ready to support.

Mr. Chairman, I have another major concern with this proposed legislation and it is a concern for which I do not have a specific remedy to propose. It is, nonetheless, a point that will require earnest and thoughtful consideration by the sponsors of this bill, the Congress, and the President who would have the responsibility to appoint members to its board of directors. I raise this concern, not solely from my present role as an academic, but also from my nearly ten years experience working in the foreign affairs establishment in Washington and American Embassies abroad. A U.S. Government-funded and sponsored Academy of Peace will be dealing with extraordinarily snesitive, intricately complex and deeply controversial questions. Those controversies will be as much a matter of domestic American political debate -- witness the Arab-Israeli conflict and the nuclear armaments issues -- as they would be argued and contested abroad and in international forums and negotiations. With the appointing authority vested in the President and Congress, and with funding dependent on the annual budget and appropriations process, can such an Academy of Peace be fully and wholly insulated from the political and bureaucratic pressures that will inevitably and understandably arise in connection with the work and activities of the Academy? This question strikes at the very heart of the fundamental value of open and unfettered research and debate in such an institution,

its credibility and standing abroad, its capacity to investigate ideas and concepts, its faculty to debate and research, and its ability to influence even indirectly the course of the pursuit of peaceful resolution of international conflicts to which the U.S. government is a party and where U.S. national interests may be at stake. If it cannot be so insulated from these pressures, and if it cannot be protected from narrow partisanship on individual and specific issues of foreign policy and international order, then its establishment and funding would be useless.

Mt. Chairman, it is agonizing for me -- having served in the U.S. military service, having spent nearly ten years working for my Government in the civil and foreign service at home and in American embassies abroad and an equal amount of time leading a prominent School of Public and International Affairs --- to appear to be opposing a bill so widely supported in the U.S. Senate and throughout the country, to be critical of an effort to promote the cause of peace and the very survival of our country. But, precisely because the issue of peace research and education and the effort to make a tangible demonstration of America's commitment to peace are so critically important, I believe that we should do it right. What we do not need is a collection of buildings in Washington or its outskirts, a symbolic monument to peace; what we do need is a vital and functioning organization that can make the most effective use of the enormously diverse and incredibly rich resources for peace already in place in this country. Monuments to the futile stupidity of war, to say nothing of the very real and ominous threat of nuclear war, abound in this city and throughout this country. We do not need

21-097 O—83——10

another one to remind us of the tragedy of war. What is needed now, so very desperately, is the mobilization, strengthening and reinforcing of the human and institutional resources of this nation in its quest for peace, not the diversion of resources and duplication of effort that would result from the establishment of yet another Academy of Peace. I do not and cannot oppose --- on the contrary, I support wholeheartedly --- the spirit and the purposes of S. 564; but I must reluctantly oppose the bill as it is presently written. It would take very little for the Committee to remove its major defects and I urge the Committee to do so and then report out a bill that can be supported enthusiastically and wholeheartedly by all.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, Dean. Dr. Zartman, we would be glad to hear from you.

Mr. ZARTMAN. I am William Zartman. I am professor of international politics at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and former chairman of the Politics Department at New York University. I have been active in the field of developing the study of negotiations and conflict resolutions and have written a widely available book on negotiations, edited two others, three others, and contributed to a number of others. And I have helped establish the International Mediation Focus of the International Peace Academy in which I teach.

Since I am a faculty member, I would like to focus on the development of a field. I think we can see that knowledge generally develops by leaps and bounds or fits and starts, if you want. A subject lies dormant for awhile, and then somebody finds a key or several keys to a partial understanding of it, and there is a burst of activity. And this continues as far as it can go until it has worked out, and then there is a time again of application of this understanding.

The Commission on the American Peace Academy seems to suggest that we are at the beginning of such a burst of activity. That is wrong. We are in the midst of it. At the present time, there is a tremendous amount of work that is being done on negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution, much larger than the bibliography that they cite, much broader than the people that they have interviewed. And this activity has been carried out by the pluralistic, competitive, active American higher education system and its adjuncts in publications and institutes, a system that is doing its job very well.

One might say, well, then in this situation, isn't it a time for a peace academy to step in and somehow help push the field forward, even though it has gone as far, incompletely, but as far as it has gone under the present arrangement. And I am suggesting, no, it has not, because a peace academy would provide unfair competition

and unproductive competition for the activity that is now going on, that it is dealing with an inappropriate subject for so-called coordination and centralization, and that it is wasting resources that are much better used for the support of the kind of activity that has already been carried on.

Such an academy, if it were to come into being, would drain away talent from existing institutions or it would have no talent itself. It would cut into funding sources or it would have only Government funding. I must say I think it is shocking to find that the bill empowers the Academy to go for private funds, thus in direct competition with the kind of institutions that are already looking for hard-to-find money in support of their activities.

And it would impinge on the degree-granting and training and policy studying functions of universities and of the Foreign Service Institute, or else it would perform none of these functions.

I was very happy to hear the testimony of the first panel. If these are people speaking in favor of the Academy, they seemed to indicate that it should have no degrees, no role, no policymaking function, and therefore, should be limited in what it would carry out to the point where it cannot do its job.

In fact, there is no model for this kind of academy; neither the space program nor the defense program nor the National Academy of Sciences nor the National Institutes of Health deal with subject matter of this kind and in a way that is proposed within the academy bill.

This is not a subject matter which produces classified technology that remains a Government monopoly, nor does it require a close core of officers trained in an official, disciplined Federal program. Space programs and military corps are appropriate subjects of a Federal monopoly or academy. But peacemaking has none of these characteristics, and therefore a single Government institution is not justified. To the extent that the Government may want to have an activity of its own in this area, it already has its Foreign Service Institute. That, too, needs support, not competition from the inside.

The bill provides for undergraduate and graduate teaching by an academy that is not an accredited higher education institution, and it calls for the creation of schools, programs, divisions, offices, colloquia, centers, symposiums, and other bodies, in other words, a grab bag, that would draw resources away from the very institutions which these creations are supposed to enter into relations with.

The question, I think, is very badly posed; in fact, trickily posed. It is not a question of whether we are for or against peace. It is a question of whether peace is best served by a centralized, coordinating, monolithic Government academy.

It is very nice to hear that money set aside would be less than the cost of one B–1 bomber; I applaud the support that is being given and the concern that is being expressed about this field. But the cost of that portion of the B–1 bomber is being put in the wrong place.

I think the conclusion is clear: what is needed is an allocation of support for research and teaching in the area of conflict resolution, to be sure, and we are concerned about this activity, but the distri-

bution of that support to the schools and institutes, programs and scholars in the American higher education system.

One means for doing this was proposed last year by Senator Denton in his proposal for a setaside in title VI of the Higher Education Act; this is a most sound proposal. Others could also be envisioned, such as Dean Picker's consortium proposal. Support for peace research is needed, but an academy is not.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Zartman follows:]

WRITTEN STATEMENT

In Favor of an Appropriate Alternative to the Proposed Peace Academy

I William Zartman
The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Peace Research and studies of conflict resolution are high agenda items today. Good work abounds and is continuing to be produced by scholars and practitioners, the two groups continuing to build on their own and each others' works. This growth is following the normal pattern in the generation of knowledge, in which a subjet lies dormant for a while, then suddenly draws attention as a few scholars find a new key or keys to its understanding. The vein is then mined until the given tools of understanding can no longer draw any more material from it, and it rests dormant again for a while as the results of the wave of attention are absorbed, tested and used.

We are now in this phase of creative activity in regard to the study of negotiation, conflict resolution, and mediation. More than a dozen books of serious value (and some others) have appeared in the past few years, the Journal of Conflict Resolution and other journals on the subject have carried a quantity of insightful articles, courses are being developed and curricula expanded, the International Peace Academy has accompanied its established focus on peacekeeping with a new series of programs on peacemaking.

All this is not enough. Theories are not strong enough, cases are not understood well enough, there are not enough courses and not enough students in them for such an important subject area, many subjects lie outside our current research efforts: Much more knowledge needs to be generated and disseminated. But the strides that have been made are the product of a pluralistic, competetive, open, academic process, in which individuals follow their hunches and seek concepts among information, many disciplinary backgrounds are developed and brought together, seminars and conferences are set up to bring people

together, research grants and project supports are supplied from a number of universities, institutions and foundations. This multiple process is the essence of Research and Developed in the American higher education system, and for it to operate it needs active individuals of different backgrounds in a broad and competetive environment, supported by substantive demand for results and by accessible sources of funding.

To set a federal monolith in the midst of this productive interaction would be to impose a different type of competition--the stifling and monopolizing presence of an expensive and uneconomic government giant, with a budget 3 times that of an existing graduate school of international affairs but with neither the promise of productivity nor the status of a university. Such an "Academy" would drain away talent from existing institutions (or it would have no talent), it would cut into funding sources (or it would have only government funding), and it would impinge on the degree-granting, training and policy-study functions of the universities and the Foreign Service Institute (or else it would perform none of these functions). In other words, there is nothing that an "Academy" would do that present institutions cannot do better, and by trying to do these things an "Academy" would unfairly compete with present institutions without bringing any new capabilities.

Peacemaking is no space program and no defense program. It does not produce classified technology that remains a government monopoly nor does it require a closed corps of officers trained in an official, disciplined federal program. Space programs and military corps are appropriate subjects of a federal monopoly or academy. Peacemaking has none of their characteristics and therefore a single government institute is not justified. To the extent that the government may want to have an activity of its own in this area, it already has its Foreign Service Institute; it too needs support, not competition from inside.

It is a waste of public resources, at a time when public funds are scarce and needed, to set up duplicate structures and new programs, guaranteed to function less well than existing programs and institutions because the new ones are removed from their academic base. Money is badly needed for research, fellowships, student scholarships, educational program support, publications, and other expenses, but it is needed by universities, journals, institutes and programs that now exist and have shown their capability of making a real contribution to the subject. The bill provides for undergraduate and graduate teaching by an Academy that is not an accredited higher education institution, and it calls for the creation of schools, programs, divisions, offices, colloquia, centers, symposia, and other bodies that would draw resources away from the very institutions which which these creations are supposed to enter into relations. It is one thing to rob Peter to pay Paul; it is even worse to rob a robust, active, proven, but poor Peter to pay an inexistent, unproven, and unpromising Paul.

The conclusion should be clear. What is needed is an allocation of support to research and teaching in the area of conflict resolution, but the distribution of that support to the schools, institutes, programs and scholars in the American higher education system. One means for doing this was proposed last year by Senator Denton is his proposal for a set-aside in Title VI of the Higher Education Act. This is a most sound proposal; other could also be envisaged. Support for peace research is needed, but an "Academy" is not.

SAIS

School of Advanced International Studies
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Dr I William Zartman is Professor of International Politics at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He has been instrumental in developing the study of negotiations and conflict resolution through his research and teaching. He is author of The Practical Negotiator, with Maureen Berman (Yale 1982), published for the Academy of Educational Development, and of the forthcoming Ripe for Resolution (Yale 1983), published for the Council on Foreign Relations. He has also edited and co-authored a number of works on negotiation, notably The 50% Solution (Anchor Doubleday 1975; reprinted Yale 1983); The Negotiation Process (Sage 1978, originally a special issue of the Journal of ConflictResolution, augmented); and, with Saadia Touval, The Man in the Middle: The Process and Practice of Mediation (Princeton 1984, pending). He has also contributed to collected works on the subject, including chapters in Rubin, ed., Dynamics of Third Party Intervention (Praeger 1981), George, Ed., Managing US-Soviet Rivalry (Westview 1983), and a review article of current works on negotiation ("How Who Gets What, When and Where") in World Politics. He helped create and regularly teaches in the peacemaking program of the International Peace Academy, of which he is a member, and has taught negotiation at the Foreign Service Institute and also at diplomatic and university programs in a number of African and Middle Eastern countries.

Dr Zartman is former Head of the Politics Department at New York University and President of the Middle East Studies Association. He was a member of the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars ("the Fulbright Council") and chairman of its Middle East Area Selection Committee. He is a State Department consultant.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you, Dr. Zartman. And now, Mr. Dellenback, we would be very happy to hear from you.

Mr. DELLENBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I assume, Senator Stafford, from what you have said that our full statements will be included in the record as if read.

Senator STAFFORD. Yes. I think I made it clear that all statements would be fully carried in the record as if read.

Mr. DELLENBACK. So rather than seeking to duplicate that which is in my statement, I would seek to make a few additional comments, if I may.

I think one of the great losses of this press of time is not that there is contraction of what we might say, a compaction on how we might deal with it, but that several other people who were intending to be here will not be heard. As you know, Senator Jepsen was to testify and Senator Hatfield was to testify, and each has spoken eloquently before in favor of the Academy, and each has a deep interest in this particular proposal. I understand you have their statements and they will be made part of the record.

Senator STAFFORD. Yes, they will. And the Chair has in mind that this hearing is designed primarily to get a balance in the testimony in front of the committee, since the hearings from last year are hardly to be overlooked as far as the committee's deliberations are concerned.

Mr. DELLENBACK. We are pleased to hear that, Mr. Chairman, because, as members of the committee know, a good deal of excellent testimony was brought before the subcommittee last time.

Mr. Chairman, there is no question in my mind that every member of the Senate favors peace. There is not any question in my mind but that every witness that has testified today favors peace. In addition, most of the witnesses who testified today favor peace studies and Government funding for those studies in one form or another.

What, then, is the question about S. 564? What are the provisions therein that really qualify it as the best way to move at this particular time?

Let me state without having time to deal in detail, some of the issues which I would take with my learned colleagues who have testified earlier today.

The Academy will not merely duplicate existing work as has been argued.

The Academy will not place heavy emphasis on the physical plant as has been argued.

Dr. Laue has commented directly on the bill's provisions relative to degrees and whether or not that is really a fundamental purpose of the Academy.

Even an academic consortium which has been proposed requires some kind of coordination if it is to be effective, either voluntary or some kind of an outside agency which will help to stimulate the work of the consortia members.

The Academy will not be a Federal monolith.

There are in existence many fine graduate educational institutions in the United States, but I respectfully say there are no peace academies in existence at the present time.

What, then, will this proposal of Senate bill 564 do that is unique?

One, in the area of research it will be intended to stimulate research, and in instances and in some ways coordinate it, both at the present time as is being done and in the future. It will use the existing institutions, not seek to supplant them, but rather to enhance their work and serve as an aid to them.

It will, in effect, in research, Mr. Chairman, do more than any present institution can do in this area.

As far as education and training is concerned, it will be of assistance to the Government, to Members of the Congress, to other branches of the Government, the State Department, the Defense Department, other parts of the administration.

But it will, in addition to that, reach far beyond Government in what it can do. It will give both practical as well as academic training. It will center on the issue of peace and not merely have it as an adjunct to that which is really the center of the work of any such other academic institution.

In short, in the field of education and training, it will do more than any present institution is doing at the present time.

And in the third area, the information service, there will be great aid possible under this bill to secondary and postsecondary education institutions. Senator Hatfield has been one of those who argues, as has Senator Randolph and others, for the extension capacity of this kind of an institution, what it can do in reaching far beyond what is already being done in the graduate schools, even far beyond what is being done in the perhaps 80 postsecondary institutions which already have some work in this field, and reach, indeed, into the secondary institutions.

In essence, in the information services area, Mr. Chairman, it will do far more than any present institution is doing or can do.

And the last comment I would make, Mr. Chairman, is something which is uniquely known to the members of this panel, because those who have lived in the political world as well as in the academic world know that much of life is psychological. The battle that takes place for the minds of men and women is underway right now, and what it is that our people will do is being struggled with in this Nation and throughout the world at the present time.

And those in this field know that much of that kind of battle is often waged around symbols: President Kennedy, the Alamo, Solzhinitsyn, the Redskins, all of these were at their time symbols or are symbols. And every person who has run for public office knows that he or she must deal effectively with substance and must deal with some way to capsulate that substance and get it out to the people so that they see the symbol of what the candidate stands for.

Part of the Academy's potential value is as a symbol. It must emerge as a national action if it is really to have significance at the present day in the battle for peace. And if that is to be indeed national action, then, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, it means that it must today in part be governmental action if it is to emerge as an action of this Nation.

That means, in essence, it must be congressional action in a very significant degree. In my opinion it would be a major historic mis-

take to reject the avenue offered by S. 564, the proposal to establish the U.S. Academy of Peace.

It is not an alternative to or an adversary of the military.

Throughout our Nation, the Academy will help harness knowledge and expand skills for peace. Its cost is relatively low, and as an investment in the future, its value may well be priceless.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dellenback follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, ARTS AND HUMANITIES
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

HEARING ON S. 564
MARCH 16, 1983

TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. DELLENBACK
PRESIDENT OF THE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE COALITION

Senator Stafford and members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate this opportunity to appear again before this Subcommittee as it picks up in the 98th Congress a matter with which it dealt so very constructively in the 97th Congress--namely, the opportunity to take the constructive forward step for our country and for the world of establishing a United States Academy of Peace.

Last year your Subcommittee held hearings on a bill which was the product of more than a year's work by the Federal Commission created by the Senate and the House of Representatives to study the issue of whether the United States government should establish an Academy within the field of peace and conflict resolution. I was one of the members of that Commission as an appointee of the President pro tempore of the Senate. Your Subcommittee studied the matter, made several amendments to improve the bill, acted on it favorably and sent it to the full Committee where it was also acted upon favorably. Unfortunately such action came so late in the 97th Congress that it was impossible to bring the bill to a vote on the Senate floor prior to the time for adjournment. You now have before you in S. 564 the same bill as approved by your full Committee last year.

Resisting the temptation to expand the bill to deal with other problems badly in need of solutions, the Subcommittee and full Committee decided that the Academy's principal focus should be on international peace. I applaud that decision. The need to remove injustice and violence from America must not divert the Academy from its principal

concentration on international concerns. The international and intranational are certainly intertwined, but except to the degree that there are international lessons to be learned therefrom, it would be a mistake to expect the Academy to concentrate on conflict problems within the nation as well as those among nations. The actual operations of the Academy could well flounder on rocky disputes over crime, education, migration, procreation, taxation, or federal-state relations. The immediacy and nearness of such issues as those could engulf and dilute the international peace mandate of the Academy. The forum to concentrate on the study and discussion of those issues per se should be elsewhere.

In one sense, the purposes of the Academy are narrow and concentrated--namely, to assist in the resolution of international conflicts without violence. In another sense, the purposes of the Academy are broad and deep. Broad in that they deal with the past, the present, and the future of peace, and are concerned about possible conflicts throughout the world. Deep because they are concerned with three allied functions: namely, performing and assisting research about international peace and peace making; educating and training--both directly and indirectly--persons from across the United States and possibly from other nations who come from government, private enterprise, and voluntary associations; and establishing an information service within the field of peace learning which will serve educational institutions on many levels, the Congress, other agencies of government, and the warp and woof of American society.

The Academy is planned to be an interdisciplinary institution concentrating on having an impact in the field of international peace. It is intended to serve institutions and individuals throughout both public and private life. It will weave together complementary programs of peace research, education and training in the field, and information services about the field. The work of the Academy will focus on the elements of peace, and the causes of war, and the skills needed for resolution of international conflicts without violence.

It will inform and respond in a way that no existing institution has the capacity to respond at the present time to concerns and activities of Members of Congress, the Executive Branch, including both the Departments of State and Defense, and persons in private enterprise and from voluntary associations.

The Academy is not intended to have policy making or dispute intervention authority. It will facilitate rather than compete with the peace interests and programs of government, businesses, labor, religious groups, international organizations, and educational and other nonprofit institutions.

Participation in the Academy's programs will strengthen the peace efforts at all levels of society and within both public and private sector institutions, including those of specialized schools of diplomacy and military training where traditional departmental alignments and policy and service emphases often impede cross-disciplinary peace scholarship and education and innovative training in peace making skills.

The argument has been made that the proposed action of creating a U.S. Academy of Peace would be wasteful and duplicative because the intended purpose is already being accomplished. This is not in fact the case.

There is excellent training in our military academics in the basic sciences, in engineering, in military tactics and weaponry, but there is inadequate coverage of the skills and the art of the ways in which our military officers can settle without the threat or use of force what might well have begun as a minor dispute. Our State Department has many strengths some highly skilled and able people, but they are given very little practical training along the lines that was found so wonderfully helpful when Ambassador Diego Asencio settled the mass ambassadorial kidnapping in Colombia a few years ago without violence. Our schools of diplomacy do an excellent job of educating scholars and future foreign affairs officers in many aspects of what they need to understand to do their jobs well, but far too often little attention is paid to the growing practices and skills of mediation and conflict resolution. Many of our nation's colleges and universities have courses in the field of peace studies, but there exists no instrument to serve as a clearing house for exchanging information about what the individual schools are doing or for disseminating among those schools and within other parts of the educational field information about how to improve and make use of valuable courses and curricula.

The United States has the great fortune of having a number of excellent schools of foreign service or international relations. From their classrooms and faculty offices have come some of our most highly effective and dedicated past and present servants of this country in our dealings with other nations of the world.

In no wise does the proposed United States Academy of Peace seek to do injury--or indeed do injury--to such schools. Rather the work of the Academy among secondary and postsecondary schools of the nation may very well open the minds of some students becoming familiar with this aspect of peace and conflict resolution so critically important in the area of international relations to the possibility of attending such schools of foreign service or international relations with an eye to a career in that field.

But the underlying purpose of the Academy--its potential impact--the persons and groups within our nation who would be served by the Academy, all far beyond the concentrated field of foreign relations and international affairs in which such graduate schools function. Among those persons from the Congress, the fields of business, the military, other areas of government service, and the academic world who would benefit from the services of the Academy would be included great numbers who would never consider attending a graduate school of foreign service or international affairs and yet who, if they are to perform their own tasks effectively, need badly to be educated and trained in the field of the resolution of conflict without the use of violence.

And there is great need for our nation to take a significant symbolic step which will say clearly to the rest of the world that we believe not only in peace through strength, but also in peace itself--and that we are prepared to walk every reasonable road to achieve it. Much of our nation and indeed of the world is awaiting such a step and such a sign. In the modern world such a symbolic step demands action by the government of the United States--action of the clear strong nature which the creation of a United States Academy of Peace would constitute.

Like it or not, the United States is now so involved with the rest of the world that we are affected to a major degree by an absence of peace anywhere on the globe. Nuclear weapons are so widely spread that long run peace is precarious.

We as a nation should simultaneously be walking all possible roads to solve inevitable international conflicts with a minimum of violence and disruption. One path is through diplomacy. Another through enhanced international commerce. Another through a strong military. Surely still another path which cries out for us to walk it would be the establishment of an Academy which will help in the training and education of those of our people who will be journeying in a key role along each of these other roads.

It would be a major historic mistake to reject the avenue offered by S. 564's proposal to establish the United States Academy of Peace. I'm sure that none of us has any illusions as to the certainty of the precise results which it can help to bring about. Such an academy will not alone create peace. It is intended to be an enabling institution, based on the premise that international peace is a deep concern to Americans and others regardless of their vocational situation. It is not an alternative to or an adversary of the military.

Throughout our nation, the Academy will help harness knowledge and expand skills for peace. Its cost is relatively low. And as an investment in the future, its value may well be priceless.

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Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Dellenback. And I thank all of the members of the panel for helping us this morning. As I indicated earlier, the Chair and many members of the committee will want to send questions to you in writing for an early response if that is agreeable. And I will open the floor. Do you have a question, Senator Randolph?

Senator RANDOLPH. I would rather not ask questions, but I will submit questions for written responses.

Senator STAFFORD. All right.

Senator RANDOLPH. But I would like to make just a brief closing remark, if I could be afforded that opportunity.

Senator STAFFORD. Certainly.

Senator RANDOLPH. I have not had the privilege today which I would wish to have had of hearing the first two witnesses. I wanted to be here. I did not delay coming here. But the hearing was in progress when I arrived. We have heard the testimony of all witnesses today, Mr. Chairman, under your leadership and with the cooperation of Senator Denton and Senator Matsunaga and myself.

Ambassador Low, the first witness; Dr. Laue, the second; Dr. Lincoln, the third; Admiral Welch, the fourth; Dr. Picker, the fifth; Dr. Clarke, the sixth; Mr. Funari, the seventh; Dr. Zartman, the eighth; and, our former colleague in the Congress, Representative John Dellenback, the ninth; it has been a part of the record, as I understand it, Mr. Chairman, that our two Senate colleagues, Senator Hatfield, of Oregon and Senator Jepsen, of Iowa have also filed statements.

Is that true?

Senator STAFFORD. That is correct. As you know, Senator Hatfield has been kept on the floor. He is the manager of the pending legislation, the jobs bill.

Senator RANDOLPH. I feel that even though this subcommittee hearing has been disjointed, in a sense, pressured, in a sense, that it has been a further opportunity for getting on the record what I call well-reasoned judgment, whether it agrees with my thinking or not.

It gives to me a sense of study and viewpoint, which is very important as we move this legislation this year to final passage, as we attempted to do last year. You have thanked the witnesses, and I join in that expression of appreciation. And I do it by the names called so that all the witnesses will know that I am grateful for what you have done in causing us to continue to believe, although sometimes we have reason to wonder, that the forum of discussion provided through public hearings is highly important.

But you must remember that we will shortly come to a time of decisionmaking in the Senate, and hopefully in the House on this bill. I offered the constitutional amendment for 18-, 19-, and 20-year-old youths to vote in this country. I offered it first it 1942. I remember the first hearing in the House of Representatives. Out of the Judiciary Committee, only one member was present, the chairman, Emanuel Celler from New York State, who died somewhat more than a year ago.

I remember thinking that the amendment should be approved then in 1942, but it was not. Ellis Arnall, then young, dynamic Governor of Georgia, a State where there was already an 18- to 20-

year-old vote, came to testify on behalf of a constitutional amendment.

This may be extraneous, but it has a point. There were only 11 persons, Senator Denton, that were at that hearing. I thought that this was important, that the youth of the country, 18, 19, and 20 should be a part of the body politic. But it did not happen until 30 years later in 1972. Now, I am saddened by the fact that the vote is not used by the young people of this country.

Approximately 25 out of every 100, 18- to 20-year-olds eligible to vote participated in the Presidential election of 1980. And barely 50 percent, many States voting 47 and 48 percent of eligible voters were participating in that election who were above the ages of 18, 19, and 20.

We must realize that the individual responsibility we have to vote can never be delegated to anyone else, and if we do not cast our ballot, regardless of how it is cast in a Presidential election or any other election if we do not cast it, it ceases to exist.

And I am frightened about the situation in America where it is not the majority over the minority on any question; we have become a government of the few, by the few, and for the few. Therefore, in this hearing and the hearings last year, there has been no more ardent exponent of comprehensive hearings than the Senator from West Virginia. I believe in them. And I think it is very, very important, Mr. Chairman, Senator Denton, that we have the opportunity to vote on this measure in the Senate of the United States.

I hope we will have that. I shall respect those votes that are not in accord with my viewpoint. But I believe this matter is important to be brought soon to the full Senate for disposition.

I am very grateful that you have allowed me to wander, somewhat, but it is all pertinent to the process of the decision which we must make in the Senate of United States a subject, highly critical, crucial, perhaps, to the body politic—and that subject is peace.

Thank you.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Denton, do you have any comment?

Senator DENTON. Well, I certainly understand and acknowledge the sincerity of the statement from my beloved colleague from West Virginia, and I want to acknowledge and thank the witnesses today. I hope that the chairman and Senator Randolph will regard the testimony heard today as part of the last year's hearing, not as a pro forma session given out of deference to another point of view. We have heard from men from all over the United States, from institutions that could hardly be labeled war mongering or hawkish or even conservative, I presume.

I doubt that they would accept any label like that, and I would congratulate them therefor. If each of my colleagues, my other 99 colleagues, had been through a course offered by those institutions—and I will include any of the ones mentioned by the gentleman who spoke or the Honorable John R. Dellenback—I would not be here. I would not have run for office because there would have been no need for half of the reason I came here, which is to try to help establish an informed perspective on what constitutes the issues that determine whether or not there will be war or peace,

whether or not there will be a march of civilization continuing in the world, indeed, whether the United States survives.

I give you my word of honor that what I said is true: I would not be here. I would not have run. But I find my colleagues 99.9 percent of the time concerning themselves with matters that deal with interest rates, internal matters of great importance, to which they must address themselves. I find with great chagrin that the life of death issues seem to accrue about one-tenth of 1 percent of their time. I say that and still at the same time acknowledge the thrust of your desire for peace and the content of what goes into that.

I just know from having taken courses at the advanced level, in such subjects as economics for development, that there is much more to the war-peace issue than most of my colleagues realize. And I say that at not the risk, but at the exposure of condescension, I suppose, because it concerns me very deeply that we are simplistically looking at matters that can within the next 4 or 5 years, as was pointed out by Mr. Dellenback, determine the heart and mind of the United States.

I think that heart and mind is generally being determined by the national media, against whom I have no categorical complaint but who reach through television into the homes of 99 percent of our people and have generally been able to decide what the issues are and which side of the issues the country should be.

I deplore that. I think that the liberal, progressive leaning of the media, as Kay Graham pointed out in her MIT graduation remarks last year, is healthy. I agree that it is traditional. I agree, however, that it is unprecedented in that it has such a grasp upon the universality of the minds, of the hearts and minds in the country, with respect to trying to learn what these gentlemen have properly portrayed as extremely complex issues and derive vitally—and I use that word advisedly—conclusions about those issues.

I wish to say that, since you mentioned, Senator Randolph, Woodrow Wilson that I would have been, were I as informed then as I am now, one of the Republican Senators who supported Woodrow Wilson in his initiative to form the League of Nations. I would not have joined La Folette, Lodge, and Borah, who succeeded in preventing the Senate from withdrawing from unilateral American self-interest or smugness about the oceans and fortress America, or whatever. Isolationism, I guess, is the word most commonly used.

I hope that it would be informative to you to know that I think this issue is related to the nuclear freeze issue, to the policy toward El Salvador, which is an economic question now that could become a military question later if we do not address it in the proper terms. I am not going to presume that the gentlemen at the table agree with me about how the issue should be handled, but I do not think that they would disagree about the fact that it is related.

It might surprise my two colleagues here at the table to know that the New Republic, which is not exactly right of Genghis Khan, has precisely the same position on the nuclear freeze that I do. That nuclear freeze is going to be voted on in the Senate with, I consider, less than 1 percent of the deliberation which it deserves, as is the defense budget for this year.

And that profoundly disturbs me. Therefore, I simply say that I support the institutions that these gentlemen represent; I believe

that an official governmental duplication thereof is bad for the reasons that these, many of these, gentlemen mentioned this morning.

Senator Inouye can get a half a page in the Washington Post today saying that he has a son in the service and he has changed his mind about El Salvador, and so forth. I wish that if I could get 2 inches acknowledging that one of my son's reactions to the Vietnam war was to go into the Peace Corps; that another's reaction was to go into helicopters in the Army and to come back disillusioned about the way we were carrying the war out; that I have a daughter-in-law who is now in the service as a lieutenant commander; that I have another son who has recently gotten out; and that I have a son who is now an ensign and very likely to be risked either in the Mideast or in El Salvador were they to become conflict situations.

I am more concerned about their remaining alive and happy than I was about myself remaining alive and happy. And I do not like wars. I have suffered. My textbook in my course at the Naval War College, the principal textbook, was a book called "Swords Into Ploughshares." It got a big laugh when I stood up in front of the whole student body and stated certain ideas about what is still an issue: The nuclear trigger, whose finger should be on the nuclear trigger in Europe. To what extent should our European allies deserve consideration on that, and so forth.

But, in the end, my paper was awarded the President's Award for the best thesis. It was a liberal thesis; it was based on John F. Kennedy's concept of the Atlantic Community.

I mention that again only because I am so totally committed and as fervently emotional as you are about this particular issue.

I see the formation of the Academy, considering the tenor and tone that it has taken on, and some of the associations which it has taken on as diverting from the course upon which you, Senator Randoph, would have had it set in 1942 when you came up with this idea.

I see it as likely to induce influences that Senator Stafford would not like to be induced. That is a matter of opinion. And I respect yours. I respect the fact that it is going to come up for vote. I just wish that we all, as Senators, had more grounding in the subject matter in which these gentlemen, including Mr. Dellenback, I am sure, are grounded.

I thank you for letting these gentlemen appear and offer what I consider to be persuasive and valuable testimony.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you very much, Senator Denton.

Senator RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman, are you going to say anything?

Senator STAFFORD. I think that you two gentlemen have covered the waterfront pretty well. I was born only 16 miles from where Calvin Coolidge was born and in the same northern New England tradition, I am going to say little. I would be glad to hear whatever you have to say.

Senator RANDOLPH. Mr. Chairman, I would like, not for any purpose except accuracy, to indicate that in your conduct of this subcommittee, we could have had no chairman who would be more fair, more objective, even though you have a viewpoint upon the measure. We could not have had a chairman that would preside on

any subject who would not have a viewpoint—but when you sit in that chair, the objectivity, the fairness, the well-reasoned way you conduct the hearing is something that always impresses me. You have met the highest standard. I thank you very much.

Senator STAFFORD. Well, thank you very much, Senator. I would be glad to have you continue along that line. [Laughter.]

Well, thank you all very much for appearing with us, and we really, I will say, are giving much more than perfunctory, pro forma attention to what you distinguished gentlemen have told us this morning. It is going to cause this Senator to rethink the problem somewhat.

[Additional information supplied for the record follows:]

SENATOR MARK O. HATFIELD R-OREGON Washington, D.C. 20510 202 [illegible]

Date: March 16, 1983

Statement by Senator Mark O. Hatfield Regarding S. 564
To Establish a National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution

Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege to testify once again in support of S. 564. I am convinced that the bill you are considering could be one of the most important pieces of legislation of our time. I am proud to be one of the principal sponsors, and I continue to urge each of my colleagues in Congress to give it his or her unequivocal support.

Senator Matsunaga has remarked many times that he has had great difficulty in Congress selling peace to his colleagues. I know he is as gratified as I am to realize that today -- finally -- it appears that Congress may be in a buying mood. We have before us a proposal backed not only by a Congressional Commission, but by 53 U.S. Senators and over 100 Members of the House of Representatives. More importantly, though, we have seen in recent weeks that the people of America have become vocal in their fear and concern over the direction in which we are headed, and we are witnessing a growing awareness all around the country that we need to find alternatives to war as a means of settling disputes.

The U.S. Academy of Peace will be both a living symbol and a practical instrument for advancing world peace. I have felt for years that there is an urgent need to counterbalance the bureaucratic momentum behind waging war. Reversing that momentum

has been compared by some to trying to make a clock run faster by pushing on the hour hand -- it is not an easy task at all. Creation of the Academy will not solve the problems overnight, but at least we will have made the decision to change our current patterns of decision making. Risk is a fact of life these days, and while we have become quite comfortable with risking war, I submit that it is time we became serious about developing creative means by which to risk peace. The United States has always been a country deeply dedicated to this cause, and I know that our President is a man who is driven by his desire to build on his own, and our nation's, commitment to world peace. We cannot cease exploring alternatives, and this Academy proposal would merge our history of innovation with our dedication to conflict resolution in making that commitment real.

The Commission has provided us with a very clear picture of what the Academy should look like, and what it should do. All nine members of the Commission are to be congratulated for their fine efforts. Their Final Report to the President and to Congress represents an even-handed and cogent analysis of the problem, and their proposed solution seems to me to be the most efficient and cost-effective direction we can take. For the record, it is important to emphasize that the Academy is not meant to supplant or compete with work that is already being done in this field. On the contrary, it is intended to complement, coordinate, and accelerate that work. We need to embody our national commitment

it peace in a single national institution -- an institution which simply does not exist today. I have no doubt that without the Peace Academy, the work currently being done in the field of peace making will slowly be infused into our society. The fact is, though, that we do not have the luxury of time. We need to act now.

A word about cost. I am, of course, quite sensitive to the budget problems which face us. I remind my colleagues, though, that we are currently engaged in cutting waste from the federal budget. There are those who are charging that this proposal is extravagant, but I submit that the opposite is true: this is no extravagance -- it is a necessity. While I understand that there are proposals afloat that may lower the initial costs of creating the Academy, my feeling is that the numbers are not as important as the basic question of whether or not the American taxpayers ought to invest in this project. The potential returns on our investment in terms of lives saved, property preserved, and money saved are unbounded. What's more, I suggest that it would be a tremendous perversion of our priorities if we were to declare ourselves unwilling to invest in this new opportunity for peace, while we continue to make investments in the more traditional search for peace through strength. This is a new direction, and we ought to pursue it, if only because the price of failure may be too high. We have before us a chance to enhance the possibility of worldwide civility. If we pass up this chance,

war continues to rage around our world as it will, our lack of resolve and imagination in the effort to keep the peace will be inexcusable.

I referred earlier to the mood of the country today and the growing awareness of the gravity of our situation. People are frightened, and they don't see any tangible evidence that we are doing anything to avert the growing nuclear and non-nuclear dangers in the world. I am, of course, a sponsor of the freeze resolution, and I continue to think that a freeze would be an important first step. We need to recognize, though, that even if we did freeze the level of nuclear armaments, or even someday succeeded in doing away with them completely, we would still have conflicts of all sorts around the world. The nations of the world have at their disposal endless non-nuclear ways of warring with one another, and the Peace Academy's creation would provide the people of America and the world with a bold new step -- tangible evidence that the United States is addressing itself to the more fundamental and long-term challenge of finding constructive and non-violent ways of resolving all sorts of disputes.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would say this: I am a veteran of World War II, and I will never forget my horrifying walk through the rubble of Hiroshima just days after its destruction. I cannot imagine how any mother, brother, friend, or countryman of

any young man who has risked his life on the battlefield [illegible] opposed to an idea that would lessen the chances that any of [illegible] brothers, sisters, children, or grandchildren would have to risk their lives again. Mr. Chairman, I cannot impress upon you and my colleagues enough how strongly I feel about this legislation. We have before us a bill of limitless potential. I submit that we, as United States Senators charged with protecting and advancing the well-being of our country and, to a large extent, the world, are duty-bound. We simply cannot let this historic opportunity pass us by.

Thank you.

SENATOR ROGER JEPSEN, R-IOWA
TESTIMONY BEFORE
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, ARTS, AND HUMANITIES
MARCH 16, 1983

MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM HONORED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY IN FAVOR OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE. AS YOU KNOW, I AM ON RECORD AS FAVORING A STRONG DEFENSE. SOME WOULD SEE AN INCONSISTENCY IN MY SUPPORT OF A STRONG DEFENSE AND AN ACADEMY TO TEACH CONFLICT RESOLUTION SKILLS. GIVEN THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE, BOTH SERVE THE SAME GOALS: THE PREVENTION OR AVOIDANCE OF WAR AND BLOODSHED.

WITH THE TERRIBLE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF TODAY'S NUCLEAR ARSENALS, MILITARY POWER ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. AS MICHAEL HOWARD, THE NOTED HISTORIAN, HAS WRITTEN:

> MODERN SOCIETIES RECOVER FROM CONVENTIONAL WAR WITHIN A GENERATION. WHETHER HUMANITY WOULD EVER RECOVER FROM NUCLEAR WAR IS A MATTER OF LEGITIMATE DOUBT.

FORTUNATELY, AS HISTORY HAS ALSO SHOWN, THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES WHERE BLOODSHED HAS BEEN AVOIDED BY NEGOTIATION. THERE ARE MANY INSTANCES WHERE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN KEPT. SUCH TRIUMPHS ARE AMONG THE BRIGHTEST CHAPTERS IN HUMAN HISTORY.

2-2-2-2

UNFORTUNATELY, THERE HAVE BEEN INSTANCES WHERE NEGOTIATIONS THAT SHOULD HAVE SUCCEEDED, FAILED. WORLD WAR I MAY BE THE MOST TRAGIC EXAMPLE. THIS WAR, WHICH HAS LEFT DEEP AND PERMANENT SCARS ON WESTERN CIVILIZATION, AROSE OUT OF A MINOR EVENT, THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE FERDINAND. THE CRISIS THAT DEVELOPED COULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN CONTAINED HAD IT BEEN TAKEN SERIOUSLY ENOUGH BY THE POWERS OF EUROPE.

BUT THE CRISIS EXPLODED. MILLIONS DIED IN THE NIGHTMARE THAT FOLLOWED FOR FOUR LONG YEARS.

WE CAN NO LONGER AFFORD TO LEAVE THE POSSIBILITIES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO CHANCE. THE STAKES INVOLVED IN ANOTHER LOST PEACE COULD BE TOO HIGH.

THE UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE IS DESIGNED TO TRAIN PEOPLE CAPABLE OF REDUCING THE RISK OF SUCH A LOST PEACE AND THIS IS WHY IT IS IMPORTANT.

TO ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORT THE UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE, ONE NEED NOT BELIEVE EITHER THAT ONE CAN NEGOTIATE AWAY ALL WARS OR THAT THE TRAINING GIVEN AT THE UNITED STATES ACADEMY Or PEACE WILL ENABLE ITS GRADUATES TO PREVENT EVERY WAR THAT IS, IN THEORY, PREVENTABLE.

RATHER, IF THIS ADDED FOCUS ON THE PEACE PROCESS -- IF THIS ADDED TRAINING TO OUR FUTURE NEGOTIATORS -- PREVENTS EVEN ONE SMALL WAR THAT OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE STARTED, THE PEACE ACADEMY WILL RANK AMONG THE BEST EXPENDITURES EVER MADE BY THIS GOVERNMENT.

DAN GLICKMAN

Fourth District, Kansas

STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE DAN GLICKMAN
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, ARTS
AND HUMANITIES
March 16, 1983

As the principal sponsor of H.R. 1249, the Peace Academy bill in the House of Representatives, I want to commend Chairman Stafford for scheduling a hearing on S. 564 so early in the 98th Congress. That is an encouraging sign and I strongly urge this Subcommittee and the full Committee on Labor and Human Resources to give favorable consideration to the bill introduced by Senator Matsunaga.

The recent conflict in the Falkland Islands and the continuing tension in the Middle East, including newly-reported injuries to U.S. observers in Lebanon, make clear that the world is not lacking in weaponry nor, as the ongoing battle in El Salvador painfully reveals, is the world lacking in the human suffering which results from the use of those weapons. One has only to take a quick look at a world atlas or the front pages of our daily papers to identify numerous other areas where recent conflict has left deep economic and human scars.

I'm enough of a realist to know that every conflict cannot be avoided and that the establishment of a Peace Academy will not bring about an end to war. I am convinced, however, that conflict can and should be managed to minimize the risk of violence, and it concerns me that we are not pursuing this approach to peace as seriously as these times demand. A glance at the defense budget suggests that there is only one deterrence to war: increased military spending. Certainly, our national government has the responsibility

for securing our national defense. None of us disagrees with that. But increases in our defense budget are not the only way to improve our security. I feel sure that the majority of Americans share that view, if the Kansans I hear from daily are at all representative. The power to mediate, negotiate and persuade is an equally important national strength, and a Peace Academy could help this country be a more effective wielder of this power. That could add immensely to our esteem in the world community.

After extensive hearings the Peace Academy Commission, on which I had the pleasure to serve, concluded that teachable, non-violent methods of resolving conflicts had been developed. However, the Commission found little official or organizational support for teaching these methods and encouraging their utilization. Witness after witness expressed concern that the arms race and international disputes over natural resources and commerce had the potential for escalating into violence unless current knowledge of peaceful conflict resolution was more fully integrated into diplomacy, business and policy planning.

That's why the establishment of a U.S. Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution is so crucial. A Peace Academy would both draw on and add to the work currently being done in the field of conflict resolution in order to enhance the peace promotion efforts of the United States. In no way would the Academy usurp or diminish the existing programs in peace study. Instead, the Academy would be the "hub of a wheel" making peacemaking activity turn more effectively. It would also in no way interfere with present functions of our governmental foreign policy apparatus. In fact, it would be, instead, a resource on which they could rely for expertise on an "as needed" basis.

The desire for peaceful resolution of conflict crosses party lines, regional lines, and even the more distinct lines between the military and civilians. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, one of only a few American Presidents to earn the military rank of General, appointed a Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament who was given cabinet rank and often called the Secretary of Peace. In his memoirs, Waging Peace, he commented on America's peacemaking capability by warning, "there is an imbalance in our national means of seeking security and liberty and an undue reliance on methods of power and force in managing conflict." Clearly, President Eisenhower knew from his personal experience--military and civilian--that weaponry is not the only road to peace.

The establishment of a Peace Academy will have not only far-reaching symbolic effects but, more significantly, will afford the citizens of this country long-range economic and national security benefits. To date, one hundred and nine Members of the House have joined me in cosponsoring H.R. 1249. With grassroots support growing, I am hopeful Congress will move forward on this important legislation. It is time the world's greatest military power--the United States--became the world's mightiest peacemaking power. A Peace Academy could move us toward that goal.

THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20202

APR 13 1983

The Honorable Robert T. Stafford
Chairman
Subcommittee on Education, Arts,
and Humanities
Committee on Labor and Human Resources
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letter requesting my comments on S. 564, a bill to establish a United States Academy of Peace. Specifically, you have asked me to comment on the need for a Federal institution designed to offer graduate and postgraduate programs, research opportunities, and information services in peace studies and conflict resolution.

Mr. Chairman, while I share the Committee's concerns about the importance of promoting peaceful resolution of international conflict, I continue to believe that creating an independent, federally-funded Academy of Peace is not the most appropriate or cost-effective way to encourage international understanding and to foster the study of conflict resolution.

As this Administration has stated previously and most recently reiterated by Stephen Low, Director of the Service Institute, Department of State before the Senate Subcommittee on Education, Arts, and Humanities on March 16, 1983, "In a time of severe budget stringencies. . .it [is] difficult to justify the expenditure of. . .federal funds over the next several years for research, educational and informational activities. . . where much work is already being done by private universities, institutes and foundations."

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I must continue to oppose the creation of an unnecessary governmental entity which would duplicate activities and research already conducted by private organizations and institutions of higher education.

I am advised by the Office of Management and Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this letter from the standpoint of the Administration's program.

Sincerely,

T. H. Bell

21-097 O—83——12

STATEMENT BY THOMAS H. MOORER, ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED), CONCERNING SENATE BILL 564 WHICH PROPOSES THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ACADEMY OF PEACE.

Having served in three wars and having been involved in several lesser conflicts, I yield to no one with respect to a wholehearted support for any and all actions which lead to the achievement of peace worldwide. However, I must say I have very serious reservations as to the soundness of the proposal to establish a United States Academy of Peace. Surely the United States more than any nation in history has put forward a major and continuous effort in terms of material, money, and manpower to establish and maintain freedom throughout the world. With the exception of a small number of members of assorted communist fronts, every American is already completely devoted to the objective of achieving and maintaining peace. Hence I see no reason to establish a United States Academy of Peace other than perhaps to have a minor impact on "image" in some circles.

It appears to me that the proposals contained in S564 will result in a top-heavy, unwieldy, and expensive activity which will immediately take issue with proposals being put forward by the U.S. Government with the result that action by the government could well be delayed and debates in the Congress would be filled with quotes lifted out of context from reports issued by the Academy of Peace. Already we have so many studies and so many positions taken throughout the land that the U.S. Government finds it most difficult to function. In my opinion, the one thing we do not need is another group given prestige by the Congress and financial support by the taxpayer to further confuse the public at large. Certainly no American is against peace, motherhood, and low taxes. For that reason, a quote from the Academy,

however unsound, will have an impact beyond its importance simply because the word "peace" is contained in the title.

In short, I consider this proposal S564 unnecessary. Also, the organization as proposed is extremely complex and I predict that if the Congress approves this unwieldy and unsound proposal in the long run it will create more problems than it will solve. It will be immediately politicized and used by special-interest groups, not so much to promote peace but rather to enhance their own position in the domestic political world. The overburdened taxpayer deserves better utilization of his hard-earned money.

Accordingly I recommend that the Congress proceed no further with S564.

Thomas H. Moorer

Thomas H. Moorer
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

Statement of the Reverend William J. Byron, S.J.,
President of The Catholic University of America,
Prepared for Presentation to the
Labor and Human Resources Education,
Arts, and Humanities Subcommittee Hearing
on Senate Bill 564, to Establish a
United States Academy of Peace,
March 16, 1983

On March 6, 1983, during his one-day visit to El Salvador, Pope John Paul II said: "I do not argue for an artificial peace which conceals problems and disregards worn-out mechanisms which ought to be repaired. It is a question of peace in truth, in justice, in the integral acknowledgment of the rights of the human person. It is a peace for all, all ages, conditions, groups, origins, political options. No one must be excluded from the effort for peace.... (A)ll have the obligation to be artisans of peace."

The Pope raised and responded to the critical question, "How?" He suggested that we can "bury the violence" with the tool of reconciliation. The focus of this work of reconciliation should be on people "who are today separated by political, social, economic, and ideological walls." We

should also attempt to "bury the violence" by employing "mechanisms and instruments of authentic participation in economic and social affairs."

Other instruments for peace would be "the possibility of self-realization through labor" as well as "access to the goods of the earth for all." Inspiring the whole effort, Pope John Paul II concluded, must be "a valiant and generous effort in favor of justice." [Origins, NC Documentary Service, Vol. 12, No. 40 (March 17, 1983), pp. 637-639.]

Mr. Chairman, permit me to draw upon the themes struck by John Paul II in El Salvador as I attempt to articulate my own personal support for the idea of a Peace Academy here in the United States.

What would a Peace Academy do? It would produce "artisans of peace."

What would be included in the curriculum, in the academic experience, provided by a Peace Academy? I can offer only suggestions and highlights here. The study of history would be taken seriously. There would be serious exploration into the nature of truth, into the idea of justice. The understanding of the rights of the human person would be cultivated (this is a philosophical task). Respect and reverence for these rights would be nurtured (thus inviting the students to move from intellectual assimilation of ideas to affective appreciation of persons).

The walls that separate people would have to be examined. This means political, social, economic and -especially - ideological analysis. An artisan of peace should understand what an ideology is. The assumptions as well as the limits of any particular ideology must be understood by the person who undertakes the work of reconciliation. The specific culture within which an ideology resides must be understood and respected. This is the work of anthropology at the first level of understanding, but the investigation will take the student along paths traced by other disciplines in search of a fuller understanding.

The pope's reference to "worn-out mechanisms" in need of repair provides an opening for a "hands-on" portion of the curriculum. As I noted earlier, the Holy Father referred to "mechanisms and instruments of authentic participation in economic and social affairs." Anyone interested in designing a curriculum for a Peace Academy would want to think of field experience in community organizations, in trade unions, political conventions and parties, indeed in the legislative process itself where differences must constantly be reconciled and accommodations of difference achieved. Too often we are embarrassed or frustrated by our differences, failing to recognize that it is only out of difference that unity can

come about. I have found the following observation particularly helpful in this regard:

> To differ, even deeply, one from another, is not to be enemies: it is simply to be. To recognize and accept one's difference is not pride. To recognize and accept the difference of others is not weakness. If union has to be, if union offers any meaning at all, it must be union between different people. And it is above all in the acceptance and recognition of difference that difference is overcome and union achieved. [Henri De Lubac, Paradoxes, trans. Paule Simonn and Sadie Kreilkamp (Southbend, Ind.: Fides Publishers, 1948), p. 18.]

In repairing the "worn-out mechanisms" used to bring people together, we will surely recognize the need for research and development aimed at constructing better mechanisms. Such research would be expected of a Peace Academy. The application of such research, both here and abroad, would be directed to the dividing walls in the human community, and to those obstacles that block access of persons to "self-realization through labor" and impede "access to the goods of the earth for all." The study of economics would have an important place in a Peace Academy.

In addition to asking what a Peace Academy would do and what kind of curriculum it would provide, I must also ask: where, upon graduation, would students in a Peace Academy go? This question, so easily answered for the U. S. Military Academy, the U. S. Naval Academy, the U. S. Air Force Academy

and the other so-called "service academies" operating under Federal sponsorship, has no easy answer in the case of the proposed United States Peace Academy. Surely, there are thousands of positions on the Federal payroll that would best be filled by persons trained along lines I've been suggesting here. But they do not constitute a uniformed force. Perhaps provision should be made for an annual injection of Peace Academy graduates into the Federal service at all levels--at home and overseas. This is not a proposal to discontinue special training for diplomatic and foreign service now available in existing non-governmental educational institutions, nor do I have in mind the reduction (and certainly not the elimination) of training centers (academic and other) for persons who will eventually pursue careers in Federal service in mediation, law enforcement, agricultural and general economic development, emergency management, development assistance and so many other necessary fields. I am supporting the idea of a special-purpose academy which would, over time, provide the Federal service with a leaven of persons skilled in reconciliation. Our government needs professional "artisans of peace."

Permit me to make a final suggestion. Throughout America, on college campuses, we have the Reserve Officers Training Corps--the well-known ROTC and its variants suited to the needs of the several branches of the armed services.

Why not have a POTC--a Peace Officers Training Corps? Why not identify tracks in the traditional liberal arts curriculum that would take a student through an appropriate sequence, both theoretical and practical, to the curriculum I have highlighted earlier in this testimony? The same commitments required of the ROTC cadet would be required of the young man or woman electing the POTC. The same inducements offered by the Federal government to attract students to the ROTC should be available to prospective POTC members. I would be more than happy, Mr. Chairman, to explore this possibility in greater depth and detail at the request of the Committee.

14 March 1983

Senator Robert Stafford
Chairman, Education Subcommittee
Labor and Human Resources Committee
Senate Hart Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Since I will be unable to attend the hearings of your subcommittee later this week on legislation to establish a U.S. Peace Academy, I would like to submit the enclosed written statement of my views on this matter.

I am using for this purpose the statement I provided last year to the House of Representatives hearings on this same subject, since I continue to believe, as I stated last year, that an academy established generally along the lines I described and focussed upon the maintenance of peace and conflict resolution, in combination with policy efforts and programs to safeguard such other national values as the safety of our people, our territory and our free institutions, as well as our economic well-being, could be a valuable contribution toward meeting an existing need, and would more than justify the expense and effort involved.

During the past year I have had opportunity to hear the concerns of a number of well-informed people, many of whom I hold in the highest respect, that the proposed academy might somehow develop along lines contrary to those intended, i.e., contrary to the serious and responsible facing up to those hard, complex facts in today's international environment on which peace, security and freedom depend. I do not believe such would need to be the case. Specifically, while recognizing the concerns that have been expressed, I believe that provisions assuring the necessary oversight to safeguard against them should be feasible and can be effective. I am aware that this view is to a certain degree optimistic, but believe, on balance, that this degree of optimism, for the purposes this legislation would serve, is amply warranted.

Sincerely,

Andrew J. Goodpaster

ANDREW J. GOODPASTER
General, U.S. Army (Ret.)

1 Incl
As stated

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER
CONCERNING A PROPOSED U.S. ACADEMY
OF PEACE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

It has long seemed to me that there is a place as well as a need for a carefully designed institution, additional to all that now exists, devoted to the serious study, both theoretical and practical, of peace and conflict resolution. From many years of service in peace and war (ranging from military command both in combat and in peacetime, to a succession of duties relating to security, defense and foreign policy) it is my conviction that a clearer, deeper understanding of the issues that bear on peace and the processes that support it can be of great and lasting value. There is widespread failure, I believe, both in the government and in the population at large -- including, in particular, its opinion-leading elements -- to understand how peace relates to the other fundamental values, needs and aspirations of our people, and how peace together with these other values can best be safeguarded and sustained.

In the interest of brevity I will limit my comments to a consideration of two questions which in my view are central to an evaluation of the proposal for an academy of peace and conflict resolution:

-- Whether "peace" and "conflict resolution" provide a valid and promising focus for study and efforts.

-- Whether an "academy" as envisaged is a promising concept for the conduct of such study and effort, taking into account the

wide range of instrumentalities, public and private, including educational institutions, that already exist and are concerned with these issues.

To both questions, provided the proposal is properly defined and developed, I believe the answer can be affirmative.

As to the first question, the merits of peace would at first glance seem to be so self-evident and so over-riding as to need no elaboration and no institutional supporting effort such as an academy could provide. But if this is true, we must then ask why international peace is so often broken, and is threatened in so many places and so many ways around the world. Obviously, it is because other high values and motivations of societies and nations are also powerfully involved, along with conflicting policies for their realization, and it is the study of the interrelationship of peace and these other values -- and the ways of pursuing and safeguarding them -- that I believe will and should be at the core of the studies of an academy such as that proposed. In our own country's history, our forefathers chose war when it was needed to gain our independence, and later when it was needed to preserve the Union. In this century we have fought against threats to our freedom, to the exercise of our international rights, and to the safety of our people, our territory and our institutions. NATO today serves as a vital example of a collective effort to safeguard the common values of the member countries, including, our own -- primarily, and hopefully, through deterrence, a coupling of peace with security. An academy of peace and conflict resolution

could strengthen and extend the understanding, in government and out, of the practical processes for keeping NATO effective in the support of its goals of peace, stable security and freedom.

An academy such as proposed could further the understanding of peace and security in relation to nuclear weapons. The desire for peace -- high-minded as it is -- and the concern over the destructive potential of such weapons, now very much in evidence, could in fact become a danger to peace and to the other values of our society, unless coupled with sober, sustained development of the military and diplomatic instrumentalities most appropriate to facing the realities of the world we live in. Working out a proper inter-relation, for example, between arms control negotiations and a well-designed military posture -- each an important arm of a coherent and comprehensive security policy -- is a continuing task of the highest order of importance to the peace, safety and freedom of our people. It demands the thorough, well-targeted training of key diplomatic and military officials. An academy that analyses past success and failures, as well as present and future threats to peaceful world order and the means of reinforcing such order by overcoming and resolving the threats, could strengthen the ability of those responsible at working level within the government to deal successfully with issues of this kind. Undoubtedly the effects would be cumulative, as a systematic body of knowledge -- both principle and practice -- was developed.

I am not in a position to attempt to prescribe the detailed organization and functions of such an academy. My experience as a past Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point,

and a past Commandant of the National War College give me full assurance, however, that these issues can be solved in a manner that provides an extremely valuable and sound basis of technical skill, knowledge and understanding for its students -- which they can later readily apply to their responsibilities in the conduct of our foreign and security affairs. The complexity and the deep-rooted difficulties inherent in the issues involved strongly suggest that the proposed academy should be primarily oriented toward the education and training of experienced and able mid-career personnel concerned with foreign and security policy, and should be conducted at a graduate-school level. With access to classified official information it should be able to maintain realism and emphasize application as well as theory in its curriculum to an extent not possible for private or public universities.

Such an academy would have an influence, I believe, beyond the government itself. Through maintaining effective ties with our country's academic institutions, as well as the many groups working for a peaceful world order, the academy could provide a channel by which their advances in thought, and their interests and concerns, could be brought to bear within the government. In addition, the academy, through its emphasis on practical solutions to policy problems, could serve as a healthy reminder to outside groups of the needs for realism and comprehensiveness in facing up to present-day international dangers and difficulties.

In conclusion, I believe that an academy established generally along the foregoing lines, and focussed upon the maintenance of peace and conflict resolution, in combination with policy efforts and programs to safeguard such other national values as the safety of our people, our territory and free institutions, as well as our economic well-being, could be a valuable contribution toward meeting an existing need, and would more than justify the expense and effort involved.

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March 15, 1983

The Honorable Robert T. Stafford
Chairman
Subcommittee on Education, Arts
and Humanities
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Stafford:

In response to your invitation of March 9, I am submitting a written testimony to be included in the record of the subcommittee with respect to the bill to establish the United States Academy of Peace.

I believe that my statement will answer the questions posed in the second paragraph of your letter. Basically, while appreciating the need to expand this countries capacity to deal with the problem of international conflict, I believe, as an experienced practitioner in this field, that many questions need to be asked of the sponsors of this legislation before it merits passage by the committee. My chief concern is that the Academy as envisioned would not achieve the high purposes intended for it. I am sure that such an achievement is foremost in the minds of the committee as they consider this possibility.

I believe there are ways that the federal government could be of assistance in increasing our

BOARD OF DIRECTORS: AMBASSADOR ELLSWORTH BUNKER, CHAIRMAN; DEAN PETER F. KROGH; AMBASSADOR JOHN P. HUMES; AMBASSADOR GLORIA C. SCHOLL; AMBASSADOR LUCIUS D. BATTLE; AMBASSADOR MAURICE M. BERNBAUM; AMBASSADOR WINTHROP G. BROWN; MR. MARSHALL B. COYNE; AMBASSADOR JOSEPH S. FARLAND; AMBASSADOR KENNETH FRANKLIN; AMBASSADOR PORTER T. HART; AMBASSADOR VERNE HOTTEL, JR.; MR. JIM HOAGLAND; HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER; AMBASSADOR CAROL C. LAISE; MRS. GLORIA ELLIOTT LEWIS; MR. ALONZO L. MCDONALD; HONORABLE ROBERT S. MCNAMARA; MR. ROBERT D. NATHAN; MR. JANE G. PISANO; DR. EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO; AMBASSADOR JOHN I. ROMINGER; AMBASSADOR KENNETH RUSH; MR. SMITH SIMPSON; AMBASSADOR GERARD C. SMITH; AMBASSADOR JOHN WILLIS TROBRIDGE; MR. CANNON WALKER; AMBASSADOR CHARLES S. WHITEHOUSE; AMBASSADOR LEONARD WOODCOCK.

knowledge of these critical issues. I hope that my statement may be helpful to the committee as they review this present proposal and possibly seek alternatives to it.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance to you on this matter.

Sincerely,

David D. Newsom

DDN:cd

Enclosure

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I welcome this opportunity to present a statement on the issue of the establishment of a Peace Academy. I regret that prior commitments out of Washington prevent my appearing in person.

No one who, like myself, has spent thirty-five years in the Foreign Service, many of them involved directly in problems of conflict management, can fail to appreciate the importance of enhancing this nation's capacity to prevent armed conflict in an age of international interdependence and catastrophic potential destruction.

For the last two years, I have also been involved in the training of university students at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service where I am now an Associate Dean and Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. My statement, however, is a personal one, not representing schools of international service. I understand that representatives of such institutions will be meeting directly with the committee.

During the past several months, I have had two conversations with Harry J. Hogan, Director of the National Peace Academy Foudation, and one with Mr. Milton C. Mapes, Jr., Executive Director of the

21-097 O—83——13

National Peace Academy Campaign. I have read Mr. Mape's speech of September 25, 1982 to the American Association of Social Psychiatry and a statement from Mr. Hogan on "The Peace Academy Proposal and the Schools of International Relations."

The Peace Academy proposal is based on the highly laudable premise that a peaceful world is possible if we can increase the public awareness of the "peace issue" and the study of the control of conflict. From the viewpoint of the practitioner in international relations, however, there is still much that is vague in the concept and a number of questions that deserve to be answered before the current legislative proposal is adopted. The organizers of the Peace Academy have suggested to me that a number of the questions can only be answered after the legislation has passed and a Boa of Directors is appointed. I suggest that, if the project is to be successful, some of the questions need to be faced before passage.

The sponsors, concerned as we all are by the threat of conflict, have reached the conclusion that this threat can be most effectively met by the creation of a new institution, at least partially tax supported. That institution is to become the focal point for the

expression of the desire for peace and for training those who can implement that desire.

It is fair to ask whether the institution as proposed will achieve the objective set out by its sponsors. As one who approaches the pursuit of peace from the standpoint of resolving and containing specific conflicts, I have trouble with several aspects of the proposal as it has been explained to me.

At least some of the premises are abstract, as represented by references to "the peace issue," "the desire to give affirmative direction to the peace groups in the country," the "social responsibilities" of schools of international relations and "a national forum to achieve American ideals by peaceful means." These are worthy objectives; how they are to be achieved, however, is at the heart of much of our current national debate. It is not at all clear how these objectives would be implemented in specific terms by a public institution and coordinated with an objective program of research, education, and information on international issues.

Peace is not an abstract goal that can be pursued apart from the issues that threaten peace and the domestic environment in the United States that must

support any peacemaking effort.

During the 35 years that I spent in the United States Foreign Service, including service as Undersecretary for Political Affairs, I was witness to and involved in one way or another in many of the major conflicts threatening peace and United States interests in the Third World: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Ethiopian-Somali conflict, the Nigerian civil war, the issues of Southern Africa, conflict in Central America, conflict in the southern Philippines, as well as issues relating to differences between the Soviet Union and the United States. I have seen during this career numerous efforts by the United States and others to help resolve such international conflicts. Many of them were based on very laudable objectives but they failed because they did not take fully into account both the international aspects and the domestic consensus within the United States. I feel it would be tragic indeed if the American people and the Congress of the United States were persuaded to appropriate a substantial sum of money and to build an institution that promised progress toward "peace" but was too abstract in its approach to deliver on that promise.

Inherent in the Peace Academy proposal seem to be

six assumptions, each one of which raises questions of applicability in either an international or domestic context.

1. That there is a close relationship between lessons from individual conflict and domestic conflict within this country and international conflict and that the technique developed for the first two can be relatively easily applied to the third. There is a very substantial difference between the resolution of an issue within a domestic setting where there are established laws and patterns and an international issue involving the laws, customs, and politics of several states. It is difficult in reading Mr. Mapes' presentation to determine where the emphasis of the Peace Academy would be, whether on the domestic or the international apsects. The fact that those supporters of the Peace Academy idea who are experienced in domestic conflict do not wish the educational portion of the program to apply domestically suggests that they would prefer not to have the Academy apply to that which they know but to apply solely to that area of conflict about which they are less experienced. If the emphasis is to be on international c flict, I am struck by the fact that on the board of directors of

the foundation, while there are a number of people who have worked on international problems, there are very few who have served abroad and there are no diplomatic professionals.

2. That techniques in the abstract can be applied to international issues. Each of the major international problems is to a very large extent truly sui generis. The question of how each can be resolved, therefore, is not so much a failure of techniques as it is a failure to be able to deal effectively with certain very special and very difficult and unique elements. These elements embrace complicated attitudes within our own society as well as in societies abroad. The Middle East conflict is one striking example. In that issue, virtually every kind of technique has been applied, but such techniques cannot overcome totally different perceptions of the issues, deeply held emotions, and a long, confusing, and disputed history regarding the causes.

3. That scientific analogies can be applied to the study of international conflict resolution. Mr. Mapes' paper refers to the National Institutes of Health, the Manhattan Project, and to NASA as possible analogs for the Peace Academy. Each one of these institutions was able to operate within a defined U.S. domestic area and within a set

of mathematical and scientific rules that were finite. It would be misleading to suggest that the same kind of substantial application of scientific expertise and money could have equal results in an area where there is often not even agreement on basic facts.

4. That a Peace Academy can be analogous to military academies. One of the premises of the Peace Academy is that, since there are institutions that prepare for war, there should be institutions that prepare for peace. A successful government training institution must, to justify the expenditure of tax dollars, have a clear career objective for its students. Those in military academies graduate into a career service. Those in war colleges return to their civilian and service positions. The Foreign Servivce Institute of the Department of State prepares diplomats already accepted for professional careers. It remains unclear in reviewing the proposal for the Peace Academy what the comparable career pattern would be for those completing the proposed courses. There can be no true comparability to existing official institutions, whether military or civilian, without a clearer indication on this point.

5. That the United States has the capacity to be influential in most international conflicts. It is very

true that the United States is looked upon by most countries as a major influence in the resolution of any conflict. The acceptance of the United States as mediator in any international dispute in which we are not directly involved, however, is by no means automatic. Our presenting ourselves as self-appointed mediator is often resented abroad. This is not to say that the United States cannot make a contribution. It does take issue with an inference that a Peace Academy established in the United States would be looked to by the rest of the world for significant contributions to disputes involving other countries.

6. That the failure to achieve peace is a failure in the application of techniques. The world has not been lacking in either the institutions or the knowledge of the management and resolution of international conflict. What has prevented the resolution of many conflicts has been the fact that nations and leaders have had priorities higher, for them, then the priority of peace. Such issues as national honor, territory, internal political ambition, and the desire for independence have led people to choose conflict over peace. Where the involvement of this country in international conflicts has failed it has not been as much because of a lack of knowledge or techniques as it has been the lack of political will on the part of

administrations to make hard decisions or the total resistance of others to the efforts of the United States.

Advocates of the Peace Academy make much of the failure of the United States in conflict management over the years since World War II. I would take issue with this. The role which the United States has played in maintaining peace in certain highly volatile areas and in avoiding major conflict with the Soviet Union, has been impressive. When one considers how many of these conflicts bear within them the highly emotional elements and the deep and bitter disputes which have in the past made conflict almost inevitable the record of containing conflict is creditable.

Questions arise in my mind, also, regarding the announced program of the Academy.

1. Research agenda: I think it would be helpful if the sponsors of the Peace Academy could lay out in somewhat more detail the proposed research agenda for the Peace Academy. Mr. Mapes' speech lists "the roots of conflict, the conditions and processes and stages of its development, and what the effectiveness of specific types and methods of intervention is at specific stages." This logical list still leaves unanswered such questions as the participation of foreign scholars and the degree to which the academy would involve itself in some issues which are highly

sensitive politically both in this country and abroad. The questions, for example, of the roots of conflict in an issue such as the Middle East or Southern Africa are, themselves, a matter of very great dispute. These are subjects which have been studied from various points of view for many years. How much would the academy seek to involve itself in issues of this kind? How much would a Congress which is prepared to endorse the Peace Academy wish to endorse at the same time the involvement of such an academy in looking at points of view which might not be politically acceptable to all members of the Congress?

2. Information: Congress has always been sensitive about the officially financed dissemination within the United States of matters relating to American foreign policy. How much latitude would the academy, federally financed, have in disseminating information on some of these critical international issues in which there are sharply different points of view within the Congress and within the American public?

3. Curriculum: Would the concentration of the curriculum be on cases or would it be on techniques? The two are of course interrelated but a true understanding of the issues can only come through a detailed examination of the cases. It would be helpful for those of us seeking to

make up their mind on the direction of the academy if a clear concept could be presented on what the curriculum would be.

4. Students: The literature on the Academy suggests that students would be primarily mid-career people out of both government and private life. Were a substantial portion of the academy to be directed to domestic issues, I could see the value of a training period for students from domestic agencies and from the private sector. This apparently is not envisioned in the legislation. The students, therefore, are to be prepared for international service, presumably in the government, in business, and perhaps in international organizations. The opportunities for such people are likely to be relatively limited. A clearer definition of the prospects for students in the staffs of Secretaries of State, the government relations of international business, and international organization would seem to be a prerequisite to determining the validity of the idea. For example, has there been any thought to the overlap between this Peace Academy and the International Peace Academy in New York, which is effectively training people for peacekeeping missions?

While I am not representing schools of foreign service, from my brief experience at Georgetown, I can understand the

concern of these schools over this proposal. This concern has not been allayed by the paper on "The Peace Academy Proposal and the Schools of International Relations" sent to me by Mr. Hogan.

The first area of vital concern to existing schools is that of funding. I have now had sufficient personal experience with the problems of securing funds for private education to understand the importance of this issue. The paper suggests that "The Academy will provide additional resources, both public and private." It suggests, further, that the Academy could undertake an endowment function and provide funds to existing institutions. I note, however, that the language of the act is mandatory ("will") as far as the activities of the Academy are concerned, but discretionary ("may") with respect to grants to other institutions.

There is clearly the expectation that the Academy will also exist through raising private funds. This implies direct competition with existing institutions. The answer of the Academy proponents is that the national consciousness on the "peace issue" will be so raised that additional funds will flow to all institutions. There is no evidence, either that the proponents of the Academy or the Congressional committees involved have approached the leading endowments,

foundations and other sources of funds to determine whether the establishment of the Academy will, in fact, lead to a reallocation or to an increase in their funding for international activities.

There is, to me, an additional disturbing aspect in the Peace Academy paper. There are references to a requirement for a "strong cooperative effort" with existing institutions and to a major role for the Academy Foundation to provide a forum "for private sector institutions to meet and to relate to each other in examining the areas of immediate decision-making by the Academy once it is authorized." The paper further states "In conclusion, the schools of international relations can achieve through the Peace Academy a recognition and expansion of their present social role. That recognition and expansion is not only possible through a direct relationship with the concern for international peace, but is very probably contingent upon it."

Given other references to the "new national perception of social values" and "the need for developing the capabilities to achieve American ideals by peaceful means," the question arises whether the "flow through" funds to existing institutions will be contingent upon an acceptance by these institutions of the points of view of the Peace Academy on these issues.

Much of the strength of the American academic community and its contribution to major world problems has come about through its treasured independence. That is not an independence to be given up lightly, even if additional federal funds are offered. I would imagine that considerable clarification of this aspect of the Academy's attitude toward existing institutions will be required before there is satisfaction on this point.

There seems, finally, little indications of awareness of what is already being taught in the leading institutions of foreign service.

The paper speaks about "going beyond" the present curricula of schools of international relations with a stronger emphasis on "cultural values, economic and fiscal systems, and social structure." It is difficult to know what is in mind here since this latter phrase is a description of the core curriculum of the finer schools of international relations in the United States.

The response I have received to questions of this kind has been that the schools of international relations should get behind the concept and help to mold it. The problem with this is that it is difficult to ask schools to get behind a concept that seems to have built into it assumptions and conclusions inconsistent with the task as

seen by these schools. Under the proposal for the Board of Directors to be made up of representatives from three different segments of society, the schools and practitioners of international relations would be a minority in a board dominated by those with an ideological rather than a practical and informed approach to problems of international peace. I am not surprised that the schools, therefore, are reluctant to proceed without a clearer idea of where all this will lead.

I believe it would have been far preferable from the standpoint of the schools of international relations to have opened the dialogue by saying that those representing the National Peace Academy Foundation believe that greater emphasis should be put on a national basis on the training of people for international peace and the raising of consciousness for an national effort and to have asked how this could best be achieved. Opening the discussion in such a way would have permitted, for example, consideration of an alternative such as an endowment. The conclusion already reached that this can only be done through the creation of an Academy precludes a truly effective examination of the issue.

In conclusion, I thank the committee once more for this opportunity to comment on this proposal. Believing that we do need a greater emphasis on how this country can effectively contribute to a more peaceful world, I have sought to raise questions in a constructive manner. I do so with the conviction that, unless these questions are directly and frankly addressed, the creation of the Peace Academy will not achieve the laudable purposes sought for it by its sponsors.

QUESTIONS FOR UNIVERSITY WITNESSES (DRS. PICKER, CLARKE, FUNARI, AND ZARTMAN), SUBMITTED BY SEN. JENNINGS RANDOLPH

EACH OF YOU HAS TESTIFIED IN OPPOSITION TO THE PEACE ACADEMY BILL, S. 564. YOU SEEM TO HAVE DONE SO IN DEFENSE OF YOUR UNIVERSITY-BASED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PROGRAMS PRESENTLY BEING TAUGHT. YOU SEE A PEACE ACADEMY FUNCTION AS BEING "DUPLICATIVE" OR "UNNECESSARY", OR "FRAGMENTING" OR "COMPETITIVE", WITH THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OR TALENT POOL THAT YOU YOURSELVES MUST DRAW FROM.

I MUST ASSUME THAT YOUR PROGRAMS IN INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION ARE AMONG THE BEST, AND THAT GREAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE IN THAT DISCIPLINE.

WOULD ANY OF YOU SAY THAT ANY OR MOST OF THE THEORETICAL CHALLENGES FACING SOCIAL SCIENCE AS APPLIED TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HAVE BEEN MET?

HAVE YOU DEFINED AREAS OF INQUIRY WHERE FURTHER THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT COULD TAKE PLACE?

WHAT ARE THEY?

IS IT TRUE THAT PROFESSORS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS/AFFAIRS PROGRAMS IN UNIVERSITY-BASED SETTINGS ARE OFTEN, OR TOO EASILY DRAWN INTO CRUCIAL TOPICS AND CONFLICTS HAVING TO DO WITH CURRENT EVENTS (RATHER THAN LEAVE THEM TO JOURNALISM) -- EVENTS WHICH CHANGE FROM DAY TO DAY AS EVENTS ARE ALTERED INTERNATIONALLY?

DOESN"T THIS CREATE "FICKLENESS" OR "FADDISHNESS" ON THE PART OF PROFESSORS TEACHING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, CAUSING THEM TO DECLARE ONE RESEARCH PROJECT OBSOLETE BEFORE IT IS COMPLETED, AND DOESN"T THAT RESULT, UNFAIRLY PERHAPS, IN RENDERING MUCH PREVIOUS TRAINING OF STUDENTS IMMEDIATELY OBSOLETE ALSO?

DON"T YOU HAVE TO START ALL OVER AGAIN EACH TIME THIS OCCURS?

IF THE PROFESSIONALS INTEND TO CONTINUE THESE "MOOD SWINGS" CAUSED BY CHANGING CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS WHICH RESULTS IN

POOR TRAINING OF STUDENTS AND FRAGMENTED RESEARCH PROJECTS INSTEAD OF DISCIPLINED, MEANINGFUL RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WHY WOULDN'T THE CREATION OF A PEACE ACADEMY WHERE DISCIPLINED AND SYNTHESIZED RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS/AFFAIRS, AS WELL AS THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF STUDENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, BE A BLESSING IN DISGUISE ALLOWING UNIVERSITY-BASED PROFESSORS ANDSTUDENTS TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE TODAY'S FADDISH CURRENT EVENTS AT WILL?

21-097 O—83——14

Answers to Senator Randolph's Questions:

1) The theoretical challenges of international relations to contemporary social sciences have clearly not been met. Much work remains to be done in drawing upon the insight, perspectives and knowledge generated from social sciences such as political science, social and group psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, geography, economics, particularly in multi-disciplinary and interdisciplinary frameworks. The creation of a U.S. Academy for Peace, however, would not, in itself, make any contribution whatever to the framing of the questions on theory nor the answers to those questions. It would simply provide a 'home' for a group of theorists cut off from the daily exchange and give-and-take of having their views and theories challenged and debated by colleagues.

2) It would be foolhardy for one Dean to set an agenda for further inquiry for the field of international affairs or international relations as a whole. I can give you only my own priorities: strategic probe theory; further development of policy analysis methods and techniques applied to issues of international peace and war; reinvioration of history as an analytical tool of international and dimplomatic policies; social psychology and communications theory applied to transnational interactions and disputes; international economics.

3) (See the answer to 2)

4) No it is not true that university faculty and academicians are drawn into "current events" topics and conflicts except to the extent that they may be asked to consult with government or international agencies, or asked to participate in television programs or interviews with the press. The very large majority of analysts and scholars in universities are devoting the substantial portion of the little time that they have left after teaching and doing their other administrative duties with analysis and conceptualizing of the larger and longer range questions of war and peace. The true "faddishness" is to believe that a new social science discipline can be created out of the understandable but spongy emotional notion that peace can be achieved by some ill-defined, non-theoretical, non-empirical, nebulous thing called "peace studies." Divorced from the economic, cultural, political and historical substance of the issues, such an approach is the essence of fickleness and faddishness.

5) The research and teaching done in international studies or international affairs is not "declared obsolete before it is completed" by university faculty or administrators. It is often slowed or forced to be abandoned by insufficient money from foundations and government agencies who expect instant or immediate results or clear-cut short answers to complex and intractable questions. Creating a "Peace Academy" will make the situation only worse.

6-7) I do not accept at all there are, as you term them "mood swings"; there are funding shortages and changing emphases. One of these "mood swings" is the current fad with "peace studies" which is on such a shaky intellectual foundation that it will probably pass in time too while the steady, too-slow to be sure, research and teaching of experienced interdisciplinary centers and schools of international affairs will make the sustained contribution to the stablishment of peace. I do not accept that there will be "disciplined and synthesized research" in a new Peace Academy; there may or there may not be and the creation of an Academy will not determine that at all. If this Academy were to become the refuge and asylum for what is loosely called peace studies now, then I very much doubt that much long-range good will come of it.

QUESTIONS FOR DRS. PICKER, ZARTMAN, CLARKE AND FUNARI, SUBMITTED BY SEN. JENNINGS RANDOLPH

S. 564, TO ESTABLISH A PEACE ACADEMY, HAS BEEN CRITICIZED AS BEING AN INTRUSION ON EXISTING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OR AFFAIRS PROGRAMS THAT ARE UNIVERSITY-BASED, AT BOTH THE UNDERGRADUATE AND GRADUATE LEVELS.

ALTHOUGH WE DO NOT VIEW THE PEACE ACADEMY'S RESEARCH, EDUCATION AND TRAINING FUNCTION AS BEING NECESSARILY "INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OR AFFAIRS PROGRAMS PER SE, IT IS OBVIOUSLY RELATED.

THE AUTHORITIES CONTAINED IN S. 564 FOR THE ACADEMY ARE SEEN AS DUPLICATIVE, WASTEFUL, A FRAGMENTATION OF THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO UNIVERSITIES, AS WELL AS A POTENTIAL "DRAIN" ON THE POOL OF TALENT YOU DEPEND ON FOR YOUR OWN PROGRAMS.

JUST HOW DO THE RESEARCH, EDUCATION AND TRAINING AUTHORITIES COMPARE WITH OR ARE SIMILAR TO, WHAT YOUR INSTITUTION TRIES TO ACHIEVE IN ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM?

IF THE ACADEMY'S FUNCTIONS WOULD INDEED PLACE THEM IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FIELD, HOW DOES THAT UNFAIRLY OR ADVERSELY AFFECT OR COMPETE WITH WHAT YOU ARE DOING? WHAT CAN IT NOT BE CONSIDERED A COMPLEMENT TO WHAT YOU ARE DOING?

WHY WOULD YOU CONSIDER AN ACADEMY'S FUNCTIONS TO BE "DUPLICATIVE" OF WHAT YOU AND NEARLY 90 OTHER UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, YET YOU WOULD NOT OPPOSE 90 ADDITIONAL UNIVERSITIES ESTABLISHING PROGRAMS SIMILAR TO YOURS?

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT ONLY UNIVERSITY-BASED INTERNATINAL RELATIONS PROGRAMS HAVE, OR CAN ACHIEVE, AN ADEQUATE THEORY ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM?

WHAT IS THE NATURE OF "INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS" SUCH AS YOURS THAT HELPS THEM INFLUENCE THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND/OR THE BEHAVIOR

OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS?

WE SEE "PEACE LEARNING" AS AN EMERGING SOCIAL SCIENCE -- A TANGIBLE ONE. AN ACADEMY WOULD HELP TO RESEARCH, DEVELOP, AND SYNTHESIZE THAT NEW SCIENCE.

WOULD YOU SAY THAT UNIVERSITY-BASED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAMS NOW IN PLACE HAVE MET ANY OF THE THEORETICAL CHALLENGES FACING SOCIAL SCIENCE AS APPLIED TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

HAVE YOU DEFINED AREAS OF INQUIRY WHERE FURTHER THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT COULD TAKE PLACE?

WHAT ARE THEY?

ARE THEY IN ANY WAY RELATED TO OR FOCUSED ON PEACE-MAKING, PEACE-LEARNING, OR NON-VIOLENT CONFLICT RESOLUTION?

ARE PROFESSORS, TEACHERS, AND/OR RESEARCHERS (INCLUDING STUDENTS) IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAMS ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES TOO EASILY DRAWN INTO CRUCIAL TOPICS AND CONFLICTS OF CURRENT EVENTS, CAUSING CONSTANT MOOD SWINGS FROM ONE RESEARCH PROJECT TO ANOTHER ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS THAT RENDERS MUCH TRAINING, TEACHING AND RESEARCH OBSOLETE -- AND THE NEED TO BEGIN ALL OVER AGAIN?

HOW PREVALENT IS THIS "FICKLENESS" OR "FADDISHNESS" AMONG INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOLARS?

ISN'T THIS SORT OF TENDENCY TO RESPOND TO DAILY INTERNATINAL CONCERNS INSTEAD OF STAYING WITH ESTABLISHED THEORETICAL PROGRAMS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DETRIMENTAL TO THE WHOLE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORT?

QUESTION FOR UNIVERSITY REPRESENTATIVES, SUBMITTED BY JENNINGS RANDOLPH (DRS. PICKER, CLARKE, ZARTMAN AND FUNARI).

EVEN THOUGH EACH OF YOU IS MORE OR LESS OPPOSED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE ACADEMY, LET US ASSUME FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE ACADEMY AS PROPOSED IN S.564 IS ENACTED INTO LAW AS IT IS NOW WRITTEN.

S. 564, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WILL BE A GRANT-MAKING BODY TO LPROVIDE FUNDS TO UNIVERSITIES WITH ON-GOING PEACE STUDIES OR PEACE LEARNING PROGRAMS, OR, TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR NEW-STARTS ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES WHERE NONE EXIST AT PRESENT.

EVEN THOUGH YOU DID NOT ENDORSE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACADEMY, IF IT BECOMES A REALITY AND IS FULLY FUNDED IN THE FUTURE, WILL YOU SUBMIT APPLICATION PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN GRANT MONIES THAT WILL BE AVAILABLE TO UNIVERSITIES TO EITHER IMPROVE AND ENHANCE CURRENT PROGRAMS, OR TO OFFER NEW ONES?
IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS FOR REJECTING THIS NEW RESOURCE.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO DR. PICKER, DR. CLARKE, DR. ZARTMAN AND DR. FUNARI, BY JENNINGS RANDOLPH.

IS THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMS AT THE UNIVERSITY YOU SERVE FUNDED, IN PART OR IN WHOLE, UNDER TITLE VI OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT?

ARE YOU WARE THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS RECOMMENDED ZERO-FUNDING FOR TITLE VI IN HIS FY 1984 BUDGET REQUEST?

HOW WOULD THE LOSS OF SUCH FUNDS (IF APPLICABLE) AFFECT YOUR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OR RELATED PROGRAMS?

IF YOUR UNIVERSITY DOES NOT NOW AND NEVER HAS RECEIVED TITLE VI FUNDS, COULD YOU SPEAK FOR YOUR COLLEAGUES AT UNIVERSITIES WITH PROGRAMS THAT ARE FUNDED UNDER TITLE VI, JUST TO GIVE US A GENERAL IDEA OF WHAT THE LOSS OF SUCH FUNDING WOULD MEAN TO INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PROGRAMS?

RESPONSES TO SENATOR RANDOLPH'S QUESTIONS

Question 1: No.

Question 2: Theoretical development can occur in any area of learning.

Question 3: Professors, lawyers, theologians and politicians legitimately involve themselves in current affairs, and not necessarily because an issue is "faddish." Any sound professional education should prepare students for the long-term future. It is also true that knowledge is constantly changing; those who do not or cannot adjust will be left behind. But I reject your central premise, that somehow students of international relations are uniquely susceptible to "mood swings." The study of international relations has been with us since at least the time of Thucydides. "Peace learning," by that name, is a mere three-four years old (though "peace research" goes back some 30-40 years). Where, then, would a reasonable man be most inclined to affix the label "faddish"? "Peace learning" is not a "blessing in disguise."

Question 4: I address much of this question in my response to questions 1-2 by Sen. Stafford. While a Peace Academy would clearly duplicate the activities of scores of existing "peace learning" institutes, the more crucial point relates to the questionable policy utility of the "peace learning" approach.

I applaud free competition among universities in the academic "marketplace." That situation, however, would be undercut by a massive (by academic standards) government subsidy to a degree granting Peace Academy whose primary methodological and substantive bent has yet to demonstrate its pertinence to the real world of international affairs. My institution, The American University, for example, is 90% tuition dependent, and most of its remaining income comes from private sources. One cannot convincingly reply - "Well, doesn't NIH and the Uniformed Military Services Hospital compete with private medical schools?" Medicine, unlike "peace learning," has unquestioned utility for society.

Question 5: No.

Question 6: My school, the School of International Service at The American University, has educated and trained hundreds of people who are now government officials, foreign leaders, activists in various nongovernmental organizations, etc. They range from Petra Kelly of the Green Party in the FRG to senior, and very conservative, officials in the Reagan administration. In addition, my colleagues have been consultants to the U.S. and foreign governments, proposed legislation which has been enacted into law, etc. By-in-large, our faculty (with some exceptions) has been

able to do this because it has wisely avoided esoteric, other-worldly approaches like "peace learning."

Question 7: See numbers 1-2 above. I am at this very moment teaching a course entitled, "International Conflict and Conflict Resolution," though, because of my experience with the Peace Academy proposal, its title will be changed to "International Security and Arms Control." I want the course to enjoy continued respectability.

Question 8: See number 3 above.

Question 9: No - unless the grant relates directly to matters I consider to be policy-relevant. I very much fear that a Peace Academy will deflect scholars away from vital research and - following the money - into the fairyland of "peace learning." I should also add that early last summer I received what can only be described as a threatening letter from a supporter of the Peace Academy which stated, among other things, that my opposition to the proposal could jeopardize my future grant prospects with this Academy. That letter, which perhaps unfortunately, I instantly (and vigorously) discarded, convinced me that active opposition was mandatory. Those who are leading the campaign for a Peace Academy are men and women of good will; I am confident that this incident was neither condoned by nor known to them.

Question 10: This question should be addressed to the administrative authorities at my university.

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N.Y. 10027

FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Dean

420 West 118th Street

March 29, 1983

Dear Senator Randolph:

Of course, Columbia University, as every other institution, is interested, as you are, in furthering knowledge that would lead to a just and durable peace. If funds were made available under acceptable terms, in a field to which we believed we could contribute, we would not only accept funds, we would seek them.

However, I am sure you want the resources employed for funding peace research and teaching to be utilized as effectively and efficiently as possible. Long experience in academia and in administration leads to the conclusion that the U.S. Peace Academy will not be as effective as other proposed methods.

It almost certainly will not be as effective a funding source. As any other institution, it will put its own interests above those of other comparable institutions. It will fund itself, wherever possible, rather than funding the best in the field; and it will have institutional prejudices in the funding it awards.

It would be regrettable, once the Congress has embarked on such an important project, not to have it create the most effective institutional arrangement. The history of education in the United States indicates that national laboratories and national educational institutions are not the best way to solve complex problems, unless there is no existing alternative in the educational field.

Columbia is funded in part by Title VI. We are deeply concerned with the President's budget recommendation for this Act. Obviously, it would decrease our effectiveness if we were not to be able to obtain this funding.

There may be many institutions which justify your concerns about "mood swings," and it is possible that the Peace Academy would also. However, at the foremost institutions there is continuous serous work going on. It is not subject to these swings, although it is open to new ideas.

The objection to the Peace Academy is that it is improbable that it will achieve the objectives for which you strive, as effectively as other methods that have proven themselves.

May I ask that you look at how the United States government organized successfully to establish and maintain our leadership in science. Do you believe that a U.S. Science Academy could have been as effective in science research and teaching as the National Science Board has been by working through existing universities? Just as the field of science, the field of peace research and teaching is too broad and complicated to be served best by a single academy, even if it may grant funds to other institutions.

With warm regards,

Harvey Picker

HP/ab

QUESTION SUBMITTED TO DR. FUNARI, BY SENATOR JENNINGS RANDOLPH

DR. FUNARI, I NOTE FROM YOUR TESTIMONY THAT YOU ARE NOT ENTIRELY OPPOSED TO THE PEACE ACADEMY CONCEPT.

ONE OF THE SUGGESTED CHANGES YOU MADE WAS THAT WE DROP THE DEGREE-GRANTING AUTHORITY FOR THE ACADEMY. IN THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS, I HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED THAT THIS AUTHORITY HAS BECOME THE FOCUS OF MUCH OF UNIVERSITY-RELATED OPPOSITION TO THE BILL.

WILL YOU ELABORATE? WILL DROPPING THAT PROVISION FROM S.564 PERMIT YOU, AND YOUR COLLEAGUES FROM OTHER UNIVERSITY-BASED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAMS, TO ENDORSE S. 564?

Answer to Senator Randolph's Question:

1. If the Academy were to be a center of study for scholars and professionals and analysis on a time-fixed term, say for two years for each individual, where they could spend some time, uninterrupted and undistracted by teaching, on research and analysis, then I could see some potential positive benefit. It is precisely the notion, wrong-headed I believe, that a degree program be established that will weaken the proposed Academy for Peace. Degree programs must, if they are to be anything other than narrow, specialized, lock-step "mills", depend upon and be the product of the wide diversity and richness of a modern major university. The Academy for Peace cannot be such an institution and students will be misled into thinking that they can become fully educated professionals by going through such a program.

Dropping this authority from the bill will be a major improvement and would greatly lessen my opposition to S. 564 even though there are some other changes that I would like to see made as I outlined in my prepared testimony.

QUESTION FOR UNIVERSITY REPRESENTATIVES, SUBMITTED BY JENNINGS RANDOLPH (DRS. PICKER, CLARKE, ZARTMAN AND FUNARI).

EVEN THOUGH EACH OF YOU IS MORE OR LESS OPPOSED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE ACADEMY, LET US ASSUME FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE ACADEMY AS PROPOSED IN S.564 IS ENACTED INTO LAW AS IT IS NOW WRITTEN.

S. 564, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WILL BE A GRANT-MAKING BODY TO LPROVIDE FUNDS TO UNIVERSITIES WITH ON-GOING PEACE STUDIES OR PEACE LEARNING PROGRAMS, OR TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR NEW-STARTS ON UNIVERSITY CAMPUSES WHERE NONE EXIST AT PRESENT.

EVEN THOUGH YOU DID NOT ENDORSE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ACADEMY, IF IT BECOMES A REALITY AND IS FULLY FUNDED IN THE FUTURE, WILL YOU SUBMIT APPLICATION PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN GRANT MONIES THAT WILL BE AVAILABLE TO UNIVERSITIES TO EITHER IMPROVE AND ENHANCE CURRENT PROGRAMS, OR TO OFFER NEW ONES?
IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR REASONS FOR REJECTING THIS NEW RESOURCE.

Answer to question from Senator Randolph:

Yes, I believe that my School would submit proposals for grants from the institution created by S. 564, provided that the grants were used to fit the mission, priorities and programs already ongoing in my School in international security, arms control, international economic order and professional education for international affairs generalists. There would have to be no limitation on the range, scope or methods of inequiry and no infringement on open, free academic research or teaching.

But I must repeat that the priorities for funding and the purposes of the funding would be determined, not by the applicant universities, but by the granting institution. If that granting institution has a particular one-track view of peace studies then I doubt that we would apply or be considered. And if that institution were a degree-granting academy then there would be a structural conflict of interest between its grant-making activities and its teaching function. Established Schools and universities could only be at a disadvantage in such a built-in conflict of interest in the purposes of the Academy for Peace.

SENATOR STAFFORD

FOR DR. ZARTMAN:

I) YOU NOTE IN YOUR TESTIMONY THAT MUCH GOOD WORK IN PEACE RESEARCH AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION HAS BEEN PRODUCED AND THAT MUCH MORE KNOWLEDGE NEEDS TO BE GENERATED AND DESSIMINATED. HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO DR. CLARKE'S ASSERTION THAT AN INSTITUTION ANCHORED IN "PEACE LEARNING" WOULD BE DESTINED FOR POLICY IRRELEVANCE?

II) TO WHAT EXENT DO YOU FAVOR SOME OF THE SUGGESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AS ALTERNATIVES TO A PEACE "ACADEMY," NAMELY,

A) A CONSORTIUM OF SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS DURING WORK IN PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION?

B) A "NATIONAL ENDOWMENT" TO CHANNEL RESOURCES, IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR HUMANITIES DOES, TO EFFORTS BEING DONE IN PEACE RESEARCH AND CONLFICT RESOLUTION?

C) A "U. S. ACADEMY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION" WHICH WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT, YET U. S. GOVERNMENT SANCTIONED, INSTITUTION FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION (AS OPPOSED TO PEACE E STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAINING)?

D) INCREASED FUNDING AND A "CONFLICT RESOLUTION SETASIDE" UNDER TITLE VI OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT?

The Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Peace Academy Hearing Questions
March 16, 1983

William Zartman, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:

Panel II Questions:

1. In your opinion, would the establishment of a United States Peace Academy, funded by the federal government, jeopardize the academic freedom normally associated with an institution of higher learning?

2. How do you believe nations around the world would perceive a "United States Academy of Peace" funded largely by the U.S. government?

3. Some argue that a "United States Academy of Peace" would unfairly compete with current institutions without bringing any new capabilities to the field. In your experience, have you encountered other instances in which the federal government drained away talents and resources from existing institutions?

4. Can you elaborate on the financial problems that international affairs schools face today? For instance, how critical is the shortage of funds for research fellowships, student scholarships, and educational program support?

SAIS

School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University

May 13, 1983

Senator Robert T. Stafford
Chairman, Sub-Committee on
Education, Arts and the
Humanities
Committe on Labor & Human Resources
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Stafford:

Thank for your invitation of 18 March to respond to some written questions. Unfortunately, I was out of the country in Egypt when it arrived and have only recently returned to be able to answer it. The questions come from three sources and I will respond to them as they are presented.

Questions from Senator Stafford:

You asked about the assertion that a Peace Academy would be destined for policy irrelevance. The reference is unclear. A Peace Academy is not expected to make policy. But any research in negotiation and conflict resolution is policy relevant. However, that is not the important question. The question is whether the Peace Academy as proposed is the right form for such research--a question which I addressed in my testimony and answered in the negative.

You asked to what extent do I favor various alternatives to a Peace Academy. My preference would be for a conflict resolution setaside under Title VI of the Higher Education Act, as I indicated in my testimony. I do not favor choice C, a Peace Academy. A National Endowment (choice B) would be a possibility, although somewhat more cumbersome than a simple setaside (choice D). As for a consortium in peace studies (choice A) I would see no objection and would find this useful, providing that the initiative for the consortium comes from the schools themselves, who have the best sense of how their programs and scholars can cooperate with others.

Questions from Senator Randolph:

I do not understand the assertion that a peace academy is not necessarily an international relations or international affairs program. If it is not that, then it is not clear to me what it is.

My institution carries out the same kind of research, education and training as is authorized in the Peace Academy legislation, just as do the other institutions teaching and doing research on international affairs and a number of disciplinary programs in a broader range of universities. The Peace Academy -- as I explained in my testimony -- unfairly competes with private and public educational institutions in that it draws on limited resources and spends large sums of federal money to create a new and centralizing

institution. That is scarcely a complement. For this reason, I would consider the Academy's functions to be duplicative. It is clear that for the very reasons that you support an Academy, the Academy is simply not another university. It is a coordinating institution with a federal seal of authority upon it. It is therefore not simply another entrant into the free higher education competition which has made this country strong, but a state-centered and created institution with a priority hand on federal funds.

I do indeed believe that university-based international relations and other programs can achieve theoretical and conceptual knowledge about the nature of the international system. It is a miscomprehension of the subject to talk about a single adequate theory. We have few adequate theories in social science about anything. We are doing well if we have concepts. I have not seen an institution that resembles an Academy provide any social science theory or enrich our knowledge about it, but as I have explained in my testimony and will emphasize later, the Peace Academy is a new venture with little precedent. Universities are among the oldest organizations for the generation of knowledge, and their pluralism and independence from federal interference and control and coordination has been a major backbone of American values, practices and traditions. I believe it is important to understand this in order to understand the creative nature of research within a free education system.

It is also important to understand the nature of disciplines, which provide particular terms of explanation to human phenomena; thus "peace learning," which is a rather unsophisticated term for some of the activities covered in negotiations and conflict resolution studies, is scarcely a discipline. It is an area of inquiry covered by such disciplines as political science, economics, sociology, psychology and perhaps others. It is scarcely an emerging social science although it is, of course, a subject of current and renewed concern among the social sciences. To say that an Academy would help research and develop and synthesize such a science is overstepping the hopes for any Academy and misreading the nature of the subject of inquiry. I have no doubt that such an Academy might be able to conduct some research and foster other research. My argument is that it is neither the most efficient nor the most productive nor most encouraging way of doing it. It think that it would be unwise for American legislators to push for the least effective way of looking into conflict resolution, and it would be wise for them to sponsor the most effective, that is at the same time consistent with the American higher education traditions.

University-based international relations programs now in place have indeed met many of the theoretical and conceptual challenges facing social science as applied to international relations and have defined areas of inquiry where further theoretical development can take place. I would invite you to read my recent book, The Practical Negotiator, published by Yale University Press and now available in paperback, or, for a more academic treatment of some of the real disciplinary issues of concept and theory, my collection, The Negotiation Process, published by Sage Publishers in 1978 and also available in paperback. If there is a serious concern about this field, it would be good to read some of the material in it. The conceptualization and the attempts to meet theoretical challenges in the field are by definition related to "peace learning" (if that is an understandable phrase) or conflict resolution.

In some curricula, there may be courses that can be called faddish or are related to topics of current concern. In limited amounts this justified. There are conflicts -- such as the Israeli conflict or the North/South confrontation or the East/West conflict -- which are complex enough and lend themselves so easily to caricature that it is important to spend a course revealing their complexities and findings criteria for better understanding. But university programs in general do not swing from one topic to another. To the contrary, they provide a disciplinary basis of knowledge and teach a grounding in the various disciplines of social science so that people can use that training to think better in the future. If there is a current events discussion, it is in the ephemeral literature and the journalistic comments that one finds on topics of the day. It is a little surprising that these would be confused with theoretical or conceptual concerns of international relations. The Senator might like to attend the American Political Science Association or the International Studies Association or even to read some of the articles in their publications to be better acquainted with the thrust of American scholarship. Frankly I do not expect to find the Senator at APSA or ISA because I am sure that he has important things to do in regard to legislation, but I am surprised that so much misinformation is used as a basis for that very crucial activity. Yes, Senator Randolph, the universities are doing their business and doing it reasonably well, and no, they are not taken up with journalism. If you want them to focus on research or conflict resolution, give them greater resources, not unfair competition.

You then ask whether universities would accept money from an Academy if it were established. Probably so, but it would not be the most efficient means of channelling money at a time when resources are tight. If the Academy would only be a grant-making body, then I would suggest that the bill be rewritten to that effect or more appropriately that a setaside be supported.

Questions from Senator Denton:

In my opinion the establishment of a federally funded Peace Academy would indeed jeopardize the academic freedom normally associated with an institution of higher learning. It would be in danger of being looked at as a biased organization, less likely to invite international corporation than universities. It is hard to cite other instances in which federal government drained away talents and resources from existing institutions since the Peace Academy represents a new venture in federal encroachment on higher education. It should be understood that few of us are opposed to the activities of the Academy, but feel that the same activities can be best carried out using the existing structures of American higher education.

To your final question, American higher education is facing a growing financial crisis, in international affairs as elsewhere. Tuition is rising more rapidly than interests even at the present high rates. (A college fund that I set aside for my now-eight-year-old son at his birth has not kept up with the rise in tuition over that same period of time). Research support, faculty salaries, but above all student scholarships and educational program support is desperately needed. If America is to maintain its pre-eminence in the study of international affairs and the improvement of conduct of international relations, as in other areas, it needs to consecrate larger sums to research and development in that part of the social sciences as well as in the hard sciences when there is such a desperate need for funds. Setting up a new institution that brings no advantage to the problems either of funding or of critical mass of scholars, but that competes for both funds and scholars, would be counterproductive.

Perhaps these answers are of some use. Again I am very grateful for the chance to appear before the Committee. If I can be of any further help, please do not hesitate to call on me.

Sincerely,

I. William Zartman

SENATOR STAFFORD

FOR DR. PICKER:

I) COULD YOU OUTLINE MORE SPECIFICALLY THE FORM THAT YOU THAT A UNIVERSITY CONSORTIUM FOR PEACE STUDIES SHOULD TAKE. DO YOU SUGGEST THAT SUCH A CONSORTIUM MIRROR THE FORMAT OF THE NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD?

II)
YOU NOTE IN YOUR TESTIMONY THAT YOU FEEL THAT THE PEACE ACADEMY BY ITSELF WOULD BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CAREER TRAINING REQUIRED FOR AN EFFECTIVE ROLE IN CAREERS OF LAW, BUSINESS, AND GOVERNMENT. IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT A LOT OF THE ACADEMY'S EFFORT WOULD CONCENTRATE ON RESEARCH GRANTS AND POST-GRADUATE WORK, DO YOU FEEL THAT THE PEACE ACADEMY COULD SERVE AS A USEFUL ADJUNCT TO THE CAREERS OF PEOPLE CURRENTLY SCHOOLED IN OUR LAW SCHOOLS. BUSINESS SCHOOLS. AND SCHOOLS OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS?

III) TO WHAT EXENT DO YOU FAVOR SOME OF THE SUGGESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AS ALTERNATIVES TO A PEACE "ACADEMY," NAMELY-

A) A CONSORTIUM OF SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS DURING WORK IN PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION?

B) A "NATIONAL ENDOWMENT" TO CHANNEL RESOURCES. IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR HUMANITIES DOES, TO EFFORTS BEING DONE IN PEACE RESEARCH AND CONLFICT RESOLUTION?

C) A "U. S. ACADEMY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION" WHICH WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT, YET U. S. GOVERNMENT SANCTIONED, INSTITUTION FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION (AS OPPOSED TO PEACE E STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAINING)?

D) INCREASED FUNDING AND A "CONFLICT RESOLUTION SETASIDE" UNDER TITLE VI OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT?

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N.Y. 10027

FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Dean

420 West 118th Street

March 29, 1983

Dear Senator Stafford:

Thank you for your thoughtful and inclusive questions. Knowing your time constraint, I have answered rather concisely. However, I'd be glad to enlarge on any reply, if you wish.

I) My suggestion of a consortium envisioned inviting several of the leading universities with outstanding interest and capability in the field of peace research and education to form a group analogous to that of the Associated Universities in the field of high energy physics or in astronomy. This consortium of universities would request government and outside funding to supplement their own activities in the field. This activity of the associated universities would be coordinated and monitored by a consortium on whose board would serve appropriate administrators, faculty members, and leading public figures appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate.

However, your suggestion of the National Science Board analogy is even better. A "National Board For Peace Research and Education" would be clear demonstration of the United States' interest in a just and durable peace. Just as the National Science Board was created to demonstrate the United States resolve to be foremost in the field of science in the world, so, too, the National Board for Peace Research and Education would demonstrate our dedication to forwarding the cause of peace.

The arguments which led to the creation of the National Science Board rather than the alternative of a United States Science Academy are equally valid, for peace research and teaching. Congress understood that no single academic institution could move the United States ahead as effectively in science, as a system which built on excellence wherever it might be and coordinated the work. The same is true of peace research and teaching. If we are seriously interested in performance, then we must be able to utilize the best teachers and scholars wherever they can do their work best, insulating them from the political pressures to which a national teaching institution might be subject. The NSB model assures that in peace efforts, as in science, the government will have used the most effective vehicle for furthering its purpose.

II) While a peace academy could manage to work with other schools such as business, law and government, experience proves that this is an awkward and inferior mode of operation. For example, at Columbia we integrate the law, business and public administration courses with those in international affairs and problems of peace. The student takes appropriate courses in each school in the same semester. This system is much more effective because the curriculum is deliberately integrated, instead of being two separate, partially related curricula. At Columbia, the teaching faculty of the separate schools directly influence each other providing a better education than if we were simply to allow a student to be educated in one place, then another. Research efforts in fields such as human rights, or international security affairs require that scholars interact readily to stimulate each other's thinking and to criticize from different standpoints, each other's results. Just as congressional committees would be handicapped by being separated geographically, so, too, advanced research is best done when the scholars work in the close proximity provided by a university instead of trying to coordinate work at a peace institution and at another remote institution.

III)

B. An endowment would be satisfactory. It would be almost certain to be superior to a U.S. Academy. The endowment would have the advantage of seeking to support the best work and teaching wherever it occurred, rather than being self-serving as a U.S. Academy would be. Based on the record of the national endowments, I think you would conclude that the National Science Board model you suggested, is superior. It is more capable of organizing the work centrally than the endowments have been. On the whole, endowments are more passive than the NSB.

C. A U.S. Peace Academy as described, would suffer from being parochial in interest. Any single institution always sets its own interests above making grants to other institutions. It takes a long time to develop a good academic and research organization, and the U.S. Academy would suffer for years from this handicap. On both counts, the U.S. Peace Academy would probably be less effective than the NSB, or the Board model. Either of these would be effective immediately and would be capable of disinterested support of the best work currently in the field.

However, the Peace Academy is probably better than simply funding "peace studies and conflict resolution." The problems of achieving peace are far too complex to be limited to these two fields, important as they are. Indeed, "peace studies and conflict resolution" carries an academic connotation of a pre-determined bias. It would be best not to start with that bias, although the fields are important and should be supported, it would be best to make it possible to make the research and education broad enough to support work that is not specifically included under this rubric.

D. Increased funding under Title VI of the higher education act is highly desirable. It may also be desirable to set aside funds for research and teaching in the broad field of peace research and teaching. Conflict resolution *per se* is too narrow a concept, and carries with it the bias that the best mode of attack on a problem that has plagued mankind since inception is already known. It would be best to widen the scope of the "set aside."

With warm regards,

Harvey Picker

HP/ab

The Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Peace Academy Hearing Questions
March 16, 1983

Dr. Harvey Picker, Dean, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University:

1. Do you believe that schools of international affairs are making an effective effort to incorporate the study of peacemaking, peacekeeping, negotiations, and conflict resolutions into their curricula?

2. One of your major concerns seem to be that students of a "United States Academy of Peace" would be isolated from scholars in other disciplines. Can you give any current examples of academic cross-fertilization, formal or informal, between university departments and schools of international and public affairs?

3. Can you tell us something about Columbia's Institute of War and Peace Studies? What does it do and how does it relate to the other components of the University? Are there other Institutes or programs of the same type elsewhere in the country?

4. You point out that a consortium of universities might be the best way to foster interest in peacemaking techniques and research. Do you believe that the major universities would be willing to enter into such an arrangement? Do any such arrangements currently exist?

Panel II Questions:

1. In your opinion, would the establishment of a United States Peace Academy, funded by the federal government, jeopardize the academic freedom normally associated with an institution of higher learning?

2. How do you believe nations around the world would perceive a "United States Academy of Peace" funded largely by the U.S. government?

3. Some argue that a "United States Academy of Peace" would unfairly compete with current institutions without bringing any new capabilities to the field. In your experience, have you encountered other instances in which the federal government drained away talents and resources from existing institutions?

4. Can you elaborate on the financial problems that international affairs schools face today? For instance, how critical is the shortage of funds for research fellowships, student scholarships, and educational program support?

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N.Y. 10027

FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Dean

420 West 118th Street

March 31, 1983

Dear Senator Denton:

Thank you for your incisive questions about the Peace Academy. I'll attempt to answer them concisely, but of course would be glad to expand on any of them.

1. Each school of international affairs is making a serious and effective effort to incorporate the study of peacemaking/peacekeeping negotiations and conflict resolution into its curriculum. These curricula are continuously being updated and improved. The increasing concern by faculty and students assure that the research and teaching are both serious and competent.

Our Institute for War and Peace Studies is an excellent example of the excellent academic cross fertilization that takes place in universities. Its members are drawn from departments in the graduate faculty. Distinguished scholars of history, political science, economics, and physics join with those from schools of business, engineering and law to do important research and teaching. To be certain that the pragmatic aspects are given adequate weight, the institute also has annual visitors from the U.S. Military Academy and the Department of State.

2. The Columbia Institute of War and Peace Studies is a research institution which brings together those scholars at Columbia University who have an interest and expertise in some aspect of how peace might be achieved. For example, some of its members have deep understanding of the attitudes, capabilities and politics of countries such as the Soviet Union, Western Europe, or Afghanistan. Others come from the U.S. Military Academy, the Arms Control and Defense Agency, or other organizations directly concerned with the process. Thus those in the institute include both academicians and practical executives concerned with the defense of the United States. The Institute of War and Peace, being integral to the School of International and Public Affairs, provides courses on the causes of war and peace negotiations to our students. Such courses are required of our students specializing in the field of International Security Affairs, most of whom will work for governments including the United States government, or international organizations.

3. Attached is a copy of the description of Columbia's Institute of War and Peace Studies. As you see, it produces many important publications, seminars and conferences.

I will try to give you a list of other similar institutes and programs elsewhere in the country in the near future.

In answer to Panel II questions:

1. Inevitably the Peace Academy will be more sensitive to governmental politics and wouldnot have quite as much freedom of inquiry and instruction as other types of academic institutions.

2. It is impossible to be certain how various nations around the world would perceive a United States Academy of Peace. Many would probably regard it as a U.S. propaganda source just as they would view a similar academy funded by the Russian government.

3. I have very little concern that the U.S. Academy of Peace would drain away faculty or students from Columbia University. My concerns are that funds spent for the peace academy would not be as usefully employed as they would if they were utilized for funding the work at either a University consortium or under the direction of a National Board for Peace Research and Teaching. The subject is too important to use anything but the type of organization that will perform the task best with the resources made available. As I have indicated in my letter to Senator Stafford, a U.S. Peace Academy is probably far from the best solution to a problem of great import to the nation.

With warm regards,

Harvey Picker

HP/ab

The Institute of War and Peace Studies

DIRECTOR: Professor Warner R. Schilling

The Institute of War and Peace Studies was organized in 1951 under the sponsorship of the late Dwight D. Eisenhower. The program of the Institute includes, in addition to research and publications, sponsorship of the Dorothy Danforth Compton Seminar in Problems of Future World Order and the cosponsorship with the Southern Asian Institute of the seminar on South Asia Security Policies, as well as administration of the Ira D. Wallach Chair of World Order Studies. The Institute's Canadian Studies Program (funded by the William H. Donner Foundation) promotes teaching and research on Canadian subjects.

The research program of the Institute has two main parts. One deals with peace and security, including relevant problems of American foreign policy, strategic studies, and arms control. The other involves theoretical and empirical investigations in international and comparative politics and international institutions. In addition to a wide variety of articles in scholarly journals and symposia, fifty-three volumes, divided almost equally between the two main parts of the Institute program, have been produced under Institute auspices.

The following Institute books were published before 1970: Alfred Vagts, *Defense and Diplomacy;* Seymour Melman (editor), *Inspection for Disarmament;* Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War;* William T. R. Fox (editor), *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations;* Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense;* S. P. Huntington (editor), *Changing Patterns of Military Politics;* Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy,*



Politics, and Defense Budgets; Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Structure of Nations and Empires;* Zbigniew Brzezinski and S. P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR,* sponsored jointly with the Russian Institute; Amitai Etzioni, *Political Unification;* G. H. Snyder, *Stockpiling Strategic Materials;* Demetrios Caraley, *The Politics of Military Unification;* K. N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience,* jointly sponsored with the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; Annette Baker Fox and W. T. R. Fox, NATO and the *Range of American Choice;* Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation,* jointly sponsored with the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University; Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations;* Wayne A. Wilcox, *Asia and United States Policy;* Donald J. Puchala and Richard L. Merritt, *Western European Perspectives on International Affairs,* jointly sponsored with the Yale Political Data Program; W. T. R. Fox, *The American Study of International Relations;* Louis Henkin, *How Nations Behave,* jointly sponsored with the Council on Foreign Relations; Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers;* Michael H. Armacost, *The Politics of Weapons Innovation;* William Zimmerman, *Soviet Perspectives on International Relations,* jointly sponsored with the Russian Institute; D. A. Rustow (editor), *Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership,* jointly sponsored with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro, and Anne Simons, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents,* third and revised edition; Alan James, *The Politics of Peace-Keeping;* and Mark W. Zacher, *Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations.*

The following volumes have been published since 1970: David A. Kay, *The New Nations in the United Nations;* A. Etzioni and Martin Wenglinsky (editors), *War and Its Prevention;* R. Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs;* Steven L. Spiegel, *Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy;* R. L. Rothstein, *Planning, Prediction and Policy-making in Foreign Affairs;* L. Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution;* Robert F. Randle, *The Origins of Peace;* W. T. R. Fox and W. R. Schilling (editors), *European Security and the Atlantic System;* W. R. Schilling, W. T. R. Fox, Catherine M. Kelleher, and D. J. Puchala, *American Arms and a Changing Europe;* L. M. Goodrich and D. A. Kay (editors), *International Organization: Politics and Process;* L. M. Goodrich, *The United Nations in a Changing World;* Lynn E. Davis, *The Cold War Begins;* R. Hilsman, *The Crouching Future: International Politics and U. S. Foreign Policy;* C. M. Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons;* A. B. Fox, Alfred O. Hero, and Joseph S. Nye (editors), *Canada and the United States;* Paul Edmund Beard, *Developing the ICBM;* A. B. Fox, *The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States;* J. Bowyer Bell, *On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation* and *Terror Out of Zion: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI, and the Palestine Underground;* Victor Basiuk, *Technology, World Politics, and American Policy;* R. L. Rothstein, *The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System;* R. Hilsman, *To Govern America;* J. B. Bell, *A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence;* Joan E. Spero, *The Failure of the Franklin National Bank: Challenge to the International Banking System;* John G. Ruggie, *The Structure of Planetary Politics;* and J. G. Ruggie (editor), *The Antinomies of Interdependence.*

The next volumes scheduled for publication are studies by William T. R. Fox on civilian and military perspectives in the making of national security policy; by Zalmay Khalilzad on security of Southwest Asia; by David C. Rapoport on praetorianism; and by Warner R. Schilling on admirals and foreign policy in World War I.

Other studies are being conducted on the American decision to make the H-bomb, United States military intervention in the Caribbean; peacemaking and peace settlements; the internal causes of war; international organization and political modernization; world systems of labor and production; law and politics of the sea; law and politics of human rights; law and international politics; world politics of agriculture; supranational rule enforcement in the European communities; the politics of international economics and world order; Rolls Royce and Lockheed: a comparative study of defense-related industries; United States commitments to authoritarian regimes; attitudes and images of Arabs and Israelis; the impact of revolutionary conflict on world order; process and politics in defense and foreign policy; power projections and nuclear proliferation; arms transfers and socioeconomic development, post-INFCE U.S. international nuclear and nonproliferation policy; international security in Southwest Asia; and East-West trade and technology transfer, the consolidation of peace, the logic of alignment in the international system, and theories of international order.

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N.Y. 10027

FACULTY OF INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Dean

420 West 118th Street

April 5, 1983

Re:

The Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Peace Academy Hearing Questions
March 16, 1983

Question 4.

A consortium for peace studies among graduate schools of international affairs does not exist at present. Because each of us who teach or do research in international affairs recognizes the central importance of a just, durable peace, there isn't the slightest doubt in my mind that one would be brought into existence by our government's willingness to join in the formation.

Let me cite several reasons for my convictions.

a. An association of professional schools of international affairs exists. I am assured by their deans that they would readily form the nucleus for such a consortium and would invite other appropriate institutions to join.

b. Even at the undergraduate level such consortia are forming. In Massachusetts the five colleges - Smith, University of Massachusetts, Mt. Holyoke, Hampshire and Amherst are creating a consortium for peace studies.

I have no doubt that it would be very easy for Congress to bring into existence a consortium that would be outstanding in peace research and teaching.

SENATOR STAFFORD

FOR DR. CLARKE:

YOU NOTE THAT YOUR PROPOSED "ACADEMY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION" WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT INSTITUTION DEVOTED TO INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH AND TRAINING IN APPROACHES OF "POLICY-RELEVANCE."

(1) COULD YOU FURTHER EXPLAIN WHAT YOU MEAN BY "POLICY-RELEVANCE."

(2) IF YOUR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE PEACE ACADEMY IS TRULY AN INDEPENDENT INSTITUTION, HOW WOULD YOU SUGGEST THAT ITS WORK BE INTEGRATED INTO THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS?

(3) WE HAVE HEARD A LOT OF ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE DEGREE TO WHICH A PEACE ACADEMY WOULD OVERLAP WITH CURRENT SCHOOLS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. WOULD NOT YOUR PROPOSAL DUPLICATE THE EFFORTS OF EXISTING INSTITUIONS TO A GREATER DEGREE THAN THE ACADEMY PROPOSED IN S. 564?

RESPONSES TO SENATOR STAFFORD'S QUESTIONS

Question 1: The term "policy-relevance," as I employ it, means that the work of individuals or institutions is clearly related to ongoing or reasonably forseeable concerns of policymakers. Policymakers themselves are best positioned to make that judgment.

Question 2: By "independent" I mean only that my proposed Academy for the Study of International Security and Arms Limitation would have the same degree of "independence" that is currently proposed for a Peace Academy under S.564. One central difference between my proposal and S.564 (and the Commission's report) is the kind of work (which would be primarily research oriented) that would be emphasized by the Academy. A focus on international security and arms control - which is a focus consonant with the broad mainstream of America's recognized experts - would be far more likely to be considered useful by policymakers than the very recently titled "peace learning" field, which has yet to demonstrate its "policy-relevance" and which promises, instead, to alienate those it must ultimately reach to be effective - government officials. In addition, I would staff the Academy primarily with past and present government officials with experience in security affairs and arms control as well as with academics who have either had government experience in these areas or otherwise interacted extensively with government officials. This would greatly enhance the quality of the products produced as well as government receptivity to them. Academic behavioral scientists - as their work is purported to relate to international affairs - would, and probably should, be ignored by policymakers.

Question 3: First, there would be overlap between a Peace Academy and the present schools of international relations. But the really significant redundancy would be between a Peace Academy and the vast network of "peace learning" institutes and research groups presently operating at other institutions. There are only a few professional schools of international relations, principally at The American University, Columbia, Denver, Georgetown, Johns Hopkins, Pittsburgh and Tufts. There are, according to the Commission, at least 79 "peace learning" institutes and research groups at as many institutions.

There is important work on international security and arms control being done at the professional schools of international relations and at other institutions. However, an Academy for the Study of International Security and Arms Limitation is necessary for the following reasons:

(1) Schools of international relations must cover the world. Only a small number of their faculty members can devote substantial attention to international security and arms control.

(2) Until 1973 there were no specific arms control centers at American universities. That year the Ford Foundation funded such centers at seven universities. This financial

assistance was renewed in 1977, but the number of supported centers dropped to six: Harvard, MIT, Cornell, Stanford, UCLA and the Rand Graduate Institute. There is considerable question as to the future continuity of funding for these centers.
(3) Faculty members at these centers have, and are expected to have, broader teaching and research interests. There has been a consequent dilution of effort.
(4) Most of the Ford grants have gone for predoctoral or, sometimes, postdoctoral fellowships, instead of furthering the policy-related efforts of established academic experts.
(5) Very few of the permanent faculty can, because of administrative and teaching duties, afford the "luxury" of delving deeply into current and likely future policy issues.
(6) In short, as Lawrence Weiler (former chief academic liaison officer with ACDA) correctly concludes: "There is no American academic center - or any other type of institutional structure - devoted to arms control issues that has the resources and personnel, freed from other duties, to achieve the critical mass necessary to make it an active participant in the nongovernmental input to the arms control decisionmaking process." (emphasis added). [in Hans Guenter Brauch and Duncan L. Clarke, eds., Decisionmaking for Arms Limitation: Prospects and Assessments (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., forthcoming 1983), p. 39.]

So, my proposal is far less duplicative than what is found in S.564 and much more necessary.

Testimony of Rear Admiral Edward F. Welch Jr, U.S. Navy (Ret)

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR STAFFORD

I) What effort does the Naval War College make to bring in and integrate some of the conflict resolution work being done outside the Naval War College?

A. This is done in a great many ways. A number of distinguished civilian professors from leading universities regularly lecture to the classes on topics being studied in the core curriculum. For example, Professor Roger Fisher of Harvard has lectured to the senior class on Points of Choice covering alternative courses of action to satisfy a given set of circumstances. He has also lectured to the junior class on negotiating techniques and how to bridge the gap between theory and practice. In the elective course on the Middle East, separate spokesmen for the Arab and Israeli causes come in to enlighten the difficult issues which attend that troublesome area of potential conflict. An elective on National Security Issues which I taught dwelt heavily on arms control and international negotiations.

The Naval War College regularly hires prominent civilian professors for a one to five-year period as regular faculty members. These professors, normally on leave of absence from their universities, then return to their universities after the agreed contractual period. In this way, a constant interchange between the Naval War College and the civilian academic world takes place. Professor Alvin Bernstein of Cornell, for example, joined the faculty this year. He is a distinguished historian and an expert on Thucydides and the Pelopennesian Wars. This period offers valuable historical insights into the age-old problems that still beset the world today. In addition, the State Department Advisor, Ambassador Nathanael Davis, adds a richness of experience from a long and successful diplomatic career.

Through a program of evening lectures and international conferences, the student body is exposed to a variety of views on peace and war. The Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, the noted author Herman Wouk, Lord Chalfont, Admiral Sir James Eberle of the Royal Navy, Ambassador William Porter and James Schlesinger are among those who have provided valuable insights on conflict resolution.

Each year the Current Strategy Forum brings to Newport a distinguished group of Americans from all over the United States to hear prominent lecturers and to discuss, in seminar, the problems facing the United States in the years ahead. This group consists mainly of business leaders, clergymen, doctors, media representatives, educators, lawyers and active duty and retired

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR STAFFORD

I) Continued

military officers. The students are fully integrated into this program.

The International Seapower Symposium, held twice during my tenure as president, brings together the heads of navies from all over the world to discuss common problems in maintaining peace. These officers are not only from allied nations but also from nations such as Sweden, Finland, Zaire, Nigeria and Algeria.

There are many more conferences held at the Naval War College. In addition, our professors regularly attend and present papers at a great number of academic conferences throughout the United States and abroad, many of which deal with conflict resolution.

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR STAFFORD

II) Could you supply the Education Subcomittee with a catalogue or listing which includes descriptions of the conflict resolution courses at the Naval War College?

A. The 1982-83 Catalog is enclosed. While there is no specific course entitled "Conflict Resolution", the reader will see that the elements of conflict resolution appear throughout the curriculum.

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR STAFFORD

III) To what extent do you favor some of the suggestions that have been proposed as alternatives to a Peace "Academy", namely,

A) A consortium of schools and institutions doing work in peace studies and conflict resolution?

B) A "National Endowment" to channel resources, in much the same way that the National Endowment for Humanities does, to efforts being done in peace research and conflict resolution?

C) A " U.S. Academy for the Study of International Security and Arms Limitation" which would be an independent, yet government sanctioned, institution for the study of international security and arms limitation (as opposed to peace studies and conflict resolution training)?

D) Increased funding and a "Conflict Resolution Setaside" under Title VI of the Higher Education Act?

Answer. As a general answer, I would favor an alternative which would provide the necessary funding to the many fine universities and institutions which have the demonstrated capabilty to enhance the study of peace and war as well as "conflict resolution" in its broad sense. I agree that more can be done. The Education Subcommittee has heard informed testimony from a number of distinguished educators who also recommend that, as an alternative to a Peace Academy, the Congress direct its efforts toward greater support and direction to those academic institutions which have served the United States so well in the past and serve it so well today. These institutions are the mainstay of our system. Their graduates serve today in the Congress, in the highest posts of government leadership and in the forefront of our many efforts to maintain and sustain peace throughout the world.

Specifically, I would support Alternatives (D), (B) and (A) in that order of priority. While I share many of Professor Duncan Clarke's views on the proposed Peace Academy, I do not favor his preferred alternative (C) for a "U.S. Academy for the Study of International Security and Arms Limitation", for I fear that such an institution would have many of the same problems which are ascribed to a Peace Academy.

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR DENTON

1. You point out that the "war colleges" teach students peacemaking and conflict resolution. Do you think that there is more that the colleges can do to foster these techniques and values?

Answer. In my response to Senator Stafford's first question, I pointed out the many areas in which the Naval War College is already addressing peacemaking and conflict resolution. I do think that additional work can be done, but I think that this must be done most carefully, recognizing that the primary purpose of War Colleges is to educate the military professionals to best serve the nation if war should come. In the academic year available, time is at a premium and too much emphasis on these areas could deflect any war college from its primary mission. In short, a judicious expansion of effort could be considered, with a careful eye to the tradeoffs involved.

2. There is a wide-spread misperception that our military leadership is concerned more with war making than peacemaking. I note with interest that you have been involved in a number of high-level, international negotiations. Based on your experience, could you discuss the role that military men and women are playing in negotiations around the world?

Answer. Military men and women play a considerable role in negotiations in which the United States participates. As a general rule, military officers are members of the US Delegation at all negotiations bearing on national security. While they primarily provide professional military advice, they also participate fully in the day-to-day work of the delegation, drafting position papers, reporting and engaging in discussions with the other parties. During my service on the Joint Staff, my office provided representatives to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), Anti-Satellite (ASAT) talks, Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), Chemical Warfare (CW), Law of the Sea (LOS), Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), International Conference of the Red Cross, the NATO Special Committee on Arms Control, the US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and the UN Committee on Disarmament. In addition, the Joint Staff provided military representation on various NATO negotiations, the Indian Ocean negotiations, the Conventional Arms Transfer talks, and a number of negotiations on base rights.

Military officers also sit on the interdepartmental working groups in Washington which do the preparatory work and backup work while negotiations are underway.

All over the world military officers serve in a negotiating role on a day-to-day basis, whether on maneuver areas, ships visits, wage rates for local employees, landing rights for aircraft, communications or legal problems associated with status of forces agreements.

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR DENTON

3. Admiral Welch, you have been actively involved in many crucial negotiating efforts on behalf of the United States. Would a "Peace Academy" have been of assistance in conducting these negotiations?

Answer. No. Most of the negotiations in which I have particapated have been in the area of arms control. Virtually all of the participants on the US side are seasoned professionals from those agencies which participate in the national security policy process. Their backgrounds are understandably varied; nearly all hold advanced degrees from well-known universities; and most have had a considerable amount of negotiating experience. I cannot see that a Peace Academy as envisioned in proposed legislation and proscribed from participation in the policy-making process, would be a meaningful contributor to such negotiations.

The only recommendation that might, in the long run, make some contribution would be the recommendation advanced by General Goodpaster and which is ignored in the current proposal. That is the idea that such an institution would be "primarily oriented toward the education and training of experienced and able mid-career personnel concerned with foreign and security policy".He also emphasized the importance of access to classified official information. Even if this were the case, graduates, through their professional performance and ability, would have to earn a place at the table. However, even this recommendation would seem duplicative of what is already being done.

4. How do you believe nations around the world would perceive a "United States Academy of Peace" funded largely by the U.S. Government?

Answer. I believe that they would be suspicious and, in some cases, distrustful. Our allies are used to dealing with their counterparts in established US government agencies and would wonder what useful purpose such a new institution would serve. I, for my part, would find it difficult to give a persuasive answer. We would hear the same incisive questions which critics of the proposed legislation have raised in hearings. In NATO, where I have had a good deal of experience, questions would be raised about a new isolationism, a repudiation of our long-standing support of the defense of the West, and an anxiety over where the United States is really going. In other areas of the world, such a US Government-sponsored institution could be viewed as a stalking horse for US initiatives which might not be in their interests.

QUESTIONS BY SENATOR DENTON

5. Based on your experience as President of the Naval War College, how do you evaluate the educational efforts of other Government schools in the subject areas proposed for the Peace Academy?

Answer. I cannot provide informed testimony on the Foreign Service Institute, but from my knowledge of the curricula of other senior service colleges and as a graduate of the National War College, I would say that their curricula provide many elements similar to the Naval War College which I have previously described. Much of what is proposed for the Peace Academy is already taught at these schools.

6. What sort of consultative or cooperative arrangements exist among the Federal Government institutions that provide education in the broad areas of peace and war? What sort of consultative or cooperative relationships exist with institutions in the private sector?

Answer. A forum is provided by the Military Education Coordinating Committee (MECC) which meets at regular intervals. At these meetings, common problems, comparisons of curricula and educational goals are discussed. Members of this group are the commandants of the five senior service colleges and the National Defense University. The intermediate service colleges have a similar consultative arrangement. In addition the Office of the Secretary of Defense holds periodic conferences on higher military education.

Consultative or cooperative arrangements with institutions in the private sector are done, in the case of the Naval War College, by the program previously described through the employment on the faculty, for one to five years, of distinguished professors from leading universities. I was a member of the Rhode Island Higher Education Council which is composed of the presidents of all universities and colleges in Rhode Island. In addition, the Board of Advisors of the Naval War College, several members of which are prominent educators, regularly provide advice. A cooperative degree program has recently been established on a trial basis with Salve Regina, the Newport College. The curriculum at the Naval War College is evaluated by the American Council on Education. The Naval War College president is also a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies.

SENATOR STAFFORD

FOR MR. LAUE:

I) WOULD YOU COMMENT ON THE MERIT ON SOME OF THE PROPOSALS SUGGESTED AS ALTERNATIVES TO THE PEACE ACADEMY?

A) A CONSORTIUM OF SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS DURING WORK IN PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION?

B) A "NATIONAL ENDOWMENT" TO CHANNEL RESOURCES, IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR HUMANITIES DOES, TO EFFORTS BEING DONE IN PEACE RESEARCH AND CONLFICT RESOLUTION?

C) A "U. S. ACADEMY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION" WHICH WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT, YET U. S. GOVERNMENT SANCTIONED, INSTITUTION FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION (AS OPPOSED TO PEACE L STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAINING)?

D) INCREASED FUNDING AND A "CONFLICT RESOLUTION SETASIDE" UNDER TITLE VI OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT?

II) HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO MR. LINCOLN'S ASSERTIONS THAT:

A) THE ACADEMY'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS SHOULD BE COMPOSED OF 25 MEMBERS INSTEAD OF ELEVEN, CONSISTING REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR, SCHOOLS OF INTERNATIONA STUDIES, THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND THE PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION?

B) THE INITIAL OPERATING BUDGET AUTHORIZATION SHOULD BE LOWERED TO ONE MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE FIRST YEAR AND 1.5 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE SECOND AND THAT THE FIFTEEN MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE CAPITALIZATION FUND BE AUTHORIZED FOR THE SECOND YEAR.

III) SHOULD THE ACADEMY BE IN ANY WAY LIMITED IN ITS ABILITY TO GRANT DEGREES?

Responses of James H. Laue to Questions
by Senator Robert Stafford
Hearings on S. 564 -- March 16, 1983

I. Alternative Proposals

A. Consortium. The university consortium as proposed by Dean Picker is an excellent idea, and I would support it as a part of the U.S. Academy of Peace, but not as a substitute for the Academy. A university consortium is, of course, possible under the present wording of the bill. Indeed, the present wording would encourage the establishment of a consortium.

One of the major goals of the Peace Academy would be to help strengthen the work of universities and the diplomacy schools in peace-making research and training. To achieve this goal, some type of cooperative inter-university arrangement will be necessary. Any consortium will require budget and staff. I believe the best and strongest arrangement is for such a consortium to have a solid nucleus or core which includes scholars working on issues of interest to the member institutions, and resources to aid the members. Otherwise consortia tend to be loose affiliations of institutions or persons primarily pursuing their own interests without the benefits of coordination and cooperation that a strong center and incentives can provide.

You should note that a consortium of peace researchers and institutions already exists -- the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED). It is based at Kent State University in Ohio, and has no significant institutional or federal funding. None of the diplomacy/international relations schools are institutional members of COPRED, and none of the deans of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs are individual members.

B. National Endowment for Peace. This also is an excellent idea, is permissible under the current language in S. 564, and should be a part of the U.S. Academy of Peace. Just as with a consortium, the value received for funds invested is increased if there is a viable core at the center of the funding mechanism. If there existed only an endowment to serve as a pass-through for federal funds to existing institutions and programs, the ability to perform the intended mission of the Peace Academy would be reduced substantially because of lack of focus and direction -- and, not insignificantly, the vulnerability of a weak center to the pressures and priorities of the members as well as external interests.

C. Academy for International Security and Arms Limitation. This proposal by Professor Clarke calls for something other than a U.S. Academy of Peace, and should be treated separately -- not as a substitute for the Peace Academy. It could be a useful institution, but that cannot be determined until Professor Clarke or others conduct considerable additional work on the proposed concept, mission, structure, and funding of such an organization.

D. Title VI Setaside. This device, which was rejected by your Subcommittee last year, would be wholely inadequate to the needs as outlined in the Peace Academy Commission's report and in the current hearing record, as well as the record from your April 21, 1982, hearing: inadequate funds, diverting funds from an existing small source established for other important functions, the absence of a clear mission and focus, etc.

II. William Lincoln's Questions.

A. Board of Directors. The Commission's analysis of the governance procedures of a number of federally-chartered nonprofit corporations led us to the conclusion that combined Presidential and Congressional

Science Associations, and of the dean of a major public policy school. The National Education Association also formally supports the Academy. The witnesses from diplomacy and international relations schools on March 16 were uniformly supportive of the need for better knowledge and application in this field, but preferred other mechanisms of support. Deans from the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs are meeting soon to consider specific parts of the legislation that relate to their interests, and the major higher education associations also are open to discussions about their support of the Academy if it carries what they believe to be an appropriate mandate and structure.

So I do not think I am in error in saying that it appears that the majority of educators in peace-related fields are supportive of the Academy.

4. Cost

I do not intend to imply that defense spending is not a part of peacekeeping. In the Commission's visits with the heads of the three military academies, and in Admiral Welch's testimony before your Subcommittee, I was impressed with the energy and commitment devoted to the peacemaking and peacekeeping roles. The service academy commandants all said their job was to train future leaders whose major mission is to find ways to make and keep the peace. They said they would welcome the opportunity to send their graduates on for extensive study and hands-on experience in negotiation and mediation techniques.

The Academy surely is not "an alternative to defense spending". It would represent a comparatively small investment in the specific pursuit of peacemaking knowledge by our leaders. With Senator Jepsen (R-IA), I believe that there are many paths to peace, that we clearly have not

rather than mandatory, and indicates that the Academy may take as one of its programs the offering of courses and other educational activities that may lead to degrees. The legislation is written in this fashion to provide some latitude for the reasoned judgment of the first and subsequent boards of directors. This provision is one of more than a dozen powers and duties the directors may choose to exercise. The possibilities range from offering no courses at all to offering courses for degrees. The clear intent of those of us involved in developing the concept of the Peace Academy is somewhere in between: courses would be offered as one type of scholarly activity, and the Academy would be free to make arrangements with degree-granting institutions for cooperative programs.

Unless some dramatic clarification is required, I think the present language regarding degrees is correct and should not be altered.

Thank you for the opportunity to
respond to these additional questions.

James H. Laue

James H. Laue
March 30, 1983

The Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Peace Academy Hearing Questions
March 16, 1983

Dr. James Laue, Vice Chairman, National Academy of Peace Commission and Director, Center for Metropolitan Studies, University of Missouri -- St. Louis:

1. You note in your statement that fear of a nuclear war is at an all-time high among the American citizenry. (p. 2) Some supporters of the U.S. Peace Academy have capitalized on that fear to make the case for its establishment. Do you believe that the failure to reach truly effective, balanced, and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union is due primarily to a lack of trained negotiators or inadequate negotiating techniques, or are there other reasons?

2. You argue that we need to do more to apply what we know about peacemaking to contemporary world conflict situations, citing the Iranian crisis, the Middle East conflict, and developments in Central America. (p. 2) You use the Falklands as a case study. I'm wondering if the failure to solve these conflicts has more to do with the nature of the conflicts than with the failure to apply state-of-the-art conflict negotiation techniques. What are your thoughts on that subject?

3. You assert in you testimony that "the vast majority of educators are supportive of the Academy." (p. 16) Yet today we will receive testimony from respected educators who are opposed to S. 564, and many others have spoken out on the issue. How do you explain this?

4. You state that the $31 million appropriation proposed for the first two years of the Peace Academy is a modest public investment, which "amounts to a seven-cent annual cost for each American citizen, compared to $1,100 per capita for defense." (p. 19) Frankly, in making this comparison, you seem to be implying that defense spending is not a part of peacekeeping. Is this because you perceive the Academy as being an alternative to defense spending?

5. Many of the representatives from academia here today have expressed fears that the Peace Academy will draw talent and resources away from worthwhile programs in other schools. In your testimony, you state that the Peace Academy should be "capable of drawing and holding the very best minds for work on the specifics of international peacemaking and conflict resolution." (p. 19) In light of your statement, their concern seems to be justified. How do you respond to this concern?

6. In your statement, you seem to argue for at least a collateral but official role for the peace academy in governmental negotiations such as those conducted by the Secretary of State in an effort to resolve the Falkland Islands Crisis short of further conflict. How can such a semi-official role be squared with the contention that the "Peace Academy" would be non-partisan, objective, detached, and credible throughout the world?

Responses of James H. Laue to Questions
by Senator Jeremiah Denton
Hearings on S. 564 -- March 16, 1983

1. Arms Control.

I believe there are several reasons for the failure to reach truly effective, balanced, and verifiable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Among them are:

a. Lack of a coherent, consistent, and jointly agreed-upon set of procedures for negotiations.

b. The desire of both parties to achieve the best possible deal, and the subsequent hesitancy to move to agreement, the false starts, back-offs, re-packaging, re-interpretation, questioning of the rules, etc. -- all typical negotiating behavior.

c. On the part of the United States, discontinuous membership on negotiating teams and absence of a unified long-range strategy (in part a function of our decentralized political system). Rep. Paul Simon (D-IL) has made this point as a result of his participation in the U.N. special session on disarmament last summer.

d. On the part of the USSR, a hardening and resistance that is in part a function of their centralized political system.

e. Fluctuation in the quality of U.S. negotiating teams and their back-up staffs and support. This may also be true of the Soviets.

2. Recent Conflicts and the U.S. Role

I would be the first to say that not every conflict can be resolved through negotiation, mediation or conciliation. Without extensive analysis, it is not possible to attribute failure to resolve certain conflicts peacefully to either the state-of-the-art of conflict resolution or the nature of the particular conflict.

In the Iranian hostage situation, our negotiations ultimately were successful in that all of the hostages were returned unharmed. But it is clear that a better understanding of the role of orthodox Islam and its role in the Revolutionary Council could have prevented us from devoting so much time to dealing with westernized Iranian diplomats who ultimately were not able to deliver what they promised. Similarly, the ignoring of the group actually holding the hostages by the Waldheim mission was a serious error that should not have been made; refusal to let the Waldheim Commission visit the hostages scuttled the mission.

A number of problems with the U.S.'s attempted mediation in the Falklands are addressed in my prepared testimony, pp. 8-11. My major points comes down to this: no experienced mediator I know would have tried to "mediate" the Falklands crisis under conditions as they were. The situation required, at the minimum, a different base for any mediator, a common site for the discussions, and an off-center-stage role for the United States.

The bottom line is this: we could do better in these situations, both at helping secure the peace and in protecting our national interests. But to do so we need to invest the same intensity of analysis, planning, and back-up support in pursuing our peacemaking role in such circumstances as we do in military missions.

3. The Higher Education Community

The statement in my testimony was somewhat more cautious than your citation. I said, "It appears, however, that the vast majority of educators in peace-related fields are supportive of the Academy" (omitted parts underlined). Then I cited the support of the Consortium on Peace Research, Education and Development (COPRED), of the Consortium of Social

Science Associations, and of the dean of a major public policy school. The National Education Association also formally supports the Academy. The witnesses from diplomacy and international relations schools on March 16 were uniformly supportive of the need for better knowledge and application in this field, but preferred other mechanisms of support. Deans from the Association of Schools of Public and International Affairs are meeting soon to consider specific parts of the legislation that relate to their interests, and the major higher education associations also are open to discussions about their support of the Academy if it carries what they believe to be an appropriate mandate and structure.

So I do not think I am in error in saying that it appears that the majority of educators in peace-related fields are supportive of the Academy.

4. Cost

I do not intend to imply that defense spending is not a part of peacekeeping. In the Commission's visits with the heads of the three military academies, and in Admiral Welch's testimony before your Subcommittee, I was impressed with the energy and commitment devoted to the peacemaking and peacekeeping roles. The service academy commandants all said their job was to train future leaders whose major mission is to find ways to make and keep the peace. They said they would welcome the opportunity to send their graduates on for extensive study and hands-on experience in negotiation and mediation techniques.

The Academy surely is not "an alternative to defense spending". It would represent a comparatively small investment in the specific pursuit of peacemaking knowledge by our leaders. With Senator Jepsen (R-IA), I believe that there are many paths to peace, that we clearly have not

found any "correct" formula, and that we should continue to explore all avenues that may be fruitful in our quest for the twin goals of world peace and national security.

5. Relation of the Academy to Other Schools

If the Peace Academy is to be a worthwhile investment, it must be more than an administrative pass-through for research funds to existing institutions and/or a coordinator of conferences. If it is to achieve the stature and substance to be of help in addressing the serious conflicts we face as a nation, it must have a solid core of first-rate scholars and practitioners in a variety of fields related to peace and conflict resolution. The existing schools of diplomacy and other institutions have many such persons now on their faculties. The Peace Academy would develop a complementary relationship with such schools, promoting joint research, faculty exchanges, the training of new scholars and practitioners in the field, etc. I envision a model similar to the National Institutes of Health (the medical schools of this nation do not fear a brain-drain from NIH -- rather they profit immensely from its existence, intellectually as well as fiscally). Such private sector institutions as the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institute provide other models to inform our thinking on this subject. In addition, see especially pp. 14-18 of my testimony.

6. Role of the Academy in Governmental Negotiations

The final report of the Peace Academy Commission, the proposed legislation (now S. 564), and my testimony all stress that the Academy would not be a policy-making or direct intervention agency. It would not, for example, manage a stable of mediators who could be dispatched on call to crisis situations. In this way, it is analogous to the service academies

and war colleges: they conduct research and train future leaders, and their faculty members give advice to policy-makers in areas of their special expertise upon request. But they do not make military policy or directly intervene in military situations.

My deepest hope is indeed, in your words, Senator, that the Peace Academy would be non-partisan, objective, detached and credible throughout the world. But first it must be credible within our own government as a source of excellent scholarship, data and advice. This will only come to pass if the Academy's people and programs are of highest quality and free from political taint from without as well as within. If the Academy achieves this stature, then it would be natural and appropriate for the Congress and the Executive Branch to call on its specialists for advice during times of conflict and crisis. The Academy thus should strengthen our ability to successfully pursue peace with security in the situations we face by broadening and deepening the knowledge on which we draw during perilous times.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to these additional questions.

James H. Laue

James H. Laue
March 30, 1983

21-097 O—83——17

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 31 1983

Dear Senator Stafford:

I am writing in response to your letter of March 18 to Ambassador Low relating to testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Education, Arts, and Humanities on S. 564, the National Peace Academy bill. Your letter transmitted a number of questions from members of your committee to Ambassador Low arising out of his testimony and other issues of concern to the Subcommittee.

This letter encloses Ambassador Low's response to those questions. The Administration believes that Ambassador Low makes two particularly important points in his testimony:

(1) The Congress established the Foreign Service Institute in the Foreign Service Acts of 1946 and 1980 to provide training for government employees from all agencies in the field of foreign affairs. That field includes study in conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation. Other government training institutions, including the National Defense University, the Service colleges, and specialized training institutes also recognize such study as part of their appropriate curriculum. It seems to the Administration, therefore, that so far as training of government employees is concerned the Congress has already established appropriate facilities for the kind of study envisioned in this legislation. These institutions are in

Enclosure:

Ambassador Low's Letter.

The Honorable
Robert T. Stafford,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Education,
Arts, and Humanities,
Committee on Labor and
Human Resources,
United States Senate.

continuing contact with private academic centers doing research in these fields and adopt the results of that research in the curriculums. A new bricks-and-mortar institution in this field would not serve a major purpose with regard to training of government employees.

(2) So far as training and education involving the general public envisioned for the Peace Academy, the question arises as to whether this is an appropriate activity for the federal government--this being the first time it has entered into general education in liberal arts. There is equally a question as to whether there is an advantage to government direct sponsorship and control of research in this field. The Administration sees a number of disadvantages. As Ambassador Low's testimony notes, and the Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace confirms, there has been considerable recent development of studies in the field of conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation. This growth has been supported by programs in a number of different government agencies. But, it has occurred without any centralized U.S. Government coordination, control, or support of the kind envisioned for the Peace Academy. There is every reason to believe that development of the field will continue and that its benefits will be absorbed by government training institutions as in the past. The Administration, therefore, does not believe that the contemplated appropriation which carries with it a presumption for continued financial support involving many millions of dollars is needed. We believe the training and research will continue and that the field will benefit from maintaining separation of government and private academic activity.

I hope this will be helpful to you and the members of the Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

Alvin Paul Drischler
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

Senator Jeremiah Denton

Question 1: In your opinion, is interest in the field of peacemaking growing or declining in the United States?

Answer:

-- Yes, it is growing. In fact, we are witnessing a virtual explosion of interest in the field of conflict management, mediation and negotiation. As the commission report itself indicated, 80 colleges and universities provide courses in the field and there are some 79 other private institutions engaged in research and teaching related to it. The literature in the field is expanding rapidly and a number of prominent authorities like Professor Fisher of Harvard and Professor Zartman of the School of Advanced International Studies have emerged to encourage further study.

-- This growth in activity which is of a comparatively recent date has occurred without the kind of coordinated or funded support from the U.S. Government which a Peace Academy might give.

-- There is every reason to believe that as long as the field merits further expansion this will occur with or without a Peace Academy.

Question 2: Does the U.S. Government have any plans for the future to expand its current efforts to prepare its employees for negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution?

Answer:

-- As I indicated in my opening testimony, the Foreign Service Institute which is responsible for providing training to all government employees in foreign affairs has recently expanded considerably its attention to the field of conflict management, mediation, and negotiation. The Service academies, National Defense University, Service colleges and specialized schools such as the FBI Academy (which has a course on negotiating in a hostage situation) are giving increased attention to it. In general, current training institutions are aware of developments in academic study of conflict resolution, mediation, and negotiation. Government personnel are in communication with leaders in the field and authorities participating in the research, as am I myself. Thus, I am confident that as the field develops, government training will follow it closely and incorporate new thought which emerges.

Question 3: Ambassador Low, in your opinion, would the establishment of a United States Peace Academy, funded by the federal government, jeopardize the academic freedom normally associated with an institution of higher learning?

Answer:

-- Anyone operating a United States Government-supported academic instituition must accept certain limitations as I myself can testify. I frankly doubt whether these limitations are significantly lessened if the institution is independent but remains funded by the government. The limitations create an obligation on the institution at least to focus on teaching and research which is relevant to U.S. Government policy. They also create a responsibility to guard against a government-funded institution becoming a platform for attacks on United States policy. Particularly in the area of research, the question arises whether the activity of a government-funded institution in coordinating private research would be welcomed by the academic community.

Question 4: How do you believe nations around the world would perceive a "United States Academy of Peace" funded largely by the U.S. Government?

Answer:

-- In my view, any United States Academy of Peace funded largely by the U.S. Government, no matter how independently operated, would be considered to carry an official imprimatur in the minds of people and nations around the world. Participants would suffer the disadvantages of government association without the advantages either of full government participation, with the authority and resources this involves, or of complete independence, with the freedom and nonpartisanship this connotes.

Question 5: Do you believe an institution like the proposed "United States Academy of Peace" could assist the State Department specifically and the executive branch in general in its effort to mediate actual or potential conflict situations such as Rhodesia or the Falklands?

Answer:

-- It is my experience, borne out I believe by recent history, that nations involved in conflict appeal to the United States Government because of the authority and influence which they perceive the United States has with the nation's opponent and with other countries of the world. In such situations, the Secretary of State will in the first instance call upon the expertise of experienced diplomats and those who have personal knowledge and experience in the background of the dispute, its historical, economic, cultural, and political roots. Individuals who are trained in the art of mediation or who as private citizens involve themselves in a conflict can be helpful. The Department would be foolish or reckless not to accept the advice of anyone who has something to offer in a situation of this kind. Nevertheless, the counsel of private parties has not traditionally been central to conflict resolution efforts.

-- It has been suggested that a Peace Academy could support the Department by supplying information and background during the course of a negotiation. In my experience, the public sensitivity of the subjects under discussion is so great that preparations of materials must take place within the bounds of confidentiality. Thus, it would be difficult for the Department to consult with a public academy about draft agreements, as I have seen suggested, without attendant, counterproductive publicity.

Question 6: You mentioned that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has statutory responsibility for research and education in the problems of disarmament and related areas. Why are ACDA's efforts not larger and more obvious?

Answer:

-- As a matter of fact, ACDA has devoted a substantial amount of money to research over the years. Since 1962, more than $60 million has been expended in support of external research. As ACDA moved from primarily a research organization to active negotiations, the proportion of its budget devoted to research has decreased. However, as late as 1980, $3.8 million, which was 20% of its budget, went to external research. Even today, ACDA spends more than a million dollars a year in support of research. For the last five years, ACDA has supplemented its external research program by awarding some 40 Hubert H. Humphrey Research Fellowships in arms control to doctoral candidates. Four grants were made last year. In general, ACDA's efforts have been more extensive than has been recognized.

Question 7: Do you believe the Federal Government should do more to encourage education and research in negotiation, peace-making, peace-keeping, and resolution of disputes? What could it usefully do, and how?

Answer:

-- In the Foreign Service Acts of 1946 and 1980, the Congress established the Foreign Service Institute to provide training for all agencies of the Government in the field of foreign affairs. This should include all pertinent subjects. The search for peace is relevant to all we do.

-- Besides FSI, there are the National Defense University and the Service colleges and other specialized institutes. I believe that the Federal government can do more to encourage systematic thought and research in the field of conflict resolution, negotiation, and mediation, but I believe that it can best be carried on through institutions which the Congress has already established to train government employees in foreign affairs or through encouragement of efforts in existing private educational and research organizations.

-- The academic field is a new one. It is expanding rapidly without Federal Government direction or coordination. There is every reason to believe it will continue to do so. The Federal Government in my view should utilize this expansion. It should take the best ideas and apply them when they are well thought out and fully developed. It should encourage new directions and new thought, but it should do so selectively and without trying to take over the field.

-- The various Federal institutions like the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the National Defense University, and others should encourage and support research and teaching in the way each finds most appropriate. This is our American tradition, and it has worked very well. There are a no quick fixes in the field of conflict resolution. We should proceed deliberately and with care. I do not believe that either large amounts of money or new institutions are going to find new ways of breaking through old conflicts, but I do believe that we should continue to give this field our best efforts.

Question 8: Would the Department of State send students to a "United States Academy of Peace" constituted as the legislation provides?

Answer:

-- The Congress established the Foreign Service Institute to provide skills to United States Government employees in the field of foreign affairs. This means principally language, area, and professional training. State Department officers and those of other agencies who are trained at FSI need to learn about the countries with which they must deal professionally, about their language, history, economics, politics, and culture. Beyond that, these government personnel must understand their duties and know their jobs through professional training. Part of this training should include an understanding of the newly-developing techniques in conflict management. We teach this at the Foreign Service Institute. For instance, our new mid-career course which all Foreign Service Officers will be taking includes elements on negotiation and crisis management in a negotiating situation. When officers have a need to develop specialized skills beyond what we can give them at FSI, we look elsewhere for institutions where they can study. Some might attend a course or take a full year of study at a United States Academy of Peace. Others might choose to do so at academic institutions elsewhere in the United States. I do not believe there would be many who would attend a Peace Academy.

Senator Jennings Randolph

Question: Dr. Low, last year we had Dr. Moorhead Kennedy as a witness at our hearings on S. 1889, the Peace Academy Bill in the 97th Congress.

Dr. Kennedy, as you know, was one of the hostages held for 14 months by the Iranians. He was also a member of the State Department's Foreign Service.

Dr. Kennedy testified that he had concluded, as a result of his captivity, that the Foreign Service school had a tendency to lump foreign "happenings" into three traditional categories--political, economic, and military--when it trained its officers to serve in various countries abroad. And he noted that the Foreign Service training did not pay any attention to the influence or religion and related psychological factors in international affairs when briefing/training Foreign Service Officers to serve in assigned countries.

In light of what did happen in Iran, do you agree with Dr. Kennedy's assessment of the Training he received prior to going to Iran to serve?

If so, has the Foreign Service Institute made any changes in its training format for Foreign Service personnel to focus on religious and related psychological aspects that might confront them in a given country of assignment?

If not, why not?

Answer:

-- At the time Moorhead Kennedy took language courses at the Foreign Service Institute, we had not yet begun the integration of area studies and language. Therefore, he may not be familiar with our new policies. As it now stands, any officer who takes foreign language is at the same time exposed to advanced area training. This includes historical, political, economic, as well as cultural subjects. For the decreasing number of employees not required to learn the local language, our general area studies orientation program for the Middle East contains a substantial element on both Islam and Judaism. Other area programs contain similar elements. Our new mid-level program authorized by Congress which all officers will take contains a substantial element on cultural and psychological analysis.

Question: Amb. Low, are you familiar with the President's recently announced proposal to create an institute for democracy--or "Project Democracy?"

If so, will you explain the program to us for the record, and particularly how it would use our university-based international relations programs to further the goals of that institute or project?

Will the institute be a grant-making body so that universities can apply, on a competitive basis with one another, for such grants?

What will be the criteria for eligibility for such grants?

Can you be specific about how the $65 million dollars the President needs for Project Democracy will be spent (if the funds are appropriated)?

Answer:

-- "Project Democracy" is not designed to create a single institute, but rather to strengthen a number of current programs, both government and non-government, and to create new programs which would all contribute to the development of democracy abroad. The Project is to be a long-term, bipartisan effort which will rely heavily on the participation of non-governmental organizations. Since education and training in the theory and practice of democracy will be a primary objective of the Project, I would predict that Universities would be prime candiates for grants. Indeed, I believe the Project will offer a significant opportunity for internationally oriented university programs.

-- The Project is contained in the budget of USIA which will administer most of the programs and will allocate funds to AID and State which will administer the rest. The criteria for eligibility are being worked out in cooperation with Congress, but for programs which fall under traditional categories, such as exchanges, existing criteria will apply. USIA has submitted a list of proposed programs under Project Democracy to the Congress, a copy of which is enclosed herewith. These programs will be adjusted and refined as the Administration consults further with Congress and the private sector.

The Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Peace Academy Hearing Questions
March 16, 1983

John Funari, Dean, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh:

1. You seem to believe that the diversity among the existing "peace academies" is a strong point. Could you elaborate on your view that a national "Peace Academy" might weaken the intellectual diversity that now exists in this field?

2. In your opinion is there a shortage of conflict negotiators in the U.S.?

3. You say that S. 564 proposes "wholly inadequate funds to accomplish the purposes of the bill. What amount do you suggest? Why do you feel that there is a need for more money when many of the basic decisions about the structure of the Academy have not yet been made?

4. Dr. Funari, you suggest the possibility of a "Center" or "Institute" or "Endowment." In his testimony in the House last summer, Dean Theodore Eliot of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy also suggested an "endowment." We know from experience that such "endowments" have their own problems. Why would an "endowment" be more advantageous than, for example, the existing mechanism under Title VI of the Higher Education Act, particularly were it to be funded at authorized levels?

Panel II Questions:

1. In your opinion, would the establishment of a United States Peace Academy, funded by the federal government, jeopardize the academic freedom normally associated with an institution of higher learning?

2. How do you believe nations around the world would perceive a "United States Academy of Peace" funded largely by the U.S. government?

3. Some argue that a "United States Academy of Peace" would unfairly compete with current institutions without bringing any new capabilities to the field. In your experience, have you encountered other instances in which the federal government drained away talents and resources from existing institutions?

4. Can you elaborate on the financial problems that international affairs schools face today? For instance, how critical is the shortage of funds for research fellowships, student scholarships, and educational program support?

Answers to Senator Denton's Questions:

1. If there were a single institution, financed and supported by the U.S. Government, carrying with it the "imprimatur" of what is accepted and what is not accepted as official scholarly doctrine on peace and war, there would be a chilling effect on intellectual and academic analysis and research in international affairs and international disputes. It is precisely because there is a free market of ideas, as Justice Holmes described it, that scholars at different universities, protected by the doctrine of academic freedom that there is a steady flow of ideas, concepts, theories and proposals on issues of peace and war. American society is stronger for having such a diversity of views. Presidents, Secretaries of State, Senators and Representatives can listen to varying viewpoints, choose among them and synthesize the best in each for a more correct and realistic policy.

2. No there is no shortage of "conflict negotiators." There is a shortage of persons who have the broad and deep education in the complexities of the substance -- history, economics, political and cultural -- of specific issues of peace and war and matters of conflict in the international order.

3. My comment that there was "wholly inadequate funds" was based on what would be created by S. 564. What is envisaged here and spelled out in all the provisions of the bill is a full-fledged academic institution that cannot possibly be built, furnished, staffed and equipped for $15,000,000. My own experience tells me that it would take at least $25,000,000 to build the building, furnish it, buy the furniture, equipment, computers, office machinery, build a library and purchase the services necessary for such an undertaking. I assumed that passage of the bill in its present form would in effect be making "basic decisions about the structure of the Academy.

4. The "endowment" concept would be a much more flexible instrument for testing theories, disseminating information and results, stimulating research and varying the teaching programs than Title VI as presently administered by the Department of Education and funded at the levels as proposed by the current administration.

Panel Questions:

1. Yes, I believe that the Academy of Peace as envisaged in S. 564 would raise serious questions of jeopardy to academic freedom.

2. If nations around the world took it seriously at all, they would probably smear it with the label of a "front" for the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency. Publications and policy discussions or analyses coming from the Academy, if they agreed with official positions, would be viewed simply as propaganda or toadying. If the reports or research did not support the official position of the American government, it would be at best confusing that one agency of the government did not adhere to another agency's policy direction.

3. It is not so much a question of a government-funded academy of peace draining away talents and resources from existing institutions, as it is a matter of taking badly-needed funds and creating a new institution when there are already so many existing peace academies who cannot carry out research and teaching because they have insufficient funds. At my own University we started 7-8 years ago a Center for Arms Control and International Security, complete with a teaching and research program, as well as "outreach" functions for the informing of rational debate on this critical issue. Faced with the budget cutbacks brought on by inflation, cutback in both federal and state funds below the level that the university needed and by the non-renewal of the foundation grant that had made its original establishment possible, the Center was scaled down to a certificate teaching program and much valuable effort and energy was lost. Had there been funds available to continue that Center we could have made a valuable contribution to the national debate and understanding on arms control. We have managed to continue, by great dint of careful budgetting and trimming, the activities on international security and arms control. If there are to be funds made available for a Academy of Peace they could be much more wisely spent funding such activities as I describe above at my own University.

SENATOR STAFFORD

FOR MR. FUNARI:

I) COULD YOU EXPAND UPON YOUR IDEA TO CREATE A "NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR PEACE." SPECIFICALLY-

WHAT CRITERION WOULD BE USED FOR THE AWARDING OF GRANTS OF CONTRACTS?

HOW WOULD SUCH AN "ENDOWMENT" WORK TO COORDINATE THE EFFORTS OF EXISTING CONFLICT RESOLUTION WORK?

ARE THERE ANY PRESENT "ENDOWMENT" PROGRAMS WHICH A "PEACE ENDOWMENT" SHOULD CLOSELY RESEMBLE?

HOW WOULD YOUR PROPOSED "NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR PEACE" BE ANY MORE INSULATED FROM THE WHIMS OF CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS THAN THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PEACE ENVISIONED IN S. 564?

II) TO WHAT EXENT DO YOU FAVOR SOME OF THE SUGGESTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PROPOSED AS ALTERNATIVES TO A PEACE "ACADEMY," NAMELY,

A) A CONSORTIUM OF SCHOOLS AND INSTITUTIONS DURING WORK IN PEACE STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION?

B) A "NATIONAL ENDOWMENT" TO CHANNEL RESOURCES, IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR HUMANITIES DOES, TO EFFORTS BEING DONE IN PEACE RESEARCH AND CONLFICT RESOLUTION?

C) A "U. S. ACADEMY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION" WHICH WOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT, YET U. S. GOVERNMENT SANCTIONED, INSTITUTION FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS LIMITATION (AS OPPOSED TO PEACE E STUDIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION TRAINING)?

D) INCREASED FUNDING AND A "CONFLICT RESOLUTION SETASIDE" UNDER TITLE VI OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT?

III) YOU MENTION THAT THERE ARE NINE "PEACE ACADEMIES" ALREADY IN EXISTENCE. COULD YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH A LIST OF THOSE NINE?

Answers to Senator Stafford's Questions:

I) As I indicated in my written testimony, there are a number of models that could be used for a "National Endowment for Peace." The National Endowment for the Humanities, the National Science Foundation and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars are precedents and models for a "National Endowment for Peace." I would envisage a board of directors or advisory board composed, perhaps, of several members from each House of the Congress and a larger number from universities, business community, unions or other organizations with interests or experience in international affairs. This group would then review grant and contract proposals for research and studies in specific international security problems, issues or areas. The "Endowment" would have a small staff, not more than ten persons, who would set up meetings, seminars and discussion groups in Washington and other major centers of interest in international affairs in the United States to disseminate the work done by individual and groups of analysts and scholars. The program of the Woodrow Wilson Center (based in the Smithsonian Institution) is an ideal model of the concept I am suggesting; the work of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York is another such model, albeit a non-governmental one.

It could serve as a focus for peace studies, both as to the substance of disputes and the techniques of settling disputes. It would not be, and could not be, completely insulated from the whims of the annual appropriations and budgetary process, but one device that might be used is to convert the present capitalization fund in S. 564 into a permanent endowment managed by the Treasury. The income from that could then be based for a period of five years, perhaps on which could be built some further annual appropriations for administrative expenses, and a base for fund-raising from private sources.

II) I think the idea of a consortium of schools and institutions is an idea worth exploring, but it does raise some questions in my mind about exclusivity. I would not want the proposed consortium to exclude the work of individual scholars and analysts at institutions that do not have a program in peace studies or international security studies. The "Endowment" or "Foundation" concept does not have that problem since individuals would be eligible regardless of their institutional affiliation for support for their work. The concept of a U.S. Academy for International Security and Arms Limitation suffers from the same crippling disadvantages that a U.S. Academy for Peace does and I would not favor it.

I would also be opposed to a "set aside" from Title VI funds of the Higher Education Act. Additional funds are needed for peace studies, international security programs, international affairs schools; setting aside funds simply re-divides the available funds without increasing them.

III) The nine schools or institutions that are already operating as "peace academies" are members of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs. They are:

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs
University of Pittsburgh

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Princeton University

School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

School of International Service
American University

Faculty of International and Public Affairs
Columbia University

School of International Affairs
University of Southern California

Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver

In addition to these nine autonomous professional schools there are many smaller programs in other universities, functioning within larger departments or schools, that focus their research and teaching on specific geographical areas or policy issues in international affairs and studies, e.g., Department of Political Science and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia or the Latin American Center at the University of Texas.

The Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Peace Academy Hearing Questions
March 16, 1983

The Honorable John R. Dellenback, Commissioner, "United States Academy of Peace" Commission and President, Christian College Coalition

Panel II Questions:

1. In your opinion, would the establishment of a United States Peace Academy, funded by the federal government, jeopardize the academic freedom normally associated with an institution of higher learning?

2. How do you believe nations around the world would perceive a "United States Academy of Peace" funded largely by the U.S. government?

3. Some argue that a "United States Academy of Peace" would unfairly compete with current institutions without bringing any new capabilities to the field. In your experience, have you encountered other instances in which the federal government drained away talents and resources from existing institutions?

4. Can you elaborate on the financial problems that international affairs schools face today? For instance, how critical is the shortage of funds for research fellowships, student scholarships, and educational program support?

Answers of the Honorable John R. Dellenback, Commissioner, "United States Academy of Peace" Commission, and President, Christian College Coalition, to Questions Posed by the Honorable Jeremiah Denton, United States Senator from Alabama

Panel II Questions:

1. In your opinion, would the establishment of a United States Peace Academy, funded by the federal government, jeopardize the academic freedom normally associated with an institution of higher learning?

   Absolutely not, so long as the persons appointed to serve as members of the Board of Trustees and chief administrative and academic officers of the Academy of Peace are of the high caliber called for by such an Academy.

2. How do you believe nations around the world would perceive a "United States Academy of Peace" funded largely by the U.S. government?

   I earnestly believe that such an Academy would be perceived, particularly by our allies and friends, as a very welcome and to be applauded symbol of the sincerity of the United States' expressed strong desire to walk every reasonable road to achieve peace in the world.

3. Some argue that a "United States Academy of Peace" would unfairly compete with current institutions without bringing any new capabilities to the field. In your experience, have you encountered other instances in which the federal government drained away talents and resources from existing institutions?

   There certainly are instances in which the federal government, by entering a field, has put pressure on the talents and resources available to existing institutions. But the National Institutes of Health stand as an excellent example of how the federal government, by demonstrating its deep concern in a given field, has increased the talents and resources available in that field in the same way, that, in my opinion, the United States Academy of Peace will do.

4. Can you elaborate on the financial problems that international affairs schools face today? For instance, how critical is the shortage of funds for research fellowships, student scholarships, and educational program support?

   I am certain that those of us deeply concerned about international affairs would applaud additional funds being available to schools specializing in this area for use for the named purposes as well as for other purposes. The impact of the creation of the United States Academy of Peace, however, by focusing attention and interest on this area would be likely to result in a justifiable increase in total funding made available to effective and efficient international affairs schools.

SENATOR STAFFORD

QUESTIONS FOR PANEL I:

FOR MR. LINCOLN-

SECTION 5(N) OF THE PEACE ACADEMY BILL SPECIFICALLY PROHIBITS THE ACADEMY FROM UNDERTAKING TO INFLUENCE LEGISLATIVE POLICY UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED TO DO SO. WHAT ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS WOULD YOU SUGGEST WHICH PERMIT THE ACADEMY TO BE A PRACTICAL TOOL IN ENHANCING OUR CONFLICT RESOLUTION CAPABILITIES YET WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE ITS INDEPENDENCE?

The Honorable Jeremiah Denton
Peace Academy Hearing Questions
March 16, 1983

William F. Lincoln, Commissioner, National Academy of Peace Commission and President, National Center Associate:

1. Can you estimate for me the number of international crisis that have developed in the last year which might have been resolvable by someone trained in conflict resolution at the U.S. Peace Academy? What are they?

2. In your testimony, you argue that an explicit restriction should be placed on the Academy to state that the Academy will neither be an intervention agency nor a policymaking body. Some of your colleagues on the Commission, and many supporters of the Academy take the opposite view. Why is there that disagreement?

3. You recommend that the Academy be neither an intervention agency nor a policymaking body. What do you see as the ultimate goal and purpose of the Academy? Did the Commission agree with your views? How does that conception differ from already existing institutions?

4. I note in your recommendation that the authorizations for the "Peace Academy" be phased in a more reasonable fashion. No decisions have yet been made about the size of the student body, the selection of staff, the development of student criteria, and many other fundamental prerequisites to the establishment of an educational institution. How would your amendment to limit funds provide more direction? Do you recommend the creation of yet another panel to solve administrative and programatic problems that were left unresolved by the Commission?

5. You believe that the Academy should have a balance of both intra- and inter- national concerns. Do you forsee a role in which the Academy would serve as a mediator of disputes within the U.S.? If so, can you explain why the Commission rejected this proposed role?

Question #5. I address this question first because I believe the issue of an intra vs. international focus by the Academy is at best bogus. The issue is not either "intra or an international." There is no "either/or" alternative. There is no alternative. The Academy must address both sectors, the international as well as the intranational. Even if the Academy's primary focus is to be upon the international arenas of conflict it cannot exclude the intranational causes of conflict and the processes for prevention, management, and equitable resolution.

There should be no resistance to such a minor adjustment of language in enabling legislation which would include the words "intranationally" and/or "in this Nation." Such is exactly how the Commission's final report and recommendations read, "...and in this Nation."

I implore you, Senator, to exercise your leadership, wisdom and privilege to persuade Senators Hatfield, Randolph, and Matsunaga--the primary sponsors

of bill S.564--as well as Senator Jepsen who is a strong advocate for the Academy, and certainly Senator Hatch, Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, to support a recommendation to the full Senate for the explicit inclusion of intranational provisions in S.564. Such a provision will add nothing to the budget.

Such an inclusion will...

- o help make the bill compatible with the Commission's report and recommendations.
- o reduce much of the opposition to the Academy as currently voiced by schools of diplomacy and international study.
- o improve the integration of theorists, researchers, and practioners of both sectors, and thus advance the field of dispute resolution expeditiously and cost effectively.
- o increase public support for the bill and for the Academy.
- o increase political support for the bill and the Academy.
- o greatly increase the Academy's credibility at home and with all nations.

In a press conference of September 28, 1982, President Reagan quite clearly stated how he is applying principles which he learned at the domestic level to the international scene:

> Q. Mr. President, it has been reported that you believe that Israel is sabotaging your peace initiative, and also that you now believe that Israel has become the Goliath in the Middle East, and that the other countries, the Arab countries, are the David. Did you say that? Do you believe that?
>
> A. I didn't say it exactly that way. In fact, I didn't say that I thought they were the Goliath.
>
> I said that one of the things, as the negotiations approach and we proceed with this peace-making business, that Israel should understand, as we have come to understand from talking to other Arab states, that where from the very beginning all of us including Israel, have thought of it as a tiny country fighting for its life surrounded by larger states and hostile states that want to see it destroyed, that their military power has become such that there are Arab states that now voice a fear that they are expansionist, that they may be expansionist, and they have the military power. So all I was referring to was that.
>
> The first part of your statement there, though, about Israel and trying to undermine--no, I don't believe that. I think both sides have voiced things that they

feel very strongly about, and contrary to what I have suggested in my proposal, and having been a long-time union negotiator, I happen to think that some of that might be each side staking out its position so as to be in a better position when it comes time to negotiate.

Presidential Press Conference
September 28, 1982

Without doubt the support for the Academy by the American Arbitration Association, the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution, and countless other endorsing agencies specifically advocate a balanced focus, internationally and intranationally. The opportunity to rectify S.564 is clearly before you.

May I suggest my written testimony on this matter be carefully considered. May I suggest that Skip Vallee discuss this matter with Rip Sullivan of the National Peace Academy Campaign. He, too, sees the appropriateness of the explicit inclusion of intranational concerns in the bill. He does have a concern as to whether or not a specific reference would unravel Senate support for bill S.564. On the contrary, such a recommended change will increase the political support for the Academy. Not to include intranational concerns is a denial of the Commission's own findings and a betrayal of peoples everywhere.

Now I will address your question quite specifically. No, I do not see the Academy--neither staff, faculty, nor students--performing any mediation role in the United States, nor any intervention role anywhere at any time for any reason.

I worked exceedingly hard for the Commission to support my recommendations--which it accepted--that the Academy would be neither an intervention or policy setting agency. See: Commission's Final Report, pp. 170-171: "To ensure the attainment of these goals, the Commission has placed important limitations upon its proposed Academy." These restrictions are then listed and elaborated.

The Commission members accepted my reasoning as to what the Academy must not be due to their concents (a) for the Academy's credibility as an academic insitution, (b) non-duplication and/or turf infringement on other governmental agencies which already have such functions, and (c) to safeguard the Academy's academic freedom from governmental intervention into the Academy's purposes.

PLEASE NOTE: The Commission did not reject the Academy's ability to include intranational concerns.

See: Commission's Final Report, pp. 2-4.

"...the Commission drew upon the following findings:

- National and international peace and security face grave danger from violent escalation of political, economic, and cultural conflicts.

- o International peace and national security require use of a range of effective options....
- o Americans have extensive national experience in resolving conflicts without violence....
- o ...Americans can expend their own and others' cross-cultural insights and abilities necessary to promote peace at all levels of society.
- o Achieving community and national peace as well as international peace requires an understanding of the relationships among conflict at these three levels of society, especially conflicts over ethnic, religious, and justice issues.
- o etc.

The Commission's Report, as documented, clearly includes intranational. I do hope, Senator, that you, with the able assistance of Skip Vallee, will take the initiative to argue for the explicit inclusion of intranational concerns into S.564, and will use the Commission's own findings to document justification.

Then what went wrong between the time of the Commission's approved report and the writing of proposed legislation?

Several members of the Commission wrongly feared the Reagan Administration was unequivocally "antidomestic anything," and, therefore, chose to down play intranational concerns by the Academy as a hopeful means to improve passage of enabling legislation. But even S.564 does not exclude intranational concerns. The bill simply does not explicitly include the intranational sector even though the Commission's final report does. It is now time to rectify this situation if only because intranational inclusion would help the Academy better meet one of its stated purposes, namely, to address cross-cultural factors of dispute resolution. Indeed, this nation with its diverse populations provides a credible opportunity for us to learn, to serve, and to benefit by such an inclusion, and to better serve the world as well. Obviously a Republican initiative is very much needed in this matter. I hope you will lead that initiative.

Questions #2 & #3. I refer you to pages 9-11 of my written testimony.

Much of my answer to these questions can be found in my last paragraphs regarding question #5. The Commission, as reported on pages 170 and 171 in its final report and recommendations, agreed with my views, and thus included them as its own. The Academy is to be solely an academic institution committed to research, education, and training. Surely the Academy will develop cooperative networks with intervention agencies as a means to provide clinical field training, but the Academy itself must not be an intervening agency in either the intra or international arenas for reasons already stated.

Explicit restrictions on the Academy--neither an intervention agency nor a policy setting body--will not only protect the credibility of the Academy, but such limitations will also lower resistance--indeed create cooperative support--by the State Department as well as by the schools of

diplomacy and international studies. As stated in my written testimony, we already have a Foreign Service Institute of the State Department, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the Community Relations Service of the U. S. Justice Department, as well as intervention divisions in other federal agencies. What we don't have and are in need of is a functional and symbolic Academy which will serve this nation and the world.

Yes, there are a few--very few--supporters of the Academy who want it to be both a policy setting agency and an intervention agency. Two of the Commissioners have gone against the report. They now do not wish to restrict the Academy due to their hopes that the Academy might emerge or at least enjoy the option to emerge as an institution which could "do almost anything in the name of peace." Such unilateral activity or assumed domination of the field, or vocational elitism would invite governmental interference in the Academy's operations as an educational institution. Furthermore, such activity would create conflict. It would disrupt governmental policy as well as dispute resolution activity by those bodies already charged with such functions. Well trained graduates will certainly become positioned in agencies to make policy and/or to provide intervention services. This "trickle up theory" must occur naturally and within established structures. I urge you to recommend explicit restrictions as recommended by the Commission, pp. 170-171.

Question #4. The Commission did not leave in its report any unresolved matters of the Academy, but it rightfully presented several matters to be addressed by the Academy's Board of Directors and administrative staff. You will note that my written testimony (pages 14-16) mentions a few of the many initial tasks (page 15) to be performed if the Academy is to be developed orderly, thoroughly, correctly, and cost effectively. Neither another Commission nor panel is needed to perform these tasks. The Academy's Board of Directors--and staff--have the responsibility to develop the Academy.

This subject naturally pertains to an initial developmental operations budget beyond a $15,000,000 capital fund. Again, I urge you to recommend that year one budget be reduced to $1,000,000 and year two be reduced to $1,500,000. How could the currently proposed $6,000,000 and $10,000,000 for years one and two respectively possibly be used without faculty or students? Such a proposal is needless, wasteful, and almost fraudulent.

Ah, but how do the proponents of such inflated budgets justify their proposals? They don't. They can't. Instead they talk loosely about a lengthy and expensive public participation process for choosing a site and having additional public input into "What should the Academy be and do?" All that has been accomplished--and for far less than $16,000,000 since the Commission and staff operated for more than a year for less than $500,000. I, as one of the most active, ardent supporters of the Academy cannot justify any preposterous developmental costs. I do believe that actual operation costs for the Academy, once established, will probably be closer to $25,000,000 per year than anything thus far proposed. But that is a

different question to be addressed by the Academy's Board of Directors and to be answered in the future by Congress.

Question #1. There is no way that I or anybody else can estimate the number of international crises which may have been resolved by a graduate of the Academy. If just one war could have been avoided the Academy would have served its purpose.

My answer is unsatisfactory. That is precisely why I believe Congress needs to include a thirty-year quasi sunset clause in the enabling legislation. If we are unable to document the effectivenpss of the Academy then the Academy must cease to operate. I refer you to pages 19 and 20 of my written testimony.

Senator Stafford's Question to Panel I for Mr. Lincoln. Much of my response to this question is based in the last paragraphs of my answer to question #5 and in my answers to questions #2 and #3. And those answers are based on the Commission's own report.

I do not advocate additional restrictions except regarding the issue of degree granting. Two alternatives seem to exist:

A. Recommend specifically that S.564 restrict the Academy to provide degrees and/or certificates in dispute resolution, but not diplomacy or international studies.

B. Recommend removal of any reference to degree granting in S.564 so that the oversight process can deal with this issue at a more appropriate time.

Either alternative will do much to reduce the resistance by schools of diplomacy and international studies.

- o I do advocate a significant change in the size and structure of the Board of Directors. See pages 11-14 of my written testimony.
- o I do advocate changing the name of the Academy to the U.S. Academy of Peace and Justice. This is no small concern. See pages 4-6 of my written testimony.
- o I do advocate, as recommended by the Commission, the creation of inexpensive regional site centers to be affiliated with existing institutions of higher education. See pages 17 and 18 of my written testimony.

In closing I can only state my concern that you, staff, the Subcommittee, and the full Committee see the practicality and rightness of all the proposed recommendations for amendments. This nation and the world, Senator, are relying on your leadership to persuade all other members of the Subcommittee and the full Committee to put forth a report to the full

Senate which will create broad interest in having the Academy considered and established. We need a Republican initiative, and, quite frankly, if it does not begin with you then it just is not going to happen. I do hope Senator Denton and Senator Hatch each will recognize and support the need for all these recommendations for amendments to S.564 even if in the end they are unable to support fully the final bill.

Sincerely,

William F. Lincoln
Former Federal Commissioner
U. S. Peace Academy Commission

President
National Center Associates

WFL/dgp

Senator STAFFORD. We appreciate you being here. The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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